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That British influence on the Continent suffered a
sharp decline in Lord Palmerston's last administration has
become a commonplace of 19th century diplomatic history.
Many factors contributed to discredit Britain's reputation:
the new drive behind Prussian diplomacy; the increase in
military and naval power on the Continent; the irresponsible,
interfering policy of the British Government itself. But
even-more important was Britain's inability to act cordially
with Prance: and it is the aim of the present thesis to
offer some explanation of why this should have been so.
The period between 1869 and 186 5 has a unity of its own
in the history of Anglo-French relations. It derives this
unity from the personality of Palmerston. His was the
dominating influence on British foreign policy in this period,
and he was specially interested in the question of British
relations with France. His advent to power in June 1859
marked the opening of a new phase in Anglo-French relations.
He ousted Lord Derby on a charge of unduly favouring Austria
in her war with France and Sardinia. Yet he succeeded in
accommodating a pledge of strict neutrality in that war with
1
one of "strict alliance" with France. And it is significant
1. Palmerston in reply to John Bright at the meeting of all 
sections of the Liberal party at Willis' Rooms on the 
eve of the reassembly of Parliament. The Times. 7th 
June 1859.
11
that the Emperor of the French did all in his power to
secure the return of the Liberals. He was reported to have
furnished Persigny with the means of influencing the 
1
elections: and Kossuth has recorded how the Snperor
encouraged him to exploit his connection with the Radicals
to persuade them to offer their political allegiance to the 
2
Liberals. At the time of his death, however, Palmerston
was no longer the embodiment of cordiality towards France -
3
the "pet of the Emperor of the French." By 1865, he was 
disillusioned in Napoleon III. He had become a symbol of 
bull-dog resistance to France and ah obstacle to the main­
tenance of cordial relations between the two powers. His 
departure from the political scene, like his re-entry six 
years before, paved the way for another phase in Anglo- 
French relations.
A study of British relations with France in this period 
has not formed the chosen topic of any single piece of 
historical writing before. But much has been written with a
1. The Earl of Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister. an
Autobiography, [1884], p.138.
2. Louis Kossuth, Memories of my Exile. [1880], cf. Emile
Ollivier, L'Empire Liberal, [1899], IV, 106.
3. The taunt with which he was met at Tiverton during the
election campaign in April 1859. E. Ashley, The Life 
of Henry John Temple. Viscount Palmerston 1846-1865,
11876 J, II, 152.
Ill
direct bearing on it. Almost all the more important issues 
in which the two powers were concerned have been treated in 
detail. Various aspects of Anglo-French relations have been 
dealt with in monographs. Public figures of the period on 
either side of the Channel have been the subject of much 
biographical study. All the relevant unpublished sources 
available in England - official and private - have been 
used before.
The present thesis attempts to make a fresh contribution 
to the study of Anglo-French relations by using this material 
to indicate the diplomatic character of the relationship 
between the two powers. This has been judged by applying 
four main criteria. The first relates to terminology: the
contemporary description that was given to the connection 
between the two powers. The second concerns the practical 
working of the association: the extent to which the two
powers acted together or apart in the international issues of 
the period. Both these criteria provide useful pointers to 
the character of British relations with France although 
neither, it will be found, is an entirely reliable guide.
The third criterion deals with the principles behind British 
and French policy: the extent to which they were similar or
conflicting. The fourth is a test of confidence; the degree 
to which each power was kept informed of the policy and 
intentions of the other. All but the second of these criteria
Iv
Involve aspects of the general question of Anglo-French 
relations which have received little attention up to the 
present: whilst the second reveals a regional trend in
the relationship of the two powers on the basis of which 
it is possible to reassess the influence of well known 
political events.
As the title of this thesis suggests, the emphasis 
throughout will be on British policy rather than French.
But the character of the relations of one power with another 
is necessarily affected by the policy of that other power. 
The general lines of French policy will emerge, therefore, 
in so far as they can be determined from the material 
available in England.
CHAPTER I.
"THE ANGLO-FRENCH 'ALLIANCE»! THE USE AND MEANING OF THE TERM."
.. . .. %hy, what la an ally? An ally is a Power allied
by treaty engagements in carrying on some active operations,
political or otherwise* But to call a country an ally merely
because it is in a state of friendship with you, is to use an
expression that has no meaning whatever because it is applicable
to every other Power in the world with whom you may happen
1
not to be in a state of war ....."
'Alliance' was the term most commonly applied to the
2
relationship between Britain and France in this period.
Friendly alliance, cordial alliance, intimate alliance, holy 
alliance, quasi alliance, bona fide alliance, special alliance, 
exclusive alliance, political alliance, commercial alliance - 
these were a few of the many contemporary descriptions that
1. lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, 21st July 1849.
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CVII, 808. 
Printed in E. Ashley, The Life of H.J. Temple. Viscount 
Palmerston 1346-1865. [1876], ii. 48^
2, W.P. Reddaway has given the title of 'entente' to the
association of the two powers in this period. But there 
seems to be little Justification for this in contemporary 
usage. The terra was very rarely applied to Anglo-French 
relations in England; and in France, where it was used 
more frequently, but still less than 'alliance', it carried 
no special meaning. The Cambridge History of the British 
Empire* [1940] ii. 547 ff.
were given to Anglo-French relations between 1859 and 1865.
With a galaxy of prefixes, bewildering in their variety, the
term 'alliance* figured constantly in written and spoken
statements on either side of the Channel. It was used
publicly and privately; officially and informally; by
responsible persons and private individuals.
The existence of an 'alliance' was acknowledged in
speeches from the throne in both countries. In 1859, the
Emperor of the French declared that his constant object had
been "cimenter étroitement notre alliance avec l'Angleterre,
et régler avec les puissances continentales de l'Europe le
degré de mon intimité d'après la conformité de nos vues et la
1
nature de leurs procédés vis-à-vis de la France..." A year
later, the Queen proclaimed the British Government's intention
"to draw still closer the Bonds of friendly Alliance" between
2
Britain and France. These references to the 'alliance' 
were particularly authoritative for although the British and 
French speeches from the throne differed in character - the 
former more like an agenda for the session, the latter an 
extended apologia with its stress on past achievement,-both 
contained a well weighed statement of foreign policy.
1. Procès-Verbaux du Corps Législatif. 1859, I, 4. Le 7
février 1859,
2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVI, 3.
24th January 1860.
The term 'alliance* was also applied to the relationship
which existed between Britain and France by responsible
Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition in both Houses of the
British Parliament. In 1859, Palmerston declared his belief
that no one could fairly refuse to acknowledge "that the
Emperor of the French has been the faithful and true ally of
England both in times of peace and war; and that we have every
reason to regard him as a monarch who feels personally and
upon system desirous to cement and perpetuate the alliance
1
which subsists between his country and our own. " In the
following year, Russell appealed to members to refrain from
hasty judgments on the question of Nice and Savoy lest they
should be unfair towards the ruler of "a country like France
with whom it is our interest to keep on terms of friendship 
2
and alliance." The Conservative leaders were equally lavish
in their use of the term. Derby declared it would be a
calamity for Britain and Europe if there were "rupture or
dissolution of the friendly alliance between this country and 
3
Prance." Disraeli deprecated the tone of the British reply 
to the French Congress proposal of 1863 on the grounds that it
1. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLV, 211.
21st July 1859.
2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVI, 2177.
2nd March 1860.
3. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLXI, 30.
5th February 1861,
was unnecessarily harsh towards a Sovereign "who was, I believe,
1
at the time Parliament was prorogued still our cordial ally."
French officials in the Sénat and Corps Législatif
added their testimony to the existence of an 'alliance*. Their
references were less frequent and less authoritative than those
made in similar circumstances in England. The occasions on
which foreign policy could be debated in France were strictly
limited; and even with the reforms of 1860, imperial policy
was defended by ministers not always fully acquainted with
information in the Foreign Office. Speeches made on the
resumption of debates on the Address, however, were received
with special deference. Speaking of French relations with
Britain, Billault proclaimed the official view that "ll y a
dans cette alliance avec, dans cette entente de deux grands
peuples une précieuse garantie pour la paix du monde, et pour
2
ses libertés ...." Baroche was even more explicit in his
reference to the connection with England. "Nous sommes à l'état
de grande, de large, de noble alliance avec l'Angleterre," he 
declared, "Nous marchons avec elle quand sa voie est la notre;
3
noua marchons seuls quand notre voie se sépare de la sienne..."
1* Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLXXIII, 89.
4th February 1864.
2. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif. [1862], I, 109.
Sénat, le 2 mars 1861.
3. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif. [1862], I, 278.
Coins' Législatif, 1© 12 mars 1861.
Senators and deputies showed less appreciation of the
'alliance*: but they did not doubt its existence. "On invoque
les grands avantages de l'alliance anglaise" was a typical
comment "on nous dit qu'ils doivent nous faire accepter quelques
dissidences de vues... Ce sont là sans doute de louables
sentiments de conciliation. Mais doivent-ils aller jusqu'à
nous faire accepter le sacrifice de nos intérêts propres? ...
la France se demande si cette alliance, qui, après tout, reste
1
si précaire, vaut le prix qu'on y met ..." A more extreme
opinion was expressed by le marquis de Boissy. ..."L'Angleterre
est notre alliée nominale, mais notre ennemie implacable au
fond;" he said, "dans toute circonstance nous la trouvons
2
contre nous ..."
During the prorogation of the French Chambers, public 
references to the 'alliance' in France were exceptional. But 
in England there was still an opportunity for official 
reference to it when Parliament was not sitting. Each year 
an authoritative statement of foreign policy was made on the 
occasion of the lord Mayor's inaugural banquet at the Guildhall. 
Speaking at the ceremony in 1860, Lord Palmerston expressed 
the hope that the changes introduced by the recently concluded 
Commercial Treaty would "tend to cement more closely the ties
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif. [1862], I, 251,
254. Speech by Kolb Bernard in the ôorps Législatif, 
le 11 mars 1861.
2. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif. [1864], I, 33.
Sénat, le 14 décembre 1863.
6of friendship and alliance between England and Prance,..»"^ 
Another example of the public use of the term is the 
reference to it in despatches that were deliberately written 
to meet the possible need for publication. Such despatches were 
practically unknown in France where the constitution enabled 
the government to withhold Information on its foreign policy. 
Pressure for the publication of official documents in England, 
however, could not be safely resisted for long: and some
despatches were actually drafted in anticipation of parlia­
mentary interpellation. Thus when Russell wrote to acknowledge 
Cowley's vindication of his conduct against the attacks made 
on him in the press, the Foreign Secretary replied in terms 
designed for a wide audience. Recalling the duties of a British 
Ambassador in Paris, he emphasised the obligation of "making
the alliance of the two Countries cordial by the frankness and
2
sincerity of your language...."
Nor was the term preserved only for public consumption. 
There were allusions to it in official communications between 
the British and French Governments, and in private and informal 
correspondence between the Sovereigns and officials of the two 
countries. It was used, for instance, in official despatches 
of which copies were left by the Ambassador of one country with 
the Foreign Minister of the other. Thus in a despatch
1. The Times. November 10th 1860,
2. Russell to Cowley, No.144, 8th February 1860, FO 27/1420.
communicated to lord John Russell, Walewski spoke of his
government's object to maintain "aux yeux du Gouvernement
Chinois et je pourrais dire aux yeux du monde entier, cette
conformité de vues et de sentiments et cette union des deux
pavillons qui constatent l'intime et durable alliance des
deux pays." The term figured prominently, too, in reported
conversations between Ambassadors and the Foreign Ministers
or Sovereigns of the Courts to which they were accredited.
lord Cowley, for instance, frequently recorded the use of the
word by Napoleon III and his Ministers. "I defy anyone to
listen to the Emperor when he is speaking of the English
Alliance without attaining the conviction that the preservation
2
of it is that which he has most at heart" he wrote in 1859.
In 1363 he reported Drouyn de Lhuy's assertion that "It had
been his object again to establish a community of action
between Great Britain and France in the defence of right - to
have cemented the alliance begun in the great Eastern Question
in that which perhaps was of the next greatest importance, the
3
question of Poland." The formal but unofficial correspondence 
between the .Sovereigns of the two countries provides further 
examples of the use of the word. Queen Victoria regarded it
1# Walewski to Persigny (copie), le 21 octobre 1859, communica­
ted 28th October 1859, FO 27/1315.
2. P.A.. Wellesley (ed.). The Paris Enbassy during the Second
Empire. [1928], 189.
3. Cowley to Russell, No.260, 1st March 1863, FO 27/1487.
8as something of an imposition that she should he obliged to
1
write at all to the Emperor of the French* It is not 
surprising, therefore, that her New Year's Greetings to him 
should have ignored the existence of an 'alliance' between the 
two Pinpires. But the Emperor gallantly persisted in his 
reference to it. Replying to the British Sovereign's con­
gratulations on the opening of 1860, he professed to desire 
"above all" that the coming year might "draw closer our
2
alliance which has always been fertile in happy results." 
References to the 'alliance' occur also in the correspondence 
between Palmerston and Persigny, and between the Emperor and 
lord Cowley.
The pervasive character of the assumption that an 
'alliance' existed between Britain and France in this period is 
most strikingly illustrated, perhaps, in the private and 
confidential communications between Ministers, and in those 
between Ministers and diplomatic : representatives abroad. 
Without reading in the French archives, it is not possible to 
form a reliable impression of the extent to which an alliance 
was recognised in the confidential communications of the 
Imperial Government. In the British archives, however, there 
is much interesting evidence of the use of the term in Cabinet 
Memoranda, Ministerial correspondence, and confidential
1. G.P. Gooch (ed.) The later Correspondence of Lord John
Russell 1840-1878" (1925), II, 270. The Queen to Lord 
John Russell.
2. T. Martin, Life of H.R.H. The Prince Consort. [1880], V, 3.
communications between the Foreign Office and the British
Embassy in Paris. Apprehensive about French designs in the
Mediterranean at the end of 1859, Palmerston wrote to Russell
in the following terms: "It certainly looks as if our good
Ally was meditating something that would not be agreeable to
us ..." Gladstone, in a long and closely reasoned letter to
the Foreign Secretary on the 3rd January 1860, expressed his
considered opinion that "the alliance with France is the true
2
basis of peace in Europe." And on 6th May 1863, Russell
wrote privately to Cowley: ., "I am very much satisfied with
3
our present alliance, England, France and Austria ..."
Alliance, therefore, was a term that was instinctively 
applied to the relationship which existed between Britain and 
France in this period. Yet there was no apparent justification 
for the description. There was no treaty engagement between 
the two powers in 1859 or at any time between 1859 and 1865 
which could be considered to constitute an active political 
alliance. Guch an alliance had been contracted in 1854; and 
its object had been defined in a Military Convention signed 
by lord Clarendon and Count Walewski on the 10th April of
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 28th November 1859,
G. & D. 22/20.
2. Gladstone to Russell, private, 3rd January 1860, G. & D.
22/29. Printed in J. Mbrley, The Life of William Ewart 
Gladstone. [1905], I, 648.
3. Russell to Cowley, private, 6th May 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
10
1
that year. But although no term had been put to its 
duration, and Article I had enjoined the High Contracting 
Parties "to do all that shall depend upon them for the purpose 
of preserving Europe from the recurrence of the lamentable 
complications which have now so unhappily disturbed the general 
peace,” their joint responsibility had been practically
2
dissolved by Article VII of the General Treaty of Peace. It
is significant, too, that Martens and Cussy should have
excluded the Anglo French Convention from a collection of
documents, published in Leipzig, in 1857, which purported to
give the text of all treaties, conventions, and diplomatic
3
acts then in force.
The absence of any formal ties between the two countries 
would seem to suggest that the frequent allusions to the 
alliance were little more than common form: gestures merely,
designed to revive something of the intimacy of the Crimean 
Alliance. It is undoubtedly true that the persistent use of 
the word was a legacy from the alliance of 1854: and it is
equally true that reference to it in public statements and in 
communications between Britain and France was often little
1. E. Eertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty. [1875], II, 1193.
2. E. Eertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty. [1875], II, 1250.
Treaty of Paris, 30th March 1856.
3. Le Baron C. de Martens et le Baron F. de Cussy, Recueil
Manuel et Pratique. [Leipzig, 1857] VII.
11
more than a meaningless courtesy. Indeed, there were a
number of occasions on which the term was deliberately exploited
for political purposes. Opportunities, not without a comedy
of calculation, were specially created for introducing a
reference to it. Persigny called upon Palmerston the day
before the Lord Mayor's banquet of 1860 to say that he was
"ready to go to the lord Mayor's Dinner To-morrow and to say
something about good understanding and alliance between the two
Countries provided that he knew beforehand what the Lord Mayor
was going to say in proposing the Foreign Ministers and
provided that .. [this] ... would be an invitation for Persigny
1
to say what he would wish and would be useful." The "Little 
2
Drama" went off well: Persigny referring to Britain with
3
marked cordiality and Palmerston naming the 'alliance'.
But although the term 'alliance' was essentially a mere 
catchword, and duly turned to account as such for purposes of 
propaganda, there were also a number of special senses in 
which it was employed. Most frequently it was used synonymously 
with 'cordial understanding'. Within this general definition, 
however, the term assumed many different shades of meaning.
It meant one thing to Britain; another to France. And the
1* Palmerston to Russell, private, 8th November 1860,
G. & D. 22/21.
2. Palmerston to Russell, private, 12th November 1860,
G. & D. 22/21.
3. The Times. November 10th 1860.
12
individual interpretations of the two countries varied from 
time to time in accordance with the political events of the 
period.
The British conception of the alliance in 1859 was
substantially the same as it had been in 1857. On March 1st
of that year. Lord Palmerston had written to his Foreign
Secretary: ... "the alliance of England and France has derived
its strength not merely from the military and naval power of
the two states but from the force of the moral principle upon
which that union has been founded. Our union has for its
foundation resistance to unjust aggression, the defence of the
weak against the strong and the maintenance of the existing
balance of power." By 1859, however, additional importance
had come to be attached to another function of the 'alliance*:
one to which Russell had no hesitation in referring in the
House of Commons on the eve of the Conservative defeat in June
1859: "I declare at once" he stated "that my belief is that
they [i.e. the Governmentj are not disposed ..to maintain
that intimate alliance with France on which our Influence with
2
France must depend." The Liberal conception of the
1. E. Ashley, The Life of H.J. Temple Viscount Palmerston
1846-1865. II, 125. To Lord Clarendon, 1st March 1857. 
cf. also Sir Herbert Maxwell, The Life and Letters of 
George William Frederick. Fourth Earl of Clarendon^ [1913], 
II, 300.
2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CLIV, 386.
10th June 1859.
13
'alliance', therefore, was twofold: a moral combination for
the promotion of peace and justice; an effective instrument
for the control of a restless neighbour# After 1860, however,
there was a modification in this conception. The annexation
of Nice and Savoy put an end to the exclusive character of
the connection with France. Speaking in the House of Commons
on the 26th March, Russell declared his belief that "however
we may wish to live on the most friendly terms with the French
Government ... we ought not to keep ourselves apart from the
other nations of Europe but that when future questions may
1
arise ... we should be ready to act with them." Shortly
afterwards, this opinion was endorsed by lord Palmerston in
a Cabinet Memorandum. Urging the need for developing closer
relations with Austria and Prussia, he declared that intimate
association with France had become impossible ... "alliance
between England and France" he wrote "can exist only so long
as the policy of France is not directed to territorial
2
aggrandisement." But although the exclusive connection was 
dead, a close relationship persisted. The need for retaining 
a controlling influence on the action of France was greater 
than ever: and this constituted the primary function of the
'alliance* which survived. It did not pass unnoticed that the
1# Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVII, 1258. 
26th March 1860.
2. Marquis of Lome, Viscount Palmerston [1892], p.198.
May, 1860.
14
term was becoming more and more of an anachronism. This 
provided opportunities for the Opposition, and especially Dis­
raeli, whose plea for retrenchment in June 1862 was couched in 
the following terms; ... "In this country, protected by 
400,000 men and a commanding fleet in the Channel, to say that
freemen are in danger of a midnight invasion from cordial allies
1
is a mystification too monstrous for belief."
In France the 'alliance* received a rather different
interpretation. Although sometimes described as "1*alliance 
2
de la liberté," it was not regarded as a moral combination in 
the sense of the British definition. It was not regarded, 
either, as a means of controlling British policy; nor, of 
course, was it considered to impose a brake on French policy.
On the contrary, it was conceived as a powerful instrument 
for promoting the interests of both countries, and giving 
added weight to their diplomacy. "[l]l ne se peut rien faire 
de grand, en Europe et dans le monde entier" Baroche declared
3
in the Sénat "sans l'alliance de la France et de l'Angleterre." 
But this early conception of the 'alliance' was rudely shaken 
by Britain's reaction to the annexation of Nice and Savoy.
1. G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli. Earl of
BeaconsfieldT [1916J, IV, 310. 3rd June 1862.
2. Annales du Sénat et du Co^s Législatif. [1862], I, 75.
Prince Napoleon in the Sénat, 1st March 1861. Cf.
Billault on 2nd March 1861, supra p.4.
3. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif. [1862] I, 203,
le 6 mars 1861.
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It showed that the 'alliance* was incompatible with a vital 
French interest. "If you disapprove of these annexations 
which are insignificant in themselves," the Emperor was 
reported to have said "which are made with the consent of the 
Sovereign who loses them, and with that of the people whose 
nationality is changed - is not the inference inevitable that 
you will object to any expansion of France, however unexcep­
tionable its character?" And so, after 1860, the 'alliance' 
came to be regarded in France - as in England - as a leas 
intimate connection. But it was still acknowledged. "The 
English Alliance is of vital importance to me" Prince 
Mettemich reported the Emperor as saying in November 1860,
"and I will maintain it in spite of the ill will of a large
2
faction in England." He needed it for the safety of France; 
and for the success of her diplomacy. In 1863, however, there 
was another modification in the French conception of the 
'alliance'. After the Polish fiasco, Napoleon was finally 
disillusioned about the value of Britain's diplomatic support; 
and after the refusal of the Congress proposal, he saw no 
further prospect of any very cordial cooperation with her. 
Reporting the substance of a conversation with the Emperor at 
this time. Lord Dufferin, then a guest at Compiègne wrote:
1. G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli. Earl of
Beaconsfleldl 1,1916] IV. 320. Ralph A. Ear3e to Disraeli, 
Secret and confidential, April, 1860.
2. V. Wellesley and R. Sencourt, Conversations with Napoleon
III. [1934J, 189. Prince Mettemich to Baron HÜbner,
3rd November 1860.
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"He was constantly talking of the great results which the
bona fide English and French alliance might have produced, and
as constantly of the extreme improbability of that alliance
1
being able to survive this last shock to its cordiality."
In the following months 'alliance' was a term that was rarely
used on the French side of the Channel, and only a continuing
respect for British sea power prevented a complete reorientation
of French policy. But as soon as Prussian policy in the Danish
question was seen in its true colours, the word gradually
reappeared in the Imperial vocabulary. In a moment of
affability or genuine conviction, Drouyn de Lhuys admitted to
Cowley on 20th June 1864 that there was only one alliance of
any value - an alliance between Bigland and France. "Each"
he was reported to have said "could do a great deal alone -
2
together they could govern the world." And so in echoing 
the sentiments which Baroche had expressed in the Sénat four 
years previously, he made a brief attempt to revive something 
of the earlier conception of the 'alliance*.
Specific instances of Anglo-French co-operation inspired 
the use of the term 'alliance' in a less nebulous sense. On 
both sides of the Channel, for instance, the Cobden Treaty was
1# A. Lyall, The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava. 
[1905], 135. Dufferin to Argyll, 20th December 1863.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 20th June 1864, G. & D. 22/60. 
Printed in F.A. Wellesley (ed.) The Paris Embassy during 
the Second Empire. [1928], 268.
17
judged to usher In a period of close 'alliance* between the
two countries. During debates on the Treaty in Britain there
was much speculation on the nature of that 'alliance'. In his
instructions for framing the Treaty, Russell had written to
Cowley: ... "they [i.e. H.M.G.] attach a high social and
political value to the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty with
France ... its significance at the present moment, when the
condition of some parts of the Continent is critical would
be at once understood and would powerfully reassure the public
1
mind in the various countries of Europe." It was not 
surprising, therefore, that critics of the Government should 
have drawn the deduction that the Treaty foreshadowed ten 
years of identity of policy between the two powers. These 
suspicions found their most exaggerated expression in a speech 
in the House of Commons by Mr. Horsman. Referring to the text 
of the instructions that had been sent to lord Cowley, he said: 
"The construction which I put upon it is this, that by the 
Treaty the great Powers of Europe were to be informed that 
England and France had come to an understanding as to their 
common policy in regard to the affairs of Europe; and that 
especially upon the foremost question which was then agitating 
men's minds and engrossing the attention of the Cabinets of 
Europe, the settlement of Italy, there was between them that 
intimate alliance and close accord which would tend to reassure
1# Russell to Cowley and Cobden, No.l, 17th January 1860,
FO 97/207.
18
the public mind as to the prospects of peace . The policy of
France,” he added, "is the extinction of treaties, aggression,
aggrandisement and war. Yet, while the sentiments, the principles
and the policy of the two countries are the antipodes of one
another, we are invited to form this new political alliance
which, we are told, is to have an unmistakable significance
in the eyes of Europe,” Similar criticism was made in the House
2
of lords by the Earl of Derby. In reply, the Duke of Newcastle
acknowledged the political bearing of the Treaty but denied its
3
political significance. Russell's own interpretation of the
connection likely to result from the Treaty was "an alliance
of nations which after all is more secure than any mere alliance
4
of Cabinets or Kings."
Less stress was placed on the political aspect of the 
Treaty in France than in England. The existence of a formidable 
body of French protectionists made it inevitable that the 
Imperial Government should wish to rest its primafy defence of 
the agreement on the grounds of economic expediency. But the
1* Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVII, 256, 260. 
9th March 1860.
2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVII, 616.
16th March 1860.
3. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVII, 638.
15th March 1860.
4. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVII, 1994.
19th April I860,
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prospect of a closer political alliance between the two
countries was by no means omitted from the official sum of its
attractions. In his speech at the opening of the legislative
session on Ist^  March 1860, the Emperor declared: .. ’'Le Traité
n ’a donc fait qu’avancer l ’époque de modifications salutaires
et donner & des réformes indispensables le caractère de
concessions réciproques destinées à fortifier l’alliance de
1
deux grands peuples.” Ten days later the following statement
was published in the official report to the Emperor of the
negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty:
.. ’’Votre Majesté, qui a toujours montré une si ferme volonté
de maintenir intacte l ’alliance anglaise & travers tant de
difficultés et de défiances, n ’était certes pas indifférente à
cette nouvelle garantie donnée à la paix du monde. Mais elle
a compris d0s le premier jour de la negotiation que ce puissant
élément de securité ne serait plus qu’éphémère et ne tarderait
pas à dégénérer en une cause dissolvante si un intérêt industriel
ou commerciel pouvait être sacrifié en compensation d ’un intérêt 
2
politique ...” The new meaning that has been given to the 
’alliance’ between France and Britain by the signature of the 
Treaty was more openly recognised in subsequent debates in the
1# Procès-Verbaux des Seances du Corps Législatif. 1860, 6.
Le Moniteur, le 11 mars 1860* Rapport à 1,’Empereur par Ll. 
Ex. le president du conseil d ’Etat, chargé par intérim du 
département des affaires étrangères et le ministre de 
l ’agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics.
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Corps Législatif. On 28th April, M. Morln macie the following 
declaration; "Le coté publique du traité c’est le renouvelle­
ment de notre alliance avec l’Angleterre, alliance qui sert 
la plus noble de toutes les causes, celle de la civilisation, 
alliance pour laquelle la France trouve l ’appui et sympathie 
dans la partie la plus active et la plus progressive de la 
nation anglaise.” In the same debate, M. le Baron David 
laid similar emphasis on the stimulus that had been afforded 
to the ’alliance’ of the two countries by the signature of the 
Treaty of Commerce: ... ”il est heureux” he said ’’qu’elle soit
cimentée par la multiplicité et par l ’abondance des relations 
2
commerciales.” Despite the professions of the Imperial 
Government, therefore, it could no more escape notice in France, 
than in England, that the Treaty of Commerce had been primarily 
inspired by political motives: that it was less a manifestation
of the cordiality which existed between the governments of the 
two countries than an attempt to allay the mounting hostility 
between their peoples.
The term ’alliance’ was also used with special 
reference to the co-operation of Anglo-French forces in China 
during the autumn of 1860# On the prorogation of Parliament 
in August of that year the Speech from the Throne contained
1# Compte Rendu des Séances du Corps Législatif. Session de 
1860, Tome Unique, 263.
2. Compte Rendu'des Séances du Corps Législatif. Session de 
1860, Tome Unique, 263.
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the following reference to the approaching expedition to
Pekin: ”We are commanded by H,M. to inform you that H.M*
regrets the pacific Overtures which by H.M’s Directions Her
Envoy in China made to the Imperial Government at Pekin did
not lead to any satisfactory Result and it has therefore
become necessary that the combined Naval and Military Force
which H,M, and Her Ally the Emperor of the French had sent to
the China Seas should advance towards the Northern Provinces
of China for the purpose of supporting the just Demands of the 
1
Allied Powers.” The designation of ’ally* was also accorded
to the Emperor of the French in the Vote of Thanks to the
Forces moved in both Houses of Parliament on the successful
2
conclusion of hostilities. But although the term was 
thought appropriate to the military and naval cooperation of 
the two powers, it had no basis in any diplomatic act. The 
objects of the Far Eastern campaign had been duly concerted 
between the governments of the two countries: but the results
of their deliberations had been embodied in separate instruc­
tions to their diplomatic representatives in China. Moreover, 
although the unsigned ’alliance* was directed towards a common 
end - the forcible ratification of the Treaties of Tientsin - 
the motives of the two ’allies’ were very different. ’’Our
1. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLX, 1833.
28th August 1860.
2. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, C.LXI, 575, 417.
14th February 1861.
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views,” Russell had written privately to Cowley on 31st
December 1859, ” - we for trade, and the French for glory -
1
differ in principle.” But Britain did not refuse to gratify
the French desire for a military excursion to China on that
account. Indeed, she regarded it as an additional reason for
her intervention. ”As long as we act together,” wrote the
British Minister in China, ”we can check them to a certain 
2
extent.” His view was fully shared by the British Government.
In France, also, the joint action of the two powers in
China was deemed to constitute an ’alliance*. Announcing the
success of the French and British forces on the 5th November,
the Moniteur referred to the expedition as one in which ”les
chefs et les soldats des deux nations alliées ont rivalisé
3
d ’estime réciproque de valeur et de dévouement.” Yet, as 
Russell was only too well aware, the French motive for par­
ticipating in the campaign was not so much a desire to promote 
the development of commercial intercourse with China as to 
extend support to the catholic missions in China and to 
demonstrate the prowess of the military and naval forces of 
France. >Signifleant in this latter respect was the paragraph 
dealing with the Chinese expedition that was contained in the
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 31st December 1859.(copy)
G. & D. 22/103.
2. Bruce to Hammond, private, 6th February 1860, FO 17/336.
Printed in W.C. Cos tin. Great Britain and China. 1833-1860 
[1933], p.310.
3. Le Moniteur, le 5 novembre 1860. Partie Non Officielle,
Paris le 2 novembre.
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Address from the Corps Législatif in 1861: ”En Chine nos
soldats, unis à ceux de la Grande Bretagne ont jeté un lustre
nouveau sur nos armes* Semblables aux phalanges antiques,
par la force de leur organisation, ils ont frappé au coeur le
plus vaste et le plus peuplé des empires.”
The Polish Revolution of 1863 provided the occasion for
another interlude of close co-operation between Britain and
Prance. Prom March to October of that year the two powers
acted in diplomatic concert to revive the liberties of Poland.
The intimacy of their association, however, was modified by
the inclusion of Austria, and it was to the relationship of the
three powers that Russell assigned the description of ”quasi- 
2
alliance.” The adherence of Austria was equally solicited
by both powers. Russell welcomed her presence on account of
the restraint that she would impose on the counsels of Prance.
”I much prefer acting with Austria and Prance to acting with
France only,” he wrote to Cowley in a private letter on the
28th March, ”l imagine French statesmen have the same feeling
3 ;
about us.” The French feeling was certainly similar: but it was
■  _  I
inspired by motives of a very different order. In seeking the ! 
co-operation of Austria in the Polish question, Napoleon looked | 
beyond the immediate issue. He hoped to lay the foundation of i
1* Annales du .Sénat et du Corps Législatif. [1862], II, 168.
2. Russell to Napier, No.16, confidential, 13th January 1864,
FO 65/656.
3. Russell to Cowley, private, 28th March 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
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an intimate union between the two continental powers which
should have for its object the revision of the map of Europe.
Reporting the conversation in which the Emperor had revealed
this intention. Prince Mettemich wrote to Count Rechberg on
26th February 1863: ”il avoue que nous avons le droit de nous
rappeler diverses circonstances de nature h ne pas inspirer
une confiance absolue. C’est pour cela qu’il a voulu, dit-il,
placer un peu l’Angleterre entre nous. Le mariage de raison
qui lie les deux Puissances occidentales dans toutes les
grandes questions qui se présentent n ’empêche pas selon-lui,
une liaison étroite et passionée entre les deux plus grands
Etats du continent ... J ’ai essayé [he reported the Emperor
to have said] de m ’entendre avec la Russie et l ’Angleterre
et je n ’ai pas réussi. Je le dis franchement, j’appartiendrai
à la Puissance qui m ’y aidera ....”
There were also occasions between 1859 and 1865 when
’alliance’ was used in the strict sense of the word to denote
a formal diplomatic engagement. During the Polish question, for
2
instance, the idea of such an alliance was broached by France;
3
during the Schleswig-Holstein question it was mooted by Britain.
1. FiHrst Mettemich an Graf Rechberg, le 26 février 1863.
Printed in Hermann Oncken, Die Rheinpolltik Raiser 
Napoleons III, von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung der 
Krieges von 1870-71. 11926]. I. 7.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.828, confidential, 27th June 1863,
FO 27/1480.
3. Ruaaell to Cowley, No.64, 18th January 1864, FO 27/1517.
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Only at one period, however, were both powers simultaneously
attracted to such an engagement. This was during negotiations
on the Italian question in the latter part of 1859 and the
beginning of 1860. In an attempt to free herself from the
impractical obligations incurred at Villofranca, France made
unofficial overtures for an alliance with Britain in September, 
1
1859. Meeting with no encouragement from the British
Government at that time, they were renewed by Prince Napoleon
2
on 17th November. After an Interview with the Emperor that
evening Cowley drew up a Memorandum outlining the project of
a settlement in Italy to which he thought the Emperor could
be persuaded to agree. He suggested that if Austria were to
withhold her concurrence from the proposal, the British and
French Governments might proceed without her ’’taking perhaps
as their rule of conduct the quadruple treaty entered into.
with «Spain and Portugal for the recognition of the existing
3
dynasties in those Kingdoms.” The British Government agreed 
to lend its support to the settlement that was proposed but 
declined to pledge military aid to France in the event of 
Austria’s renewing the war to enforce the stipulations of the 
Treaty of Zurich. Such was the Cabinet decision: but Russell
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 4th September 1859,
G. & D. 22/20; Cowley to Russell, private, 4th September 
1859, G. & D. 22/53.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 17th November 1859, G. & D.
22/53.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 18th November 1859, G. & D.
22/53 .
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would have had no scruple in contracting a formal alliance
1
in the sense that France had desired. As rumours of 
Austrian military activity increased, he took the initiative 
in proposing to the Cabinet that Britain should enter a formal 
engagement with France and Sardinia to prevent a settlement 
being forced on the states of Central Italy by Austrian inter­
vention. Despite the support of Palmerston and Gladstone, a 
majority of the Cabinet refused their assent to the proposal 
on the 3rd January. Palmerston thereupon adjourned the 
meeting for a week in the confident expectation that maturer 
reflection would bring dissenting members to sounder judgment.
In an attempt to further the process, he circulated a Memorandum 
to the Cabinet on 5th January in which he stated the case in 
favour of alliance with France and Sardinia. ... "what is the 
understanding or agreement which we ought to establish with 
France and Sardinia?”, he asked. "Clearly a joint determination 
to prevent any forcible interference by any foreign power in 
the affairs of Italy. This, it is said, would be a league 
against Austria. No doubt it would be as far as regards the 
interference of Austria by force of arms in the affairs of
Italy: and such a triple league would better deserve the title
2
of holy alliance than the league which bore that name."
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 6th December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
2. E. Ashley, The Life of H.J. Temple Viscount Palmerston
1846-1865. II, 174.
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A diminution in Austrian military ardour, however, and an 
alternative proposal from Persigny, reconciled the two states­
men to the abandonment of the project for a triple alliance. 
VJhen Thouvenel revived the possibility of an intimate alliance 
between Britain and Prance in conversation with Cowley on the
17th February it evoked no sympathetic response from the
1
British Government. Indeed, Russell chose to invest the 
French overture with rather more significance than it really 
warranted in order to put an end to the recurring suggestions 
from France that intimate alliance between the two countries 
would secure an immediate solution of Italian difficulties.
The chief interest in these negotiations for a formal 
alliance between Britain and France lies in the motives which 
had led prominent members of both governments to incline 
towards it# The ostensible object of their co-operation was 
the defence of Italian liberty against Austrian despotism#
But neither power was wholly disinterested. France looked upon 
alliance with Britain as a welcome means of resolving her 
difficulties in Italy, and perhaps of bringing about that 
consolidation of central Italy which would enable her to extort 
the cession of Nice and Savoy from Sardinia. Britain, on the 
other hand, was mainly concerned to prevent France from reaping 
singlehanded the advantages of a second victory over Austria.
1# Cowley to Russell, Secret and Confidential, 17th February 
1860, FO 27/1333.
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"We cannot" wrote Russell "let Italy be played for by 
Austria and Prance without taking part. We should then really
1
establish French influence as paramount in Italy for a century."
The designation of ’alliance*, therefore, was a
misnomer for the connection which existed between Britain and
France in this period. But even if, as Palmerston so eloquently
contended, it was a "slipslop expression", a "totally unmeaning 
2
term", its constant application to Anglo French relations in 
this period was not without significance. It served as an 
indication of the occasions on which the two powers acted in 
particularly close accord on a specific issue: and in the
frequency of its use, it served as a barometer of their general 
relations. But an analysis of references to the ’alliance’ is 
not a reliable criterion for establishing the character of 
their relationship unless the motives which governed their 
association, as well as the use of the word itself, are also 
taken into account. Co-operation between the two powers did 
not always spring from an identity of purpose; more often it 
was the outcome of policies that were essentially in conflict, 
to which the designation of alliance was frankly paradoxical. 
Moreover, repeated references to the ’alliance’ were more 
frequently the indication of a desire for improvement in
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 24th December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
2. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CVII, 808.
Printed in E. Ashley, The Life of H.J. Temple. Viscount 
Palmerston 1846-1865. [1876], II, 480.
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relations that were strained than the spontaneous recognition 
of prevailing cordiality: absence of such references, more
indicative of a relationship that was untroubled than of a 
desire on the part of either of the two powers to sever their 
existing connection. When these factors are taken into con­
sideration it becomes apparent that the term ’alliance’ was 
not only a misnomer for the relationship of Britain and France 
in this period but a particularly misleading anomaly. Whether 
in relation to the general association of the powers, or to 
specific instances of co-operation between them, it cloaked a 
divergence in their Interests and principles. It helped to 
disguise, but was unable to conceal the rivalry and suspicions 
that were engendered by the international issues in which the 
fortunes of the two powers were involved between 1859 and 
186 5.
CHAPTER II.
THE REGIONAL TREND IN THE WORKING OF THE ’ALLIANCE»
The character of British relations with France was 
practically determined by the degree to which the two powers 
acted in cooperation or opposition in the various international 
issues of the period, and by the relative intimacy of their 
association with the other great powers of Europe. The 
application of this criterion reveals a regional trend in their 
relationship. Similar characteristics are apparent in each 
of three geographical divisions: northern Europe, southern
Europe and the Mediterranean, ana districts overseas. In 
the opening years of the period, relations between the two 
powers were worked out in issues which had the lands bordering 
on the Mediterranean for their setting.
lo The Mediterranean.
The major international problems in which British and
French interests were involved in this region were threefold: -
1
the settlement of Italy, the pacification of Syria, and the
2
establishment of a new dynasty in Greece. Apart from these
1. A question of "extreme importance" - Russell to Cowley,
No.745, 27tn July 1860, FO 27/1327.
2. "I am afraid this Greek Succession will prove as great a
Bungle as the Spanish Marriages" - Palmerston to Russell, 
private, 17th November 1862, G. & D. 22/14.
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Issues of obvious importance, there were a number of minor 
questions which brought the two powers into contact - questions 
relatively unimportant in themselves but bearing ultimately 
upon such vital considerations as the maintenance of the 
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the east 
and central Mediterranean, of the Moroccan Empire in the west.
British relations with France in these issues had the 
appearance of infinite variety, ranging from close collaboration 
to spirited opposition. The cooperation between the two 
powers comprised differing degrees of intimacy. Occasionally 
they acted jointly; occasionally in cooperation with a third 
great power; but most frequently they shared the wider 
association of all five of the great powers. The extent to 
which they resorted to prior consultation in anticipation of 
diplomatic intervention with other powers is a further gauge 
of their connection; but one that it is not always possible 
to determine from the archives of a single country.
Perhaps the most striking example of joint cooperation 
between Britain and France was the negotiations into which the 
two powers entered at the end of 1859 with a view to discovering 
a practical substitute for the Italian settlement which hac). :
j
been outlined at Villafranca, and confirmed in all its 
ambiguity at Zurich. A typical instance of the admission of 
a third power to the joint counsels of Britain and France was 
that in which Russia took part in regulating the question of
32
succession in Greece at the end of 1862. The occasion for 
intervention by all five great powers was provided by the 
outbreak of massacres in the Lebanon in 1860.
The significance of these various instances of 
cooperation from the point of view of the character of British 
relations with France, turns on the motives which prompted 
the association of the two powers; on the course their 
cooperation followed; on the results that it achieved. In 
attempting to secure the acquiescence of the French Government 
in a liberal solution of the central Italian problem, Britain 
not only hoped to forestall the creation of a French puppet 
Kingdom in Tuscany, but, by increasing and consolidating the 
strength of Piedmont, to establish an effective bulwark against 
the infiltration of French influence. Britain’s disposition 
to act with France and Russia in attempting a solution of 
Greek difficulties in 1862 represented an equally doubtful 
compliment to the disinterestedness of their policies. Her 
association with those powers developed naturally out of the 
obligations which all three had incurred at the time of the 
establishment of Greek independence: but her eagerness to
invoke the self-denying engagement of July 1827 was prompted 
by fear that France might be induced to countenance the 
candidature of a Russian prince for the Greek throne. ■ Nor 
was British cooperation with France over Syria inspired by 
motives of a higher order. Indeed the British Government
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gave their consent to the French proposal for the despatch of
foreign troops to the Lebanon only after prolonged discussion
in the Cabinet and then with obvious reluctance. Defending
the decision against Palmerston’s objections, Russell indicated
the consequences of an opposite policy, .."Russia would
probably join France with might and main," he reasoned, % e
have been with Russia against France (1840) and with France
against Russia (1854) but we have never had to oppose both,
1
and in so rotten a cause it would be terrible work..."
In each of these questions the ostensible object for 
which the two powers had combined was duly achieved. The 
revolution in central Italy was peacefully consummated by 
fusion with Piedmont; Greece was provided with an innocuous 
dynasty; the Lebanon was pacified, and as a pledge for the 
future converted into an autonomous province with a Christian 
governor and a revised system of local administration. Judged 
solely by its results, cooperation between Britain and France 
appeared to constitute an effective and satisfactory instrument 
of diplomacy. Yet a critical investigation of the negotiations 
which took place over these particular questions leads to 
a very different conclusion. In each case a solution was 
delayed, if not imperilled, by the inability of Britain and 
France to act in cordial cooperation. At the beginning of
1. Russell to Palmerston, private, 27th July 1860, G. & D.
22/30. Printed in G.P. Gooch (ed.), % e  Later Correspond­
ence of Lord John Russell 1840-1878. [l925j, II, 266.
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I860, for Instance, France suddenly withdrew her support 
from Russell’s four point proposal for the settlement of 
central Italy in an attempt to supersede It by an alternative 
plan which harked back to the retention of an independent 
state in Tuscany. Unknown to the British Government, she 
attempted to prevail on the northern Courts to press for the 
assembly of a Conference to which this modified proposal mi^t 
be submitted. Much incensed at this unforeseen check to a 
solution to which Austria had appeared resigned and afraid 
that the new proposal might result in the substitution of 
French influence in Italy for Austrian, Britain instructed 
her representative at Turin to. declare officially that the 
British Government considered the French proposals subversive 
of Italian independence. Her prompt condemnation of the 
French plan was immediately effective. Cavour refused to 
entertain it; the British policy of non-intervention regained 
the ascendent; and the settlement of central Italy, momentarily 
jeopardised by the breakdown in Anglo-French cooperation, was 
finally secured. Equally chequered was the course of 
British cooperation with France and Russia in Greece where 
negotiations were unduly protracted by the equivocal conduct 
of the two latter powers in regard to the candidature of the
1. cf. A.J. Whyte, The Political Life and letters of 
Cavour 1848-61. [1930j.
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Duc de Jjeuchtenberg. In Syria,the cooperation between the 
two powers was still more superficial# British hostility 
to the French occupation became such that it endangered the 
chances of effecting a speedy pacification of the disaffected 
districts# The more violent her representations, the less 
France was able to withdraw without sacrifice of honour. Yet 
the longer the occupation,the more fanatical became the 
animosity between Druses and Maronites.
In addition to the occasions on which Britain acted 
in nominal cooperation with France, were a number of instances 
in which she opposed the diplomacy of the French Government.
Her opposition, like her cooperation, varied in intensity.
Latent opposition to French designs in the Mediterranean was 
evinced in secret and confidential despatches to the British 
Ambassador in Paris. In January 1861, for instance,
Russell warned Cowley of intrigues that were on foot to 
restore a separate kingdom in Naples, to create a new state 
from the disaffected provinces of the Austrian and Turkish 
Empires, and to place French princes on the thrones of both.
He expatiated on the dangers that the success of these schemes 
would present to British power in the Mediterranean. "I have 
no wish," he concluded, "that you should speak to M. Thouvenel 
on this subject unless specially instructed to do so. He might, 
with perfectly good faith, deny that he approved of such 
conspiracies. But it is fit you should know that H.M.G. will
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use all their influence to counteract these designs and to
1
make them abortive." British suspicions of French territorial
designs in the Mediterranean were the subject of formal
representations to the French Government. Shortly after the
annexation of Nice and Savoy, lively apprehension was caused
in England by fear that Cavour might alienate Genoa or Sardinia
to France in return for a further extension of Piedmontese
territory in the direction of Venetia, Naples, or Sicily.
Palmerston was particularly alive to the serious effect that
such an arrangement would have on the balance of power in
2
southern Europe and the Mediterranean. As a result of his 
initiative, the French Government were formally asked whether 
a secret treaty existed between France and Sardinia. Warning 
was mixed with blandishment. "The government of the Emperor 
must be aware" Russell wrote, "that such a project would be 
viewed in the most serious light by Great Britain, and Her
1. Russell to Cowley, No.SL, Secret, 9th January 1861,
FO 27/1372.
2. Outlining his objections in a private letter to Russell on
10th July he wrote: ... "Genoa in the Hands of the
French would lay Italy at the mercy of France, Sardinia 
given to France would add greatly to the naval Stations 
and naval Resources of France and if such an arrangement 
were some fine day started upon us without our having 
opened our Eyes betimes and having done our best to 
prevent it we should be laughed at and abused as simpletone 
whom the Tragi-Comedy of Savoy had been performed to in 
vain...." Palmerston to Russell, private, 10th July 
1860, G. & D. 22/21.
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1
Majesty's Government cannot think that it has been entertained."
Still more serious, from the point of view of the relations
of the two powers, were the persistent remonstrances of the
British Government against actions by France in various parts
of the Mediterranean. Her occupation of Rome, for instance,
and her sponsorship of de Lessep's project for the construction
of the future Suez Canal met with constant and remorseless
opposition from the British Government. Most serious of all
manifestations of British hostility were the occasions on
which Britain reinforced her representations to France by
enlisting support from other powers. Particularly significant
in this respect was her attempt to assemble a moral coalition
at the end of March 1860 to prevent the French annexation of
the neutralised districts of Nice and Savoy which, it was
considered, would not only endanger the security of Switzerland
2
but furnish France with easy, unrestricted access into Italy.
One basically significant fact emerges from an analysis
of these varying types of nominal cooperation and opposition:
1. Russell to Cowley, No.719, 23rd July 1860, FO 27/1327.
2. ..."[W]e cannot say in any shape or form" Russell wrote
to Cowley, "that we are satisfied to see the southern 
shore of the Lake of Geneva and the passes of the 
Simplon and the St. Bernard in the hands of France."
Russell to Cowley, private, 5th June 1860, (copy),
G. & D. 22/104.
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that British relations with Prance in this region were
dominated by suspicion of French designs and by the conviction,
in lord Palmerston’s words, that ’’the Traditional and standing
policy of France with Regard to the Mediterranean is aggressive
1
and tending to the spread of French Domination.’’ Several of 
the examples indicate something further about the character of 
British relations with France in this region: that the
relationship was embittered, on occasion, by the existence of 
rival diplomatic alignments.
One of Russell’s immediate preoccupations on entering 
the Foreign Office in 1859 was the knowledge that a secret 
agreement had been reached between France and Russia* 
Gortchakov’s assurance that it contained nothing which could 
be interpreted as constituting a hostile alliance against 
England had been publicly disclosed at the hustings during 
the election campaign. But it was an unsatisfactory 
assurance - admitting the existence of the agreement whilst 
giving only a negative indication of its substance - and on 
the reassembly of Parliament fear was expressed that the under­
standing might have been inspired by the Treaty of Tilsit, one 
of the clauses of which had been directed towards establishing
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 27th December 1864, 
G. & D. 22/22.
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1
a monopoly of the Mediterranean for the littoral powers.
Russell was less perturbed by the potential danger of such a
combination than the want of cordiality it evinced in the
2
gttitude of the French Government. Cowley was equally of
the opinion that there was nothing to be alarmed at in an
3
understanding between France and Russia. In the following 
year, however, both were to learn that the agreement was 
capable of nullifying the diplomacy of the British Government. 
For it was Russian connivance which, by defeating the British 
attempt to instigate a diplomatic coalition against France, 
made possible the French annexation of Nice and Savoy, British 
suspicions of Franco-Russian intrigue were roused intermittently
1. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CLIV, 56,
7th June 1859, The Marquess of Normanby; le Comte de 
Garden, Histoire Générale des '^raités de Paix et autres 
transactions principales entre toutes les puissances 
de l’Europe. X, 240, Article VIII.
2. ...’’The secrecy about the Russian engagement with France
is not very consistent with our cordial alliance," he 
wrote to Cowley in a private letter of 23rd June 1859, 
"Walewski might as well be reminded that if he wishes the 
two nations to be friends he ought to put more zeal in 
the business. Our accounts of the Russian navy do not 
make them appear formidable but they may be so one day..." 
Russell to Cowley, private, 23rd June 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103,
3. .. "It suits them both to have it believed that such an
understanding exists but I am convinced that there is
nothing alarming in it." Cowley to Russell, private,
24th June 1859, G. & D. 22/53,
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on a number of occasions thereafter: on some of which no
evidence could be adduced, on some of which no proof was 
needed. In May 1860, for instance, Britain suspected, the 
Russian proposals for instituting an inquiry into the state 
of the.Christian population in the Ottoman Empire to have been 
previously concerted with Prance. At the beginning of the 
following year, French and Russian plenipotentiaries worked 
together in conference at Paris to procure an extension in 
the period of French occupation in Syria. In August, 1862, 
there were rumours that France and Russia had come to a secret 
agreement about the policy they should pursue at Constantinople 
on the subject of Servian relations with Turkey. Later in the 
year Britain was confronted by indications of collaboration 
between France and Russia in the choice of a candidate for 
the Greek throne.
Although the British Government was inclined to be 
sceptical about the range and potency of the Franco-Russian 
understanding, British policy towards France was undoubtedly 
influenced by the knowledge of its existence. Uncertain 
about the objects which France and Russia might be pledged 
to promote In the East, Britain tended to be more willing to 
act with France in Mediterranean issues than she would have 
been otherwise. It was the fear of a combined move by Russia 
and France, for instance, which won her assent to the despatch
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1
of French troops to Syria. But the Franco-Russian entente
was also responsible for influencing British policy in an
opposite direction. The need for countering the new combination
encouraged Britain to enlist the support of another great
power. Her choice fell on Austria. Austria was a continental
power, conservative and predominantly catholic; Britain was
insular, liberal and protestant. If, as John Bright contended
in 1859, a war between England and Austria was as unlikely as
a fight between a fish floating in a river and a horse grazing 
2
upon its banks, the basis for a close understanding between
them seemed to be equally wanting. Despite the obvious
differences in their outlook, however, and an understandable
reluctance on the part of Austria to provoke the military
power of France, the two powers gradually drew together in
reply to the muffled challenge from France and Russia. French
annexation of Nice and Savoy gave impetus to the tightening
of relations between England and Austria. In April 1860,
Rechberg proposed the conclusion of a formal alliance to resist
- 3
any further territorial aggrandisement by France. This
Britain declined on the grounds of her traditional objection to
3
binding engagements. A month later, however, she took the
1. V. Supra p.33.
2. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CLIV, 220,
9th June 1859.
3. Russell to Loftus, No.124, most confidential, 25th April
1860, FO 7/586.
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Initiative in establishing an agreement with Austria whereby 
each power undertook to communicate to the other any proposition 
it might receive "tending to alter the Territorial circum­
scription of Europe or to disturb the balance of Power" and
to withhold a favourable answer until informed of the views 
1
of the other. Thereafter Britain became more and more
2
inclined to act with Austria and especially anxious to 
exploit the one vital interest they shared in common: respect, 
amounting almost to reverence for the independence and 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Although there were occasions
1. Russell to Loftus, No.164, confidential, 13th June 1860,
FO 7/587; Loftus to Russell, No.358, confidential, 28th 
June 1860, FO 7/594. This agreement, and a similar one 
concluded with Prussia, seem to have originated with 
the Queen. Writing from Aldershot on 13th May 1860, 
-inspired, so Palmerston believed, by the ’Genius loci’, 
she urged the need for doing "somethin# to secure Europe 
and ourselves" against France. '*The most simple and 
least dangerous step the Queen can think of" she wrote,
"is a union with the German Powers having for its object
to watch France, and giving mutual security that no
overture made by her to any one of the Powers will be
received without being at once communicated to the
others ...." (Memorandum by the Queen, 13th May 1860,
G. & D. 22/14). Later, it seems, she urged the further 
suggestion that the powers should agree to refrain from 
replying to such overtures until after an exchange of 
views. (Palmerston to Russell, private, 3rd and 5th 
June 1860, G. & D. 22/21).
2. Writing privately to Cowley in the midst of negotiations on
the subject of Nice and Savoy, Russell commented:"... I 
fear these Bonapartes will never let us be quiet and if 
Alexander of Russia has formed an unholy alliance with 
them the two may give us a great deal of trouble .... for 
my part I get more and more Inclined to act with Austria..." 
Russell to Cowley, private, 19th May I860, (copy)
G. & D. 22/104.
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on which Austria appeared reluctant to incur the displeasure
of France, her conservative cooperation with Britain in the
1. During the Syrian crisis in 1861, Prince Mettemich
admitted to Cowley that although his government agreed in 
principle with the British view, it could not afford to 
offend France in a matter of so little importance to 
Austria. Cowley’s private report of this conversation 
provoked the following official, though confidential 
retort from Russell:-
"You may inform Prince Mettemich that the question 
of the supply of arms in the Principalities is nothing 
in our estimation compared to the question of Syria.
H.M.G. are making themselves unpopular in the 
Principalities by their endeavours to return the arms 
brought from Genoa to that port. If H.M.G. are asked to 
promote the interests of Austria on the Danube and told 
at the same time that the interests of H.M.G. in the 
Mediterranean are as nothing to Austria, Prince Mettemich 
must see that this one sided relation cannot long 
continue and that H.M.G. must treat Austrian interests 
as matters of indifference to Great Britain.
But H.M.G. have always been under the impression 
that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire and the 
prevention of the acquisition of its Provinces by powerful 
European States was an object in regard to which the 
Austrian Government considered itself as having a great 
and direct interest and it is not easy to see how, if 
that be so, the Austrian Govt, can maintain that it has 
no interest in preventing Syria from falling under the 
dominion of France.
It is manifest that the transfer of Syria to France 
would soon be followed by an extension of French 
domination to other parts of Asia Minor; that the example 
thus set by France with the support of Russia would soon 
be followed in Europe by Russia with the support of 
France; and the Austrian Govt, would ere long find that 
vital interests of Austria had been sacrificed by the 
weakness and short sightedness which her Government would 
have applied to the consideration of the Syrian Question."
Russell to Cowley, No.215, confidential, ’Not to be sent 
Abroad', Slat February 1861, FO 27/1373/215.
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©astern Mediterranean stood in striking contrast to the more 
adventuresome policy of France and Russia in that region.
Indeed the Anglo-Austrian connection became almost as 
distasteful to Prance, as the Franco-Russian association 
to Britain.
British relations with France in the Mediterranean
were further impaired by the knowledge that British policy
was suspect in France. French suspicions were rarely the
subject of direct representations to the British Government,
but they were freely mentioned in conversation with the
British Ambassador and no less freely referred to in public
statements to the French Chambers. Resentment at British
opposition to the settlement of Villafranca, for instance,
as well as British hostility to the French occupation of
Rome was openly deplored by government representatives in the
1
sénat and Corps Législatif. In the course of a conversation
with Cowley, Drouyn de Lhuys referred to the popular belief
in France that Britain was scheming to set a prince of British
extraction on the throne of Greece with the object of
establishing a jumping-off ground for a life and death struggle
with Russia. His disclaimers left the British Ambassador in
2
no doubt that he shared the general opinion. Senators and
1# Annales du Sénat et du Corps législatif. [1862], II, 151, 
Billault, Corps Législatif, le 22 mars 1861; [1863],
II, 128, Billault, Corps Législatif, le 12 mars 1862.
2. Cowley to Russell, Ho.8, Most Confidential, 2nd January 
1861, FO 27/1484.
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deputies in the French Chambers subscribed to the conviction 
that Britain was seeking to establish predominant influence
1
in -Sicily if not to acquire formal possession of the island.
2
Similar suspicions were revealed in regard to Egypt. The
effect of all this resentment was to stimulate a policy of
counter-encroachment on the part of the French Government
and so to add to the already considerable sum of jealousy between
the two powers. Indeed, Drouyn de Ihuys was apparently frank
in his admission that the good conduct of France in the
Mediterranean was not a little dependent on her interpretation
of British action in that area. "His object," Cowley reported,
"would be to act cordially with you and you would much
facilitate his endeavours if you drew it mild in Italy. He
did not want to make conditions - but he told you the exact 
3
truth ...."
Cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual distrust is 
sufficiently difficult if the suspicions entertained on either i
1. Compte-Rendu des Séances du Corps Législatif. Session de 
1860, tome unique, 1040, , M. le Baron David, le 13 
juillet 1860.
Annales du .Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1862] I, 247,
M. Kolb Bernard, Corps Législatif, le 11 mars 1861.
Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1862] I, 182,
M. le Baron Bourgoing, Sénat, le 20 février 1862.
Annales du Sénat et du Corps législatif [106.4] II, 128,
M. Hubert Delisle, Sénat, le 18 décembre 1863.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 7th November 1862, G. & D. 22/57.
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side are unfounded; when they are in fact justified it
becomes infinitely more so. That the British Government
was hypersensitive to the moves of French diplomacy in the
Mediterranean is undoubtedly true. Palmerston himself was
particularly allergic to signs of French activity in this
area. His private letters abound in the wildest accusations
against the French Government. At different times in this
period he stated his opinion that France was intent upon
1 2 
disrupting Turkey, occupying Constantinople, and maintaining
3
a military Tete-de-Pont in Rome. But these accusations 
were the outpourings of an unusually ebullient spirit. It 
is improbable that they represented his considered judgment: 
far more likely that they were intended to keep the Foreign 
Office on the alert. Russell, moreover, was less extreme 
in his mistrust of French designs in the Mediterranean: and
as a result the suspicions that were sufficiently credited to 
become the inspiration of government policy were not, so far
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 31st July 1861,
G. & D. 22/21.
2. Palmerston to Russell, private, 8th August, 1860,
G. & D. 22/14.
3. Minute by Palmers ton, 5th September 1861, FO 391/7.
47
as published sources reveal, much in error. Britain was
undoubtedly justified in suspecting France of desiring to
1
establish a satellite power in Italy if she was mistaken in
saddling the French Government with territorial designs in
Genoa, Sardinia and Sicily, She was justified, too, in
believing that the French occupation of Rome was influenced
by political motives: for although it is unlikely that France
maintained an army in Rome for the strategic advantage it
gave her in the centre of the Mediterranean, still less for
the opportunity it afforded her of promoting the return of
Francis II, it seems certain that the primary object of her
occupation was to preserve the very considerable influence
she wielded over Catholics in the Mediterranean and beyond
2
as *la Fille aînée de l'Eglise*. Nor was the British 
Government mistaken in believing that France sou^t to extend 
her influence in the East by affording support to the 
allegedly Christian population of the Turkish Empire. Such
1. Vide Mémoire addressed by Napoleon III to Walewski on
the eve of war against Austria in 1859. Emile Ollivier 
L'Empire Libéral [1898] III, 537-542.
2, This was acknowledged by Billault in a speech to the
Corps Législatif on 12th March 1862. Annales du Sénat 
et du Corps Législatif [1863] II, 126.
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1
was her avowed intention in Syria where the British Government
was certainly justified in suspecting her of a desire to
establish predominant influence if over-zealous in crediting
her with motives of territorial ambition. The justice of
British suspicions of French activity in Greece cannot be
finally determined without access to the French archives. It
seems probable, however, that France had no desire to promote
a claimant who would be objectionable to Britain; that her
tolerance of the Due de Leuchtenberg was inspired by jealousy
of Prince Alfred# And certainly the intrigue to establish a
French or Italian prince on the throne of Greece - never very
seriously regarded, however, in England - seems to have been
2
fomented by Bouree in liaison with Drouyn de Ihuys rather than 
by any design of the Emperor himself.
1. Reporting a conversation with Thouvenel on 28th January
1861, Cowley represented the French Foreign Minister 
to have said: •• "There is not a post which arrives
from Syria that does not bring petition upon petition 
to the Emperor for continued protection and it is 
difficult to abandon altogether these people who have 
at all times looked to us,for I will not deny that we 
place a certain value in the preservation of our 
influence over the Maronites. .."
Cowley to Russell, No.152, 28th January 1861, F.O. 27/1384.
2. It was Cowley’s view that Bouree "would support the
devil himself" sooner than it should appear that British 
influence was uppermost in Greece. Cowley to Hammond, 
private, 18th December 1862, FO 396/6. Russell also 
attributed French intrigues in Greece to Bouree, adding 
however "I fear Drouyn himself stirs the cauldron."
Russell to Cowley, private, 6th May 1863 (copy)
G. & D. 22/105.
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British suspicious that France planned to advance
her policy in cooperation with Russia were fully grounded.
She had signed a secret treaty with the Russian Government in 
1
January 1859 which envisaged joint action in the east in
return for a pledge of Russian neutrality in event of war in
Italy. That agreement was subsequently reinforced by other
2
diplomatic acts; by a Memorandum in September 1860, by
3
a secret protocol in August 1862: yet from the published
material at present available it appears that Britain was 
right in judging that France had no intention of rewarding 
Russia for her services in Italy by any very substantial 
return in eastern coin. Her reaction to the Russian proposal 
for remonstrating with the Porte about the condition of the 
Christian population of the Ottoman Empire in May 1860 was 
sufficient evidence of that. Indeed France had succeeded in 
obtaining the neutrality of Russia in war with Austria, her 
assent to the annexation of Nice and Savoy, her diplomatic 
backing in 3yria, as well as a potential acquiescence in the 
general diplomacy of France in exchange for the vaguest
1. Vide. B.H. Sumner, "The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of
3rd March 1859," En/^llsh Historical Review. XLVIII, [1933], 
65-83.
2. F. Charles-Roux. Alexandre II, Gorchakov, et Napoleon III
[1913] 299. ------------ ----------- -----------------
3. T.W. Riker, The Making; of Roumania - a study of an
international problem. 1856-1866. [l931j 382 note.
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insinuations of cooperation in the East. And even here there 
was little prospect of any very cordial alliance for the only 
bond between the two powers was the negative one of contempt 
for the Turk. In any attempt to redraw the political frontiers 
of the Ottoman Empire it was obvious that French championship 
of the Catholic population would come into conflict with 
Russian patronage of the Orthodox Christians. The French 
Government, however, showed no inclination to precipitate a 
radical solution of the eastern question in this period: and
Russell showed a just appreciation of the value of the entente 
to France and its menace to Britain when, in a private letter 
to Grey, the charge d ’affaires, on the 3rd November 1864, he 
expressed his misgiving about t b m y ’s inclination to revive 
the connection with Russia. "I'low, mind," he wrote, "the 
alliance between France and Russia is the worst thing that can 
happen for us on the continent of Europe - not indeed
1
threatening our safety, but injurious, very, to our influence."
France’s suspicions of British policy were largely 
the outcome of exasperation at the obstacles deliberately 
strewn in her path by Britain. Some of them, on that account, 
were hopelessly wide of the mark: England had no more intention
1. Russell to William Grey, private, 3rd November 1864, 
(copy), G. & D. 22/106.
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1
of acquiring Sicily than of Egypt nor of founding a dynasty 
in Greece. But her policy of non-intervention in Italy v;as 
nicely judged to raise her influence in the central 
Mediterranean at the expense of France and her excessive 
solicitude for the rights of the Porte was calculated to bring 
about a similar result in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.
British relations with France in this region, therefore,
suffered for the most fundamental of all reasons; that the 
interests of the two powers were not only dissimilar but 
conflicting. Both had a deliberate, integrated, Mediterranean 
policy. Britain had trading interests to protect in the 
Mediterranean and beyond; she had imperial possessions whose 
defence in time of war depended on her being able to retain 
undisputed communication with the east by way of the Ottoman 
Empire. She was determined that the new forces which were 
conspiring to change the territorial possession of lands 
bordering the Mediterranean should not diminish the influence 
which she had established in that sea. She disclaimed any 
desire for predominant influence, stipulating only for a 
position of equality with France.. But she saw nothing incon-
1# "The lies about Sicily respecting us are hardly worth
notice," Russell wrote to Cowley on 15th May 1860,
"When the Genoese offered themselves to Louis XI 
he said: ’You give yourselves to me and I give you
to the Devil.’ Our reply to the Sicilians would not 
be so uncivil, but equally negative." Russell to 
Cowley, private, 15th May 1860, (copy), G. & D. 22/104.
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slstent between this and the desire to maintain a superior
1
naval force in Mediterranean waters.
Britain's resolve to prevent political developments 
in this region from undermining the balance of power and 
weakening her own position brought her into immediate conflict 
with France. For France, it seems, was intent upon turning 
the new forces of liberalism and nationalism to her own 
account. In giving military support to the Italians, and 
diplomatic support to the subject races of the Ottoman 
Empire, it would appear that she aimed also at extending 
her influence in the Mediterranean, Her interest in 
this region was not only economic and strategic. It
1. It is interesting to compare a minute written by Lord 
Palmerston in 1864 with a postscript to a letter of 
his written three years previously. The former was 
provoked by the intrigues of Beauval in Tunis
"Lord Cowley might usefully state to Drouyn - That in 
all Parts of the world in which France does not pretend 
to paramount Influence, Phglish and French agents get on 
well together. But that in all Parts of the Countries 
bordering the Mediterranean, French agents assume that 
France and French influence ought to be paramount and 
as English agents assert their right to be on an Equality 
with the French there is a perpetual struggle ..."
8th May 1864, FO 27/1529/46.
The latter was inspired by the French proposal for 
European Intervention in Syria
"As to the number of Ships to be stationed in the 
Mediterranean we ought if possible to be stronger there 
than the French. Do you know how many Liners they have 
there?" .... Palmerston to Russell, private, 20th July 
1860, G. & D. 22/21.
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was also the result of something less tangible; the conception
of the Mediterranean as a kind of native preserve, a sea
washing the shores of France, Algeria, and those parts of the
Ottoman Empire to whose catholic populations France extended a
jealous and traditional protection* To translate this
conception into reality - to establish French hegemony in the
Mediterranean, and convert it into a French lake - would appear
to have been no less an object of policy with Napoleon III than
1
it had been with Napoleon I# It was not, of course, an
ambition which could be publicly avowed so that evidence for
it is bound to be scanty. But it was considered as one of the
dominant ideas in the Emperor’s mind at the beginning of the
period by Cowley, who, at that time, may perhaps be regarded
2
as a contemporary observer well qualified to judge. Its
qdvocacy by members of the French Chambers subsequently would
3 !
seem to indicate its force as a national aspiration. And 
it had apparently been all but acknowledged in words attributed
1. c.f. Albert Pingand "La Politique Extérieure du Second
Empire", Revue Historique. [1927], CLVI, 41-68.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.53, confidential, 27th June 1859,
FO 27/1298. Cowley was well disposed to the Emperor at 
this time and had had an opportunity of watching him 
closely since 1852.
3. Annales du Sénat et du Corps lé&islatif. [1862], 244,
M. Koenigswarter, Corps Législatif, le 11 mars 1861; [1863], 
179, M. Lefébure, Corps Législatif, le 9 février 1863.
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1
to Napoleon III in 1857 by Bismarck, and recorded by his son.
In the Mediterranean, therefore, Britain and France 
pursued policies which were essentially conflicting. Yet it 
is significant that the only substantial rivalry between 
them was confined to the opening years of the period. Their 
conflict reached a climax in 1861; it persisted, thou^ on a 
lesser scale, in the following year; it was reawakened, 
briefly, by disturbances in Tunis in 1864. But after the 
FranCO-Russian understanding had foundered on the Polish 
question at the beginning of 1863, events in the Mediterranean 
ceased to have the same vital repercussions.on International 
relations. The centre of diplomatic activity shifted from 
the Mediterranean to the north of Europe; and it was primarily 
in that region that relations between Britain and France 
were then shaped.
1. "Je ne dis pas,que je veux faire de la Méditerranée un 
lac français," Napoleon III was reported to have said, 
mais pourtant à peu près la même chose." Die Grosse 
Politjk der Europaischen Kablnette 1871-1914 11922 L VI. 
102-3.
CHAPTER III.
THE REGIONAL TREND IN THE WORKING OP THE ’ALLIANCE*
2. Northern Europe.
In contrast to the many and varied issues in which 
Britain and Prance were involved in the Mediterranean, there 
were only two major questions which called for their inter­
vention in northern Europe: those of Poland and Schleswig-
Holstein. Sympathy for the Poles and Danes was a common 
sentiment on either side of the Channel so that the solution 
of these problems seemed to offer the fairest prospect of. 
cooperation between the two countries. France took the 
initiative in proposing intervention in Poland; Britain was 
responsible for suggesting joint measures in Schleswig-Holstein, 
But the alignment of powers they endeavoured to establish in 
each case was conspicuously impotent: for in this region, as 
in the Mediterranean, the interests of the two countries were 
fundamentally irreconcilable.
The conflict of interest in northern Europe originated 
with the Treaties of Vienna. The pushing back of the French 
frontiers created an inevitable grievance in France, and an 
inevitable source of potential discord in Anglo-French 
relations. But the question of the Rhine remained on the whole 
a latent issue between the two powers until the opening of
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this period. Russell had scarcely entered the Foreign Office
in 1859 before rumours reached him that France Intended to
extort the cession of Nice and Savoy from Sardinia. He
immediately warned the French Govemmont that if Savoy were
annexed to France "it will generally be supposed that the left
bank of the Rhine and the ’natural limits' will be the next
object and thus the Emperor will become an object of suspicion
to Europe and kindle the hostility of which his uncle was 
1 2 
the victim," Walewski's assurance that the Emperor had
abandoned all idea of annexing Savoy was received with a good
deal of relief; but Russell was careful to give publicity to it
in the House of Commons and to construe it as an indication
that the Emperor did not intend to make "any addition whatever"
3
to the territory of France. On this note of optimia^ British 
speculation about French designs on the Rhine subsided. But 
not for long. % e n  the French project of annexing Nice and 
Savoy was revived in the following year, Russell repeated
1. Russell to Cowley, No.56, 5th July 1859, FO 27/1284.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.145, confidential, 8th July 1859,
FO 27/1299.
3. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CLIV,
1052, 12th July 1859.
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1
the warning he had given in July. When, a little later,
Thouvenel attempted to justify French claims by alluding to
2
the Treaty of 1814, the British Government pronounced the
reference disquieting. "For other cessions on other frontiers
of France were made in 1815 and the plea now put forward of
the severity of the Treaty of 1815, if admitted, might be used
in support of other arrangements which might be proposed and
3
which might alarm other susceptibilities." After the
transaction had been completed, Cowley warned Russell privately
that the Emperor could be expected to make constant efforts
to secure the peaceful revision of the map of Europe; that in
particular he would be likely to incite Prussia to extend her
territory in the north in order to obtain compensation for
4
France on the Rhine. Russell responded with a counter-warning
1. ... "the question of the annexation of Savoy would be
regarded not so much as composing past troubles as raising 
the elements for new storms. Natural frontiers - the Alps 
and the Rhine - the repetition of the history of long and 
bloody wars - the commencement of a new struggle between 
France and Europe, such are the ideas which would pass 
through men’s minds at the announcement of such an 
acquisition." Russell to Cowley, No.62, Seen by the Cabinet, 
28th January 1860, FO 27/1322.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.87, confidential, 5th February 1860,
FO 27/1332.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.114, 13th February 1860, FO 27/1323.
At the request of the French Government, (communicated in 
Cowley’s despatch of 18th February - No.144, confidential,
FO 27/1333 -) this extract was withheld from publication, 
as well as Thouvenel’s reference to the Treaties of 1814 and 
1815, to which it was a reply. (Accounts and Papers Vol. 
LXVII,[1860], pp.73, 82).
4. Cowley to Russell, private, 2nd May 1860, G. & D. 22/54.
Extract quoted in Wellesley and Sencourt, Conversations with 
Napoleon III. [1934], 182.
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of his own: "I think ••• that you should say that without
having instructions you know full well from the temper of the
English people that either the present Ministry would resist
such a scheme of spoliation or if they should fail to do so
they would be succeeded by lord Derby who would have the
whole nation at his back."
These warnings indicate a heightened consciousness
in Britain of the potential divergence between herself and
France. In suspecting that the Emperor might follow up
the annexation of Nice and Savoy with a move to the Rhine,
the British Government were no doubt influenced by prejudice
and fear. The presence of a Bonaparte on the throne of
France made them over credulous when rumours of French
aggressive designs were in circulation: and their conviction
that any extension along the German section of the French
frontier would endanger the security of Britain made them
doubly cautious. But their apprehension was also roused by
a number of more substantial factors. The apparent surprise
and resentment with which France received British objections
2
to the annexation of Nice and Savoy did not reflect any 
great reverence for the existing treaty settlement. Nor were 
the arguments which the French Government cited in support
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 4th May 1860 (copy) G. & D.
22/104.
2, Cowley to Russell, No,87, 6tb February 1860, FO 27/1332;
Cowley to Russell, No.144, confidential, 18th February 1860, 
FO 27/1333.
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of that transaction calculated to allay suspicion. Many
were of a general nature, equally valid for the justification
of other projects of expansion. One of the most alarming,
perhaps, was Thouvenel*s contention that the decision to
annex Nice and Savoy had been precipitated by popular
1
agitation in the press: for it was followed shortly after­
wards by the appearance of pamphlets urging aggression on
2
the Rhine. Moreover, the official denials that France
1. Cowley to Russell, No.144, confidential, 18th February
1860, FO 27/1333.
2. "As to the frontier of the Rhine," Cowley reported
Thouvenel to have said on 2nd February 1860, "everybody 
knew that that idea had long been exploded in France.
It had existed so long as she had not recovered her 
military reputation but the place which France had 
occupied in Europe since the accession of the Emperor 
had reconciled her to her territorial limits." Cowley 
to Russell, private, 3rd February 1860, G. & D. 22/54.
Thouvenel emphasised that this was a personal opinion 
for he had not had an opportunity of discussing the 
matter with the Emperor since his appointment. But he 
reiterated it as an official opinion shortly afterwards.
.. "he went into some details to prove that there existed 
no notion whatever of extending the French frontier 
towards the Rhine. He said that since 1815 the separation 
of Belgium from Holland and the erection of the formér 
into a neutral Kingdom covered a large part of the French 
frontier which had previously been exposed; and that 
in fact the only open country still remaining was well 
protected by the fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg.
There was therefore no sufficient reason for desiring 
an extension of frontier towards the Rhine." Cowley 
to Russell, No.144, confidential, 18th February 1860,
FO 27/1333).
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Intended to expand her territory to the Rhine lost much of
their effect owing to persistent rumours to the contrary.
Loftus reported that one of his colleagues in Vienna had been
informed by Moustier, the French Ambassador, that the Emperor
had indicated to him, whilst on leave, the necessity of
rectifying the French frontiers' in the direction of Landau,
1
Saarbruck, Saarlouis, and the Palatinate. Cowley received
2
similar reports from his colleagues; and Palmerston was 
told by Persigny that if Germany were to be united in one 
state, France would undoubtedly think it essential for her
3
safety to demand an extension of territory towards the Rhine.
The precedent afforded by the French annexation of 
Nice and Savoy was sufficient to justify the British Government 
in believing that theFbiperor would not scruple to invent a 
pretext for extending his territory if such were his object.
But the reports of his intentions were conflicting, and of 
questionable validity. It was not surprising that Thouvenel*s 
disclaimers should have inspired the British Government with 
little confidence. If the Emperor had formulated the intention
1. loftus to Russell, No.228, Most Confidential, 19th April
1860, FO 7/592. Printed in Wellesley and Sencourt, 
Conversations with Napoleon III. [1934], 377.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 2nd May 1860, G.& D.22/54.
Extract quoted in; Wellesley and Sencourt, Conversations 
with Napoleon III. [1934], 182.
3. Minute by lord Palmerston, 22nd February, 1860, FO 391/7.
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of going to the Rhine, it was by no means certain that he 
would have informed his Foreign Minister. And even if 
Thouvenel had been aware of such a plan he would have been 
unlikely to have disclosed it to the representative of a 
country whose immediate reaction would have been to devise 
ways and means of making it miscarry. But the validity of 
the reports which credited the Emperor with designs on the 
Rhine was scarcely less questionable. Statements attributed 
to the Emperor were received at second hand, sometimes at 
third: and even if they had been accurately reported they
might have been indicative of a fleeting fancy rather than a 
fixed intention. Statements of other Frenchmen, however 
influential, were no more than individual expressions of opinion.
If British sources contain insufficient evidence for 
establishing the justice of Britain's suspicion that the 
Emperor harboured an intention of overstepping his boundaries - 
and it is very possible, of course, that social contacts 
provided the British Government with indications beyond the 
reach of the historian - it is questionable whether material 
in the French archives would be able to throw any conclusive 
light on the subject. Whether from motives of shame or cunning 
an aggressive intention is rarely committed to paper, even in 
the most secret of chancelleries: and it is only when the 
intention is transformed into action that it can be proved to 
have existed at all.
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But although it is impossible to deduce any certain 
facts about the Emperor’s intentions from material in the 
British archives, it is significant that the reports which 
represented the Emperor as intent upon ’rectifying* his 
frontiers should have reached the British Government from a 
number of independent sources. It is significant too that the 
apparent revelations should have been withheld from British 
diplomats, and made only to representatives of powers who 
might well have been supposed less hostile to the project or 
less able to resist it* Both these factors go some way 
towards justifying the British Government *s assumption that a 
divergence of interest existed between Britain and France, and 
their apprehension that subsequent international issues 
would precipitate it.
British fears were not realised until diplomatic 
activity became centred in northern Europe at the beginning of 
1863. In the intervening years, however, speculation about 
French designs on the Rhine did not entirely subside. It 
continued to flourish as a favourite topic of private corres­
pondence between Cowley and Russell: and althou^ Cowley's
information about the Emperor’s ^intentions was necessarily 
limited - based âs it was on hearsay or the opinions of those 
who were believed to enjoy the Emperor's confidence - it was 
nevertheless valuable in showing the extent to which Imperial 
circles, and the general public in France were preoccupied by
63
thoughts of the Rhine. His report of a conversation with
Walewski in July 1860 is a curious yet typical example of the
sort of intelligence with which he regaled the Foreign
Secretary. In it, he represented Walewski, who had just
returned from a visit to Fontainebleau, to have said that the
Emperor had been endeavouring to raise the,Eastern Question
for months previously; that his one object in doing so had
been to obtain the Rhine for France in return for acquiescing
in the transfer of the Danubian Principalities to Austria*
"It is clear to me," Cowley added in comment, "from what
Walewski said, and what I have heard from Paris that this is
the Emperor's principal dream. If the Eastern Question comes
to a crisis he will say to Europe - do what you like - place
whom you will at Constantinople and elsewhere, but give me
1
Belgium and the Rhine." Russell was disposed to agree in
this interpretation of Imperial policy. "It shows what I
always supposed," he wrote in reply, "that the Rhine is the
2
darling object in the Imperial mind, and not the East," 
Palmerston was equally convinced that the Rhine was Napoleon's 
main objective; but he differed from Cowley and Russell in 
thinking that an attempt would be made to secure it by force. 
Without disclosing the grounds for his belief, he informed
1. Cowley to Russell, private, 13th July I860, G. & D. 22/55.
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 14th July 1860 (copy),
G. & D. 22/104.
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Russell at the beginning of 1862 that he expected the Emperor
to make war on a grand scale in the following Spring with the
double object of obtaining Venetia for Italy and the Rhine 
1
for France, In reply to Russell's request for an opinion
2
on this forecast, Cowley embodied his views in a Memorandum 
which was subsequently circulated to the Cabinet. He agreed 
that it would be idle to suppose that the Emperor did not 
desire to associate his name with the restitution of what the 
French were pleased to call the "natural limits" of France.
But he did not think that the Emperor intended to set about 
it by aggression. The bases on which he rested his contention 
offer a compelling illustration of the difficulty of reaching 
any definite conclusion about French designs from British 
sources. Uncertainty about the British attitude towards an 
attack on the Rhine was one argument which he thought would 
make the Emperor pause. This was reasonable enough. But 
the fact that none of the Frenchmen with whom hewas acquainted 
had ever spoken to him about the restitution of French frontiers 
by force was obviously a deficient argument; for it was 
quite conceivable that they would have refrained from discussing 
such an eventuality with a British Ambassador. Nor could 
much solid comfort be derived from Cowley's observation that
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 8th January I860 (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
2. Cowley to Russell, private. Memorandum, 10th January 1862 
G.&D.22/57. Printed in full Wellesley, and Sencourt,
Conversations with Napoleon III [1934], 200.
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he had never come across "a man of less decision of character,
of more indolent disposition, or more inclined to wait upon
events instead of creating them" than the Emperor.
But despite the prognostications of lord Palmerston,
the Spring of 1862 came and went without any aggressive
move from France • It was not until February, 1863 that her
action was suspect. On the 24th of that month, the French
Ambassador communicated to Russell a proposal that Britain,
France and, if possible, Austria should present identic notes
at Berlin, remonstrating against the signature of the
Alvensleben Convention by which Prussia had undertaken to give
certain assistance to Russia in suppressing the Polish 
1
insurrection. Russell did not think the Convention "a peg
2
big enough to hang an invasion of the Rhine provinces upon";
but the Queen was "terribly alarmed" by the French proposals,
and far from satisfied with Palmerston's attitude to them.
She despatched a frantic note to Lord Granville her confidant
in the Cabinet: "The Queen shudders at the very thought of
what, if we are not very careful, .... we may find ourselves
plunged into! The proposals of France would inevitably bring
us into collision with Prussia and we should have a French
3
army on the Rhine before we could turn round." But the royal
1. Baron Gros to lord Russell, 2nd March 1863, FO 27/1509.
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 26th February (copy) G. & D.
22/105.
3. Qheen Victoria to Earl Granville, 23rd February 1863 (copy)
Letters of Queen Victoria. 2nd Series, [1926],3,66-7.
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fears had been roused unnecessarily - at least so far as
Palmerston was concerned. He was quite ready to believe that
1
French policy was dictated by motives of aggrandisement, and
in full agreement with the Cabinet’s decision to "throw cold
2
water" on the French proposals. Delay, however, occurred.
A reply had been agreed on the 25th February, but it was not
until three days later, after a second meeting of the Cabinet,
3
that it was eventually sent to Paris. The delay does not 
seem to have been caused by any misgiving about the wisdom
1. Earl Granville to Queen Victoria, 24th February 1863, 
Letters of Queen Victoria. 2nd Series, [l926],i;67.
2, Earl Granville to Queen Victoria, 25th February 1863, 
Letters of Queen Victoria. 2nd Series, [l926]p,69.




of separating British policy from French; hut it contributed 
to the irritation which the terms of the British reply provoked 
in France. They were irritating because evasive. The reply 
made no direct reference to the project of identic notes. 
Instead, it enclosed a copy of a very mild despatch about the 
Alvensleben Convention which Britain was to send to Berlin
1. It seems rather to have been the result of uncertainty
about the Austrian attitude towards the Polish question. 
When Russell informed Cowley privately on the 25th 
February that the Cabinet had agreed on a reply to the 
French proposals, he stated that this would be sent 
off on the following day "if your despatch does not 
alter our views" (G. & D. 22/105, (copy)). He referred 
to a despatch which Cowley had outlined in a private 
letter of 24th February but was unable to draft
officially until the 25th (G. & D. 22/59). It
reached the Foreign Office on the 26th, and reported 
Prince Mettemich's private opinion that Austria might 
be persuaded to throw in her lot with France and 
England in the Polish question if advised to do so by 
the British Government. (FO 27/1487/238 Most Confi­
dential). It may well be that this intelligence 
prompted Russell to withhold the draft reply to France 
and resubmit it to the Cabinet on the 28th. There 
seems to be no record of this original draft. But 
it is possible that it was identical with a draft of 
the 28th which bears an alteration in Russell's hand; 
and possible, too, that the alteration was the result 
of the Cabinet meeting on that day. For it concerned 
the attitude Britain was prepared to adopt towards 
Austria in the Polish question. The original passage 
suggested that in deference to representations received 
from Count Apponyi Austria should not be invited to 
join a demarche to Russia on behalf of Poland, but 
that she should merely be informed of the course to 
be taken by the Western Powers. The final version, 
however, was as follows: "HMG will be .••• ready to
ask Austria, as well as other Powers, Parties to the 
Treaty of Vienna to concur in the steps which Great 
Britain and France are about to take at St. Petersburg." 
(FO 27/1477/306, Confidential).
68
with the explanation that it had already been drafted when
the French proposals were received. As the British Government
had been warned of the probability of a French demarche as
1
early as the 21st February, the evasion was as palpable as
it was naive.
Subsequent reports from Paris showed that British
fears about the motives of French policy in the Polish question
had not been entirely unfounded. Those which disclosed the
substance of French overtures to Austria were, perhaps, the
most significant. Based on 'reliable sources', and the personal
testimony of Bourqueney and Metternich, they revealed that the
Emperor had spoken of territorial compensation in proposing an
alliance for the reconstitution of Poland. "Prince Metternich
has no doubt that floating visions of the frontier of the
Rhine are mixed up with vague ideas of Polish independence,"
Cowley wrote in a secret despatch of the 27th February, "though
it does not appear that H.M. allowed any expression to escape
2
him for which he could be fairly called to account." Other 
reports confirmed that official circles in France were becoming 
more and more preoccupied by thoughts of war and the Rhine; 
and that similar ideas were pervading the general public. In 
an interview with Drouyn de Ihuys on the 12th March, the 
British charge d'affaires received the impression that the
1. Cowley to Russell, No.207, confidential, 20th February
1863, PO 27/1486.
2. Cowley to Ruasell, No.255, Secret, 27th February 1863,
FO 27/1487.
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Foreign Minister was deeply disappointed at having failed
to secure British cooperation in a project which might have
brought material gains to France. He was convinced that
"(h) e [i.e. Drouyn de Lhuys ] regrds the loss of the opportunity
which was offered by the Petersbourg Convention, which he said
in so many words was 'un Incident duquel nous aurions du profiter' "
Cowley wrote that he had good reason to believe that the
Emperor had approved a reference to himself in the report of
the Committee of the Senate appointed to consider petitions
on behalf of Poland as a Prince who had shown on more than
one occasion "qu'11 ne recule pas au besoin devant une guerre
2
juste et nécessaire." And Grey was convinced that with every
Frenchman he met "sympathy for Poland" was but a pretty
3
expression for a desire of the Rhine.
Indeed, the 'caucaus' of Paris became so vociferous 
on the subject of the Rhine that the Emperor saw fit to 
reassure the British Government about his intentions. Cowley 
was invited to an audience on the 19th March and in his report 
stated that he had received the most positive declaration that 
the Emperor had no thoughts whatever of obtaining the frontier 
of the Rhine. His own rejoinder, however, illustrated the
1. Grey to Russell, No.19, confidential, 12th March 1863,
PO 27/1488.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.298, confidential, 16th March 1863,
PO 27/1488.
3. Grey to Russell, private, 13th March 1863, G. & D« 22/69.
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the necessary inadequacy of any such declaration: "I responded
that I was quite certain that H.M. would not state that which
he did not believe but that I could not forget that public
opinion in France had forced him to take possession of Nice
and Savoy against assurances previously given, and that public
opinion might also insist on the acquisition of other
advantages were France again to be engaged in successful 
1
hostilities."
Russell and Cowley regarded his assurances as satis­
factory for the time being: and they were relieved to note 
that the Austrian refusal of the French overtures of alliance 
seemed to have a sobering effect on the French Government. 
Nevertheless Cowley continued to express the opinion that the 
Emperor and Drouyn de Lhuys were only waiting to profit by the 
Polish question; and indeed that they would not hesitate to
pick a convenient quarrel with Prussia if Britain became
2
engaged in war with America# The British Government's 
reactions to subsequent overtures they received from France 
showed that they were not prepared to discount these 
suspicions. The French proposal that Austria, Great Britain 
and France should make a collective representation to Russia 
on the subject of Poland met with concurrence from the British
1. Cowley to Russell, No.314, Most Confidential, 19th March
1863, FO 27/1488.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 24th April 1863, G. & D. 22/59.
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1
Government; but in writing privately to Cowley, Russell
made no secret of bis satisfaction that the cooperation of
Austria would necessitate a "piano-forte, bitter-sweet note"
which would leave Britain free to abstain from any further
2
action if it were ignored by the Russian Government. Britain
was less accommodating when Prance indicated a desire to settle
the affairs of Poland in a general conference or congress,
composed of all the governments of Europe, Russell told Cowley
privately that he had informed Baron Gros of two objections to
this procedure. "First, that it is not what Russia asks -
Second the delay and clumsiness of such a Machine - Next,
(apparently an afterthought) we have nothing to propose."
"The proposal has certainly the merit of staving off a war,"
he went on "but at the expense of making us all ridiculous."
And then came his real objection to the proposal: "V/hat would
save the project from ridicule would be that the Congress,
inspired by Italy or France, might propose to construct a new 
3
map of Europe." It was for this reason that the British 
Government took the precaution of defining their attitude 
towards the assembly of a Conference on the subject of Poland 
in an official despatch to Cowley: "In case of the meeting
1. Russell to Cowley, No.402, 27th March 1863, FO 27/1478.
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 28th March 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
3. Russell to Cowley, private, 6th May 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
72
of a Conference," It ran, "the following two conditions must 
he positively agreed to; 1. That the Conference should 
consist only of the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of 
Vienna. 2. That the subject of its deliberations should be 
confined to the affairs of Poland." To prevent any misappre­
hension on the subject, Cowley was instructed to leave a copy
1
of the despatch with Drouyn de Lhuys.
British suspicions were equally apparent when Drouyn
de Lhuys called Cowley’s attention to some information he had
received which suggested that Prussia was contemplating the
conclusion of an agreement with Russia for the suppression of
the Polish insurrection. He indicated that he would not
make any representations to Prussia himself, for he recognised
that any action by Prance might be suspect. But he stated
his intention of communicating the facts in his possession to
the British Government, and of asking them to make the approach 
2
to Prussia. Cowley regarded Drouyn’s suggestion as an
"artful dodge to mix you up in the discussion which he may
3
turn to account later when the Rhine is ripe." Russell was 
equally alive to the danger of making any complaint to Prussia 
"which our neighbour mi^t follow up in another and more angry
1. Russell to Cowley, No*715, 2nd June 1863, PO 27/1479,
2. Cowley to Russell, No,657, confidential, 5th June 1863,
FO 27/1492.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 5th June 1863, G. & D. 22/59.
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1
voice." The Prussian Government, therefore, remained 
unmolested.
A more serious proposal from France later in the same
month brought British suspicions of her intentions to a climax.
On 23rd June, Russell received what he regarded as "a very
2
important despatch" from Baron Gros. It proposed that the
three Governments of Austria, Great Britain and Prance should
conclude a diplomatic act - in the form of a Convention or
Protocol - with the object of defining the scope of their
action on behalf of Poland. "Elies ajouteraient," Drouyn
de lhuys suggested, "qu'elles attendent 1 'aplanissement des
difficultés actuelles d'une discussion amiable et du seul emploi
des moyens diplomatiques, en se réservant, toutefois, d'examiner
d'un commun accord les résolutions qu'elles auraient à prendre
dans le cas où elles ne parviendraient point, par les seules
3
voies de la persuasion ....." Cowley detected the cloven
4 5
hoof in these proposals; Russell, the smell of gunpowder:
and the Cabinet decided that the time was not fitting for any
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 6th June 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.828, confidential, 27th June 1863,
FO 27/1480.
3. Drouyn de Lhuys to Gros, 20th June 1863. Affaires Etrangères.
Documents Diplomatiques. (1863), p.36.
4. Cowley to Russell, private, 23rd June 1863, G. & D. 22/59.
5. Russell to Cowley, private, 24th June 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
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1
fresh agreement between the three Courts. Cowley’s report
of Drouyn de Lhuy's reactions to this decision suggested that
it had been a wise one. He represented the French Minister
to have contrasted the results of the Crimean and Italian Wars
in defence of his proposal to define the engagements of the
three powers; to have repudiated all ambition of adding to the
territory of France, yet to have stated "were she left
unsatisfied in the great question of the day" [i.e. Poland]
.. "then - he did not say it would be the case, but it might
happen that France would be agitated by other desires than
2
those which impelled her now." Neither war, nor territorial 
expansion, seemed very far from his thoughts.
With the Austrian and British rejection of these 
proposals, the Emperor, if not his Foreign Minister,became 
progressively more pacific: but the uncertainty of the
situation remained - owing to the apparently vacillating 
character of the Emperor and his policy - until the three 
powers recognised the futility of further remonstrance and 
withdrew in ignominy from their diplomatic contest with Russia 
Britain’s belief that France wished to profit by the 
circumstance of the Polish insurrection to effect a 
’remaniement’ in the map of Europe and bring her frontiers to
1, Russell to Cowley, No.828, confidential, 27th June 1863,
PO 27/1480.
2, Cowley to Russell, No,735, confidential, 26th June 1863,
FO 27/1493.
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the Rhine, was the main cause of the failure of the ’Quasi- 
1
alliance*. It not only confirmed her in the pacific policy
she had resolved to follow from the start; but it coloured
the tone of the diplomatic representations she was prepared
to make to Russia. Russia was not unaware of the divergence
of interest between the two Western Powers. Indeed, Baron
Brunnow seems to have deliberately exploited it as a means
of calling Russell's bluff in an interview on the 10th April.
For Russell represented him to have called attention to the
existence of projects for altering the map of Europe, and
to have expressed the hope that Britain would be as circum-
2
spect in discountenancing them as Russia. Brunnov/ may have 
had no solid grounds for making this observation, but it was 
an effective rejoinder to the British remonstrances, and it 
tallied well enough with the general trend of British 
suspicions for it to strike home.
It was scarcely less difficult for the British 
Government to form a reliable opinion about the existence of 
French designs on the Rhine during the Polish crisis than it 
had been at the time of the French annexation of Nice and
1, Russell to Napier, No.16, Confidential, 13th January 1864, 
FO 65/655. 
cf. Supra p. 23,
2. Russell to Cowley No.486, confidential, 10th April 1863, 
FO 27/1478.
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Savoy three years earlier. But in 1863 they had reason to 
believe that the Emperor had broached the subject of territorial 
revision with another great power. Their information on this 
point was based almost exclusively on Austrian sources. Its 
validity, therefore, was by no means absolute. Yet there was 
no apparent reason for supposing that Austria would deliberately 
mislead the British Government about the character of the 
proposals she had received from France ; nor that her Ambassador 
would give an inaccurate report of the Emperor's words. This 
initial indication of the trend of Imperial policy was confirmed 
by others, individually less valuable, but cumulatively no 
less significant. The successive proposals of the French 
Government; the stray remarks of the Foreign Minister; the 
agitation by the general public: all were straws in the wind,
and all pointed in the same direction. All lent a degree of 
veracity to the information that had been received from 
Austria; all suggested that the Emperor was disposed to exploit 
a favourable opportunity to claim territorial compensation 
for France. It would seem from British sources, therefore, 
that the potential divergence of interest between Britain 
and Prance in this region was established for a brief moment 
during the Polish question on the occasion of the French 
overtures to Austria; that it lapsed into the realm of 
potentiality with Austria's refusal of those overtures; but 
that it formed a far more disquieting background to Anglo-French
77
relations In northern Europe than it had done previously.
The Polish question had no sooner subsided than the
death of King Frederick VII of Denmark precipitated another
international problem in northern Europe: the graver one
of Schleswig-Holstein. Anglo-French co-operation was no
more effective in this issue than it had been over Poland: and
recent studies have suggested that it was Britain’s curt
refusal of Napoleon Ill’s famous Congress proposal which lost
her the support of France in the subsequent negotiations
1
over Schleswig-Holstein.
Yet was the British reply such a gratuitous Insult 
to France? The fact and circumstances of its publication; 
its substance; its tone; ail have been declared wanting in 
the rudiments of diplomatic tact. Of these charges, perhaps 
the first is least well substantiated. After the publicity 
Napoleon had given to the project in his Speech from the 
Throne, it was surely appropriate that the British Government 
should have published their answer, even though a refusal.
It was particularly unfortunate that the British despatch 
should have appeared in the London Gazette before it reached 
the French Foreign Minister. But as Cowley was able to 
explain that this was the result of a genuine mistake - for
1. L.D. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question [1933], 113;
H.C.F. Bell, Lord Palmers ton 11956 ). II. 351. 365;
H. Temperley and L.M. Penson, Foundations of British 
Foreign Policy [1938], 253-9.
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which he and Drouyn de Lhuys were equally responsible - it
1
was not a legitimate ground for resentment.
Based on a characteristically vigorous letter of lord 
2
Palmerston’s, the substance of the British despatch may have
3
been "unnecessarily explicit." But after all it was only
a logical development of the arguments which Russell had used
to oppose the assembly of a conference or congress of all
Europe on the Polish question: arguments which he had made
to the French Ambassador informally and to the French Foreign
4
Minister by implication in an official despatch.
The tone of the British despatch was less defensible,
Cowley admitted - though not to lord Russell - that it was
5
thougb-t in France to be "rude and dry". But he assured 
the Emperor that the British Government had desired to convey 
their refusal in "a courteous and conciliatory form" and
1. Cowley to Russell, private, 11th December 1863, G. & D,
22/59, Extract quoted in Wellesley and Sencourt, 
Conversations with Napoleon III. ’[1934], 224. Defending 
the early publication in the House of lords, Granville said 
that the Government had considered it desirable in view of 
the fact that "French papers had stated that England had 
consented to enter into the Congress and that other nations 
were most anxious to learn what the decision of this 
country was." Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates CDCXIII,
60. 4th February 1864,
2. Palmerston to Russell, private, 8th November 1863, G. & D.
22/22, Printed In Temperley and Penson, Foundations of 
British Foreign Policy [1938], 254.
3. The criticism of The Times, noticed by Spencer Walpole,
The Life of Lord John Russell [1889], 382.
4. Supra p.71.
5. Cowley to Layard, private, 1st December 1863. British
Museum Add: M.S. 39108,
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reminded hlm of the difference in style between British and
French despatches: "H.M. must have seen enough of our
despatches to know that it was not our habit to do more than
to convey as succinctly and plainly as possible the resolution
at which we had arrived." The British reply was indeed
no more didactic, haughty or consciously stylised than a host
of other despatches with which Russell had favoured France in
the past. Perhaps his colleagues were more resigned to the
peculiar style of his despatches than the French Government.
At any rate, they do not seem to have found his tone dis--
courteous or provocative. That it was not so intended may
be reasonably inferred from Russell’s reply to Lord Napier,
British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, who had raised the
question whether Britain should depart from her traditional
connection with France in favour of a closer understanding
with Russia on the lines of the "masterly and successful
2
combinations of 1840." Russell was unmoved by this historical 
analogy. In his view, the safety of England depended on * 
maintaining rather than severing relations with France. "It 
would be very dangerous" he wrote "to leave France to suppose
3
that she was excluded from the Councils of the Great Powers..."
1. Cowley to Russell, private, 11th-December 1863,
G. & D. 22/59.
2. Napier to Russell, No.823, Most Confidential, 31st December
1863, PO 65/639.
3. Russell to Napier, No.16, confidential, 13th January 1864,
PO 65/655.
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Even if the British reply to the Congress Proposal 
had an opposite effect to what was intended and created - as 
it undoubtedly did - a feeling of resentment in France, is 
it true that it led to the reshaping of the alignment of 
powers in Europe? Was it the interpretation which France 
put on the British reply which prompted her to seek an under­
standing with Prussia? If this were the real cause of her 
overtures to Prussia, it presupposes that she had hoped to 
cooperate with the British Government at the Congress. But 
this seems improbable. The tone of the Emperor’s Speech from 
the Throne was ill-calculated to conciliate the British 
Government;. It referred to the intimate relations which had 
existed between France and Russia on the outbreak of the 
Polish revolt - "une des premières alliances du Continent" -
but it contained no reference to the character of French
1
relations with Britain. An even clearer indication that 
Napoleon did not expect to cooperate with Britain in the 
Congress was the fact that he announced his proposal to the 
world without previous concert with the British Government.
He knew that Britain was opposed to participating in a Congress 
on unspecified subjects, and thou^t to force her hand by
1. Anna
prononce
les du sénat et du Corps Législatif. (1864), Discours 
 par sa Majesté l ’Empereur, le 5 novembre 1863.
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1
appealing to the British public. Had he hoped to secure 
her cooperation, as distinct from her acquiescence, it is 
unlikely that he would have resorted to this subtle form of 
intimidation.
Moreover, to attribute the new grouping of powers in
the Schleswig-Holstein question to the rebuff which France
considered she had received in the British reply to her
Congress proposal presupposes also that she had not already
2
begun to court an alliance with the Prussian Government.
But material published from the C-erman archives suggests
that the Emperor and his Foreign Minister had started to work
towards an understanding with Prussia very shortly after the
failure of their overtures to Austria in February and March,
1863. Prince Henry VII of Reuss reported this trend in
3
Imperial policy as early as June. Count Goltz gave repeated 
indications of it subsequently: in August, September and
1. In a letter to the Duke of Argyll on 20th December 1863,
Lord Dufferin represented the Emperor to have said that
"he adopted the thunderclap mode in proposing the Congress ' 
from the conviction that although the idea would be 
scouted by the Cabinet it would be hailed with such 
enthusiasm by the people of England that you would be 
forced to agree with him ..." Lyall, The Life of the 
Marquis of Dufferln and Ava. [1905 I. 134. I
2. Professor Steefel gives due prominence to the French over- |
tures to Prussia before the British refusal of the Congre si 
proposal: but he attributes the acceleration of those '
overtures in November and December 1863 to French resent- ' 
ment at the terms of the British reply rather than to the -^ 
precipitation of the Schleswig-Holstein question.




October. And in reporting a conversation with Drouyn de
Lhuys about the projected Congress on the 8th November, he
represented the Foreign Minister to have said; "Vous vous
reppelerez, que je vous ai plusieurs fois exprimé le désir
de faire quelque chose ensemble avec vous: Peutétre que ce
2
moment est arrivé."
A study of the unpublished material in the British 
archives, therefore, and of published material from the 
French and Prussian archives, leads to the conclusion that 
this incident in Anglo-French relations has been overstressed; 
that it was in fact a symptom rather than a cause of the 
divergence of policy between Britain and France in northern 
Europe. Sensitive about the failure of his diplomacy in 
Poland, and the reverses he had suffered in the French 
elections, it seems probable that the Emperor’s object in 
proposing a general Congress was not only to restore French 
predominance on the Continent by posing as an international 
arbiter, but also to conciliate public opinion in France by 
securing a rectification of his frontiers. For although he 
proclaimed that he was disinterested in making the proposal. 
Lord Dufferln reported him to have said subsequently that "if 
there had been a Congress some slight modification of the
1. Die auswlfrtige Politik Preussens 1858-71 III [1932]
Nos. 646, 671, 677, 704. IV [1933] No.3.
2. Goltz an Bismarck, le 8 novembre. Die ausw&rtige Politik
Preussens IV [1933] p.124.
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north frontier of France, to the extent perhaps of the
extradition of a fortress here and there, might have been
1
subjected to its consideration." If it is true that he
meant to obtain some addition of territory for France - and
Bufferin's evidence certainly points to the intention - he
would have needed the cooperation of at least one great power.
Britain was known to oppose any extension of the French
frontier, and having no territorial designs herself, was
beyond the reach of bribery. Austria had already indicated
her aversion to any territorial reshuffle in Europe. But
it was possible that Prussia - the guardian of the Rhenish
Provinces - might be interested in projects of territorial
compensation. That such was Napoleon's hope may be inferred
from the tenor of Drouyn de Lhuys' remarks to Count Goltz on
2
the 8th November. With Britain's refusal of the Congress 
proposal, the opportunity was lost. And it was not surprising 
that the Emperor should have vented his wrath against the 
power which had made his plan miscarry.
Britain saw as much reason to suspect ulterior motives 
behind the Congress proposal as she had done behind the 
various overtures she had received from France on the subject 
of Poland. "I can hardly doubt that in proposing the assembly




of a Congress H.M, anticipates also the possibility of that
readjustment of the map of Europe which years ago he so
pertinaciously advocated" was Cowley's first reaction.
Russell's misgivings about the Emperor’s intentions may be
detected in the disclaimers of suspicion in the draft of the
interim reply which he submitted to the Cabinet. "H.M. commands
me to say," he had written "that She does not call in question
fbr a moment the motives by which the Emperor of the French
2
has been guided in making the proposal." Perhaps the 
Cabinet thought this would have made too great a demand on 
Imperial credulity. At any rate it was discreetly excluded 
from the final version of the despatch.
By aggravating the relations between the two powers, 
the 'Congress' incident undoubtedly contributed to the failure 
of their cooperation in the approaching negotiations over 
Schleswig-Holstein. But the cause of that failure lay far 
deeper. Britain had been unable to interest the French 
Government in finding a solution to the problem of the Duclies  ^
for several years past, France had remained persistently 
unresponsive to the various expedients which Russell had 
devised in 1861, 1862 and 1863: and she had taken no initiative
in the matter herself. "I don't know whether Thouvenel means
1. Cowley to Russell, No.1061, 7 November 1863, FO 27/1498.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.1192, 12 November 1863, FO 27/1482.
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to take any notice of my explanatory despatch about Holstein"
was a plaintive enquiry from Russell in 1861. "Does he mean
to decline altogether to take part in the affairs of Holstein?"
But the British charge d'affaires could obtain no more from
the French Minister than an expression of the degree to which
2
the whole question of Holstein "bored" him. Nor was there
any apparent change in the attitude of the French Government
in the following year. After communicating a fresh proposal
from Russell in April 1862, Cowley reported that Thouvenel
considered it "time enough for the. Non-German Powers to
interfere when the integrity of the Danish Monarchy should be
3
really threatened." No wonder that Russell refrained from 
concerting his famous ’Gotha' proposals with France. "I did , 
not communicate my plan .. previously to Thouvenel", he '
explained to Cowley, "as he always throws cold water upon any 
attempt at settlement previously shown to him. He will do
4
the same now but the bolt is sped and cannot be recalled."
With the failure of the allied intervention in Poland, France 
became still more reluctant to move in the Danish question.
1. Russell to Grey, private, 1st June 1861 (copy), G. & D.
22/104.
2. Grey to Russell, private, 3rd June 1861, G. & D. 22/56.
3. Cowley to Russell, No.517, 22nd April 1862, FO 27/1437.
4. Russell to Cowley, private, 11th October 1862, (copy)
G. & D. 22/105.
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Commenting on Russell's suggestion that the two powers
should remind Austria, Prussia and the German Diet that any
action tending to weaken the integrity and independence of
Denmark would he at variance with the Treaty of 8th May 1852,
Thouvenel pointed to the disturbing analogy between this
proposal and the course already pursued by Britain and France
in the Polish question, "He had no inclination ••• to place
France in the same place with reference to Germany as she
had been placed with regard to Russia" Grey reported him 
1
to have said.
In view of the fact that Denmark had traditional claims
on the sympathy and support of France, it was not surprising
that Britain should have looked for some ulterior motive to
account for the attitude of the French Government. "Perhaps ...
there is a latent thought, hardly avowed, that Holstein and
Schleswig might be some day or other a compensation for the
2
Rhine" Cowley suggested in May, 1861. In the following
year he believed that it was the Emperor's determination to
"pay court to Germany" which prevented him from intervening
3
in the dispute between Denmark and the Diet. But after France 
had succeeded in separating Austria and Prussia in the Polish
1. Grey to Russell, No.52, 18th September 1863, FO 27/1496.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 10th May 1861, G.. & D. 22/56.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 22nd April 1862, G. & D. 22/57.
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question, he was more inclined to think that the Emperor would 
seek to profit from the situation by ranging himself on 
the other side. He was not disposed to place much credence in 
the rumours which suggested that France was secretly encour­
aging Denmark to resist the pretensions of the German powers. 
"At the same time, I am far from affirming that in the case 
of hostilities between Denmark and Germany, the Emperor may
not side actively with the former in the hope of obtaining
1
some territorial advantages for France."
But even when the Danish question drew rapidly to 
a climax with the death of the King, Federal Execution, and 
the invasion of both Duchies by Austria and Prussia, the 
Emperor showed no sign of departing from his attitude of 
reserve. By a curious reversal of the rôles which they had 
assumed in the Polish question it was Britain who pleaded 
the cause of intervention - military as well as diplomatic - 
and France who remained provokingly aloof. But the British 
Government were no less ready to discover an aggressive 
design in French apathy than in French restiveness. "The 
Prussians ought not to be lulled into security by the firm 
repose of France on this Question" Palmerston wrote to 
Russell at the end of December, "She is only waiting to see 
Prussia fairly committed beyond the Power of Retreat and then
1. Cowley to Russell, No.741, 27th June 1863, FO 27/1493.
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she will fall foul of Prussia with the approval of all
1
honourable men."
This comment of Palmerston’s is particularly signifi­
cant: for it shows how little the British Government were
aware of what the German archives have since revealed about 
the trend of Imperial policy at the turn of 1863. To judge 
from the reports of Count Goltz, it would seem that Napoleon
was much more intent upon extending his frontiers by striking
2
a bargain with her than provoking a conflict. If he and 
his Minister were sincere in the suggestions which the Prussian 
Ambassador attributed to them it was evidently their aim to 
secure compensation for France in the Rhenish Provinces of 
Prussia by sanctioning a radical solution of the Schleswig- 
Holstein question: the cession of Holstein and German
Schleswig to Prussia, and the fusion of Denmark and Danish 
Schleswig into a Kingdom of Scandinavia. Of the substance 
of these overtures to Prussia, Britain remained ignorant.
But during the course of January 1864, rumours began to reach 
the British Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh, Berlin and Paris 
that France was endeavouring to reach an understanding with
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 26th December 1863,
G. & D. 22/14.
2. Vide L.D, Steefel. The Schleswig-Holstein Question 
“ IT932], 117 ff.
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1
Prussia: and it was not long before the British Government
were able to form a pretty clear picture of the Imperial 
design from the actions and commentaries of the French 
Government itself,
France did not withhold diplomatic support from 
Russell’s expedients for preserving peace. But in many cases
2
her response was dilatory; in nearly all it was unenthusiastic.
Often the British Government had reason to suppose that she
had acquiesced in a proposal from the conviction that it
would be useless: sometimes, that she had taken steps to
3
nullify the very measures she had affected to support. Nor
1. Napier to Russell, No.825, 31st December 1863, FO 65/639;
Buchanan to Russell, No.40, confidential, 12th January 
1864, FO 64/555; Cowley to Russell, private, 1st January 
1864, G. & D. 22/60; Cowley to Russell, private, 14th 
January 1864, G. & D. 22/60.
2. .."the more I see and hear the more I am convinced that the
French Government do not desire to prevent hostilities.
They could not refuse the principle either of discussion 
or of mediation but they have delayed giving an answer 
until the answer will be of no utility. This conviction 
is shared by all my principal Colleagues .... ’’
Cowley to Russell, private, 8th January 1864, G. & D.22/60. 
Cf. Cowley on the delay of the French Government in reply­
ing to Russell’s suggestion that the Diet should be urged 
to refrain from entering Schleswig, 12th January 1864,
FO 27/1522/70.
3. ..’’As I feared Drouyn cannot play a straightforward game.
I find that Metternich and Goltz saw him after my interview 
with him yesterday and that he told them that he had only 
backed up your proposal for an armistice par acquit de 
conscience but that he knew it to be impossible for either 
Austrians or Prussians to consent to it under present 
circumstances, in other words telling them to go on ..." 
Cowley to Russell, private, 12th February 1864, G. & D. 
22/60.
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did the Emperor and Drouyn de Ltiuys convey the Impression In
conversation of desiring a peaceful solution of the dispute
between Denmark and Germany. Cowley reported that they could
scarcely conceal their joy "even for the sake of decency" -
when the invasion of Schleswig was announced. Their vexation
that Britain showed no signs of becoming embroiled in
hostilities, he added, was no less pronounced: and it was
echoed with some violence in the press and society of Paris.
The Emperor's object, Cowley surmised, was to keep the
solution of the question in his own hands. "That the Emperor
still meditates the creation of a Scandinavian Kingdom and the
consequent annexation of Schleswig to Germany is to my mind
beyond a doubt," he wrote. "What scheme of profit there may
be for France at the bottom of Scandinavian and German unity
I need not now stop to enquire ..." To remove any possible
misconception on the point, Palmerston pencilled the concise
1
comment "Rhine" in the margin.
There were only two occasions on which France showed 
any inclination to depart from her passive rôle. The first 
was on the eve of the invasion of Jutland when rumours of the 
impending extension of hostilities and the Prussian threat 
to Saxony seemed to predispose the Imperial Government to join
1, Cowley to Russell, No.217, confidential, 5th February 
1864. FO 27/1525.
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Britain, Sweden and Russia in a naval demonstration in the 
1
Baltic. The change in the French attitude was only
momentary: it lasted a bare couple of days and Drouyn de
Lhuys was soon repeating the Emperor's determination to be
"excessivement prudent" about giving material aid to Denmark.
Professor Steefel has interpreted this sudden volte face on
the part of the French Government as a warning to Prussia,
and an incitement to Britain rather than the symptom of any
real desire to intervene in the dispute between Denmark
3
and the German powers. Cowley suggested still another reason
for the Emperor's conduct: "I quite agree that it would
never do for us to hold out baits of any kind to the Emperor,"
he wrote in reply to a letter from Russell, "Probably some
4
hope of this kind may influence his present conduct..."
1. Cowley to Russell, No.232, Confidential, 20th February 1864,
FO 27/1525; Cowley to Russell, No.299, Most Confidential, 
23rd February 1864, FO 27/1526.
Extracts quoted in: Steefel; The Schleswig-Holstein 
Question [1932] 186, 193.
Cowley to Russell, private, 21st February 1864,
G. & D. 22/60.
Cowley to Rusaell, private, 22nd February 1864,
G. & D. 22/60.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.289, 22nd February 1864, FO 27/1526.
3. Steefel: The Schleswig-Holstein Question [1932], 197-8.
4. Cowley to Russell, private, 22nd February 1864,
G. & D. 22/60.
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Drouyn de Lhuys had given Cowley no reason to suppose
that such was the French game: and it was not until three
months later - a result, perhaps, of the meetings of the
crowned heads of Austria, Russia and Prussia at Kissengen and
Carlsbad - that he even suggested that the alliance of France
1
could be bought. In an interview of 20th June, he gave
Cowley to understand that French military aid might be
forthcoming if the theatre of operations were extended from
the Baltic to the Adriatic; if Venetia were freed from
Austrian rule, and a portion of the Rhenish provinces ceded
to France. "The word 'Rhine' was not mentioned by either
party," Cowley explained, "though it was easy to see what
2
Drouyn was driving at." Palmerston's immediate reaction 
was to proclaim the price too high. French assistance in 
expelling Austria from Venetia would only be given in return 
for compensation in Sardinia, Sicily or Genoa, "none of which
1. Curiously enough, Drouyn de Lhuys seems to have informed
the Danish Minister in Paris early in June that he had let 
Cowley know .that the cooperation of France might have 
been obtained "by an intimation from H.M.G. that some 
material or 'moral' advantage would necessarily accrue 
to her in the event of her taking up arms." Cowley 
explicitly denied the truth of this assertion. Commenting 
on it in a confidential despatch he stated: "M. Drouyn de
Lhuys has on the contrary in his conversations with me 
invariably asserted that it was a calumny to suppose 
that the Emperor entertained, those plans of obtaining the 
frontier of the Rhine which had been attributed to him..." 
Cowley to Russell, No.685, Most Confidential, 11th June 
1864, FO 27/1530.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 20th June 1864, G. &  D. 22/60.
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Cessions ... would suit us"; and so far as the Rhenish
provinces were concerned, the loss to Prussia would signify
little "hut as future Danger to Belgium and Holland, and
through them to us. Such an Acquisition to Prance would he 
1
hurtful to us." In view of the Cabinet's decision to
abstain from war in conjunction with France - so long as there
was no immediate threat to the continued existence of Denmark
as an independent power - it was perhaps fortunate that the
Emperor should have again retracted the advances of his
2
Foreign Minister.
It was not until 20th June, when Cowley reported the 
substance of his conversation with Drouyn de Lhuys, that the 
British Government had any concrete evidence for their 
suspicions that France sought to profit materially from the 
Danish question. Goltz had every reason to withhold the 
Imperial confidences from Cowley: and Britain was unable to
discover how far French overtures to Prussia cut across 
fundamental interests of her own. She was not in possession 
of sufficient information to appreciate to the full the subtle 
irony of the Emperor's plea that suspicion of his designs 
on the Rhine made it imperative for him to follow a pacific
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 21st June 1864,
G. & D. 22/15.
2. Earl Russell to Queen Victoria, 25th June 1864, Letters of
Queen Victoria. 2nd Series, [1926] I, 229.
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1
policy. But she was able to draw her own conclusions from 
the reluctance with which France supported her efforts to 
prevent war; her satisfaction at the outbreak of hostilities; 
and her evident desire that a British naval force should be 
sent to the Baltic. Whilst, therefore, British sources 
contain valuable indications of the reserve which France 
maintained towards Britain, they reveal little about the 
motives which inspired it. They convey the impression of a 
divergence of interest between the two powers, but provide 
insufficient evidence for judging the extent of the divergence 
Published material from French and German archives, however, 
goes some way towards filling this gap: and, moreover,
towards substantiating the suspicions of the British 
Government •
The conflict of interest between Britain and France 
in northern Europe is less easy to define than that in the 
south and Mediterranean. It was not the result of rivalry; 
nor was it openly revealed. It grew out of the British 
belief that France desired to revise the frontiers which 
recorded the defeat of her armies, in 1815. It cannot be said 
to have existed until the French Government, acknowledging 
that desire, resolved to translate it into action. The 
Emperor did not deny that French aspirations were centred on 
the left bank of the Rhine, "but people might dream," he
1. Cowley to Russell, No.165, 26th January 1864, PO 27/1524.
Clarendon to Russell, private, April 15th, 1860,
G. & D. 22/26.
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reminded Lord Dufferin, "without ever thinking of carrying
1
dreams into effect." Evidence of the French resolve to 
act upon the national 'dream* is extremely fugitive in 
British sources. It is always verbal; always indirect. 
Refutations of it, by contrast, are constant; written as well 
as verbal; direct, therefore, as well as indirect. Cumu­
latively, however, evidence in the British archives suggests 
that the desire for the Rhine was latent in France until 
1860; that after 1860 it was sufficiently strong to be 
precipitated by the evolution of events in northern Europe.
It does not lend support to the much criticised theory of
2
Professor Oncken, that desire for the Rhine was the be-all 
and end-all of French policy. Rather it indicates that the 
Emperor was disposed to exploit the opportunities which 
presented themselves but that with one exception - the Congress 
proposal - he was not prepared to create them. The divergence 
of interest between Britain and France, therefore, seems to 
have been constantly potential; and only occasionally 
established. But potential or established, it was always a 
poison in Anglo-French relations.
Unlike the conflict between Britain and France in the 
Mediterranean, the divergence of interest between them in
1. Lyall, The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava.
[1905], 134.
2. H. Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III, von. 1863
bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870/71.
Berlin und Leipzig [1926j.
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northern Europe was not reflected, to any marked degree, in 
a rival alignment of powers. Indeed, the outbreak of the 
Polish insurrection had the appearance of tightening rather 
than relaxing the relations between Britain and France for 
it severed the connection between France and Russia, and drew 
France towards an understanding with Austria, with whom 
Britain had already been working closely in the Mediterranean, 
After the failure of the 'quasi-alliance' between the three 
powers in Poland, Britain attempted to maintain her conserva­
tive connection with Austria, until this was precluded by 
Austrian policy in the Danish question, France did not sever 
her relations with Austria but she concentrated her efforts 
upon securing an understanding with Prussia, to which she even 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to attract Russia, In her new 
association, unlike her earlier one with Russia, it was she who | 
was the dupe, not her partner. So that on the conclusion of ! 
hostilities in Denmark, and the triumph of Bismarck's policy in 
the Duchies, France was no less isolated in Europe than Britain, 
The absence of cooperation between the two powers in northern 
Europe had inflicted a signal defeat on the policies of both - 
with incalculable consequences for the future. They were to 
be kept apart until "France would once for all declare herself !
content with her present limits and •••• would not seek to 
1
extend them,"
1. Russell to Grey, private, 7th November 1864, G. & D. 22/106,
CHAPTER IV.
THE REGIONAL TREND IN THE WORKING OF THE 'ALLIANCE'
3. Outside Europe and the Mediterranean.
The issues in which Britain and France were concerned
overseas played a leas important part in shaping the character
of their relationship than those nearer home. They rarely
took precedence over the more vital questions in the
Mediterranean and northern Europe: and they rarely held the
y
diplomatic stage alone. Indeed, these were treated by both 
powers - by Britain perhaps rather more than by France - less 
on their own merits than according to a deliberate calculation 
of the effect they would be likely to produce on Anglo-French 
relations in general. As a result, both governments were 
disposed to minimise points of conflict; to agree to differ rather 
than to persist in dispute; to compromise, and whenever possible 
to present the appearance of co-operation. Their task was 
eased by the very fact of these issues arising at a distance 
from Europe. This precluded the intervention of two of the 
remaining great powers; and the third - Russia - showed no 
inclination to disturb the relations of the Western powers 
in Asia or America. Differences between Britain and France 
in this region, therefore, were not accentuated by the
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diplomacy of those seeking to displace the Anglo-French
understanding hy other alignments.
There were only three series of events overseas
sufficiently important to exert a substantial influence on
the general relations of Britain and France. In each case
the two powers achieved some measure of co-operation* The
period opened with the repulse by Chinese forces of the
small Anglo-French expedition sent to ratify the Treaties of
Tientsin in Pekin. The outrage was deeply resented in London
and Paris; and the two governments co-operated in sending a
further expedition to Chinese waters. Their motives in so
1
doing were fundamentally dissimilar. Yet one motive was
common to both: the belief, in Cowley's words, that "our
double action at a distance may perhaps bring back a little
2
more cordiality between the two nations." The Emperor 
emphasised this aspect of the expedition in conversing with 
Cowley. And to Russell it was equally important. From 
the point of view of Britain's military prestige in the Par 
East he would have preferred that British forces should have 
been allowed to restore their reputation alone. But "if the 
enterprise brings us together, and Paris will be amused by
1. Supra pp.21-2.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 21st September 1859,
G. & D. 22/53.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 5th October 1859,
G. & D. 22/53.
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the accounts of a march to Pekin" he was not disposed to
1
object to a joint expedition.
Diplomatic preliminaries were concerted in a spirit
of compromise. Both powers made some sacrifice of opinion in
2
fixing the Indemnity to be claimed from China. The execution
3
of the campaign was inevitably marred by dissension, but
this was carefully concealed in official statements on the
conclusion of hostilities. Speaking in the House of Commons,
Palmerston unblushingly acclaimed "the most perfect harmony"
that had prevailed between the British and French forces.
"I trust," he added, "that this is only a happy omen of the
4
concord which will long prevail between the two nations."
These sentiments were echoed in the Corps Législatif, where 
Baroche went so far as to express the hope that allied
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 11th October 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
2. A private letter from Palmerston suggests that Britain was
not entirely disinterested in meeting the French view.
"As to the French despatch about China," he wrote to 
Russell, "we might perhaps join them in demanding money 
if we are obliged to send an expedition. I do not give 
much weight to the opinion that the Chinese could not 
pay. Those semi-barbarous Governments have generally a 
Treasure hoarded up. Moreover the French say they will 
occupy Territory probably Chusan as Security for payment 
and we might as well have a joint occupation with them as 
leave them in sole Possession of an Island very much 
commanding Shanghai."
Palmerston to Russell, private, October 29th 1859,
G. & D. 22/20.
3. Vide P.H. Chiang, Anglo-Chinese Diplomatic Relations 1856-60.
unpublished PH.D. Thesis, [1939].
4. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLXI, 400,
14th February 1861.
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victories in China might efface the memory of the "discordes
1
séculaires" which had divided the countries for so long.
This was much to expect of a minor operation in a
remote part of the globe. Yet the co-operation between Britain
and France in China did make some contribution towards
improving their relationship. It came as an opportune
antidote to the ill feeling that had been roused over Nice
and Savoy, ^nd it gave the British Government the satisfaction
of observing that the secret understanding between France and
Russia, although operative in the Mediterranean, did not
extend to the Far East. For France had shown no disposition
to accept thè Russian offer of mediation between China and
2
the Western Powers: whilst Palmerston affected to believe
3
that Russia was at the bottom of Chinese resistance at Taku.
The second major event to affect British and French 
interests overseas was the American Civil War. In its most 
crucial phase, this titanic struggle on the American continent 
happened to coincide with a curiously uneventful period in
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1862], I, 278, le
12 mars 1861.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.585, 5th October 1859, PO 27/1303.
3. "There can be no doubt that there were Russians employed
in the Construction of the Peiho Batteries and in the 
working of them in the late action" he wrote to Hammond.
"I heard the other Day from a Person likely to know that 
a Batch of Russian Officers was sent to China in 
February last and they did not of Course go thither for 
nothing." Palmerston to Hammond, private, 20th September 
1859, FO 391/7.
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Europe. The problems it posed for Britain and France,
therefore, acquired a special prominence: and the attitude
adopted by each power towards them played an important part
in determining the general character of their relations.
From the outset, the British Government was anxious
"to act in this American business entirely in accordance with 
1
France." Russell sought French co-operation in inviting
both sides to accede to the four points of the Declaration
2
of Paris on maritime law. He readily modified his draft
instructions to Lyons in Washington to meet the French
objection that a renunciation of privateering was more likely
3
to be acceptable to the north than the south. Moreover,
when negotiations were transferred to London by Seward's
offer to adhere to the Declaration by means of an Anglo-
American Convention, Palmerston was instrumental in making
the British acceptance conditional upon a similar Convention's
4
being signed with France.
It was Britain, therefore, who was responsible for 
initiating a joint policy with France in the American question:
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 21st May 1861, (copy),
G. & D. 22/104.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.563, 11th May 1861, FO 27/1376.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.600, 16th May 1861, FO 27/1376.
4. Vide E.D. Adams, Great Britain and the American War. [l925j,
I, 167. The project foundered when Britain and France
insisted that the Convention should be accompanied by 
separate declarations to prevent the Northern States 
demanding that Southern privateers should be treated as 
pirates.
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and Britain who showed herself the more conciliatory in 
establishing it* Yet Prance was hardly less convinced of 
the need for a common stand* Although more concerned than 
Britain about the shortage of cotton, she refused to be led 
away from the British policy of neutrality by the wiles of the 
Southern Commissioners. It was her action in supporting 
British claims over the Trent which provided the most convinc­
ing demonstration of Anglo-French co-operation in American 
affairs. Not only did the French Minister at Washington give
1
valuable "moral support" to lord Lyons on his own initiative;
but Thouvenel formally upheld the justice of British claims
in a despatch which was subsequently communicated to each of
2
the principal courts of Europe. Russell was particularly
gratified by the form of the French support - "precisely that
S
which was most useful to Her Majesty's Government" - and
writing privately to Cowley, he expressed his confident hope
"that this incident will do much to strengthen the alliance
4
between England and France." Whatever the motives of French 
conduct - and neither Palmerston nor Cowley could believe them
1. Lyons to Russell, private, 23rd December 1861, (copy),
G. & D. 22/14.
2. Affaires Etrangères, Documents Diplomatiques 1861. (1862),
99. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a M. Mercier,
le 3 décembre 1861.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.49, 15th January 1862, PO 27/1419.
4. Russell to Cowley, private, 7th December 1861, (copy),
G. & D. 22/106.
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1
disinterested - the effect was certainly to lessen British
suspicions of French intentions in Europe. For as Cowley
reasoned in his famous Memorandum of 9th January 1862, if the
Emperor were contemplating a move to the Rhine it was scarcely
probable that "he would, unsolicited by us, have given advice
to the United States calculated to prevent war with England,
when his policy would rather have been to embroil us at a
2
distance from home in the other hemisphere."
Anglo-French co-operation was maintained in the 
following months; although the increasingly urgent demand for 
cotton in France threatened to disturb its harmony. The British 
Government felt obliged to decline a proposal from the Emperor 
that the Maritime Powers of Europe should offer mediation.
3
But Russell's reply was couched in terms of unusual cordiality.
1. Palmerston has left two interpretations of the French
action. To Russell he wrote that the line taken by the 
Emperor was "in keeping with ..• the Feelings of the 
Emperor against the Northerners." (Palmerston to Russell, 
private, 6th December 1861, G. & D. 22/21). As a 
marginalia to Cowley's Memorandum of 9th January 1862, 
he pencilled "He [the Emperor] could not wish the Northern 
American Navy to be annihilated". (Cowley to Russell, 
private, 9th January 1862, G. & D. 22/57). Cowley's 
view is contained in a private letter to Layard: .. "The 
French hate us cordially and systematically", he wrote,
"but at the moment they hate the Americans more because 
they cannot get their cotton. They hope that this Trent 
affair will lead to opening the Southern ports and that is 
the reason why they are with us ..." (Cowley to Layard, 
private, 5th December 1861, B.M. Add. MSS. 39102, Private 
Layard Papers).
2. Wellesley and Sencourt, Conversations with Napoleon III.
[1934], 204. Of. Supra p.64.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.1128, 13th November 1862, FO 27/1429.
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It emphasised the Queen's desire to act "with France upon
the great questions now agitating the world, and upon none
more than on the contingencies connected with the great
struggle now going on in America"; it referred in grateful
terms to the "noble and emphatic manner in which the Emperor
of the French vindicated the Law of Nations and assisted the
cause of peace" in the affair of the Trent; it acknowledged
"the benevolent views and humane intentions" that had prompted
the Emperor's suggestion. All that was questioned was the
timing of the proposal. In declining it on those grounds the
British Government implied that it might be renewed with
advantage at a future date. Cowley reported that Britain's
rejection of the French overture had caused no irritation to
1
Drouyn de Ihuys, . an impression which Layard, then on a visit
2
to Paris, was able to confirm. Certainly it appeared to make 
very little difference to the relations of the two countries, 
even in American affairs. With the exception of an independent 
offer of mediation to the North at the beginning of 1863, France
1. Cowley to Russell, No.1290, 18th November 1862, PO 27/1447.
2. "As regards the offer to mediate in America," Layard wrote
to Russell, "he [Drouyn de Lhuys] said he did not attach 
much importance to it - the Emperor had made it to 
discharge a duty he owed to humanity. He had heard 
from Plahault that you had declined to entertain it 
and did not seem surprised." Layard to Russell, 
private, 13th November 1862, G. & D. 22/28.
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showed no inclination to sever her previous association
with Britain. Nor did she attempt to supersede it by one 
1
with Russia. As a result, Anglo-French co-operation survived
in America when it was virtually extinct in Europe. It is
significant of the strength of the association on American
questions that when the war was over Drouyn de Lhuys should
have found it necessary to disabuse the American Minister
of the belief that British and French policy had been regulated
by a formal understanding. "If by understanding was meant
any political engagement between the two Governments, he
[Mr. Bigelow] was in error .... but it was perfectly true
that during the late lamentable war the two Governments had
maintained a constant exchange of opinions with a view to
2
acting in common."
For France, common action with Britain in the American 
question had spelt subservience: a subservience, however,
partly the result of the leading role she had assumed in the 
third major incident of this region - the debt collecting 
expedition to Mexico. This was the very antithesis of the
1. Mercier did sound Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at
Washington, on a joint offer of mediation without Britain; 
but only after he had failed to enlist Lyons* co-operation. 
And he received no encouragement from Stoeckl who was 
informed by his Government that Russia did not wish to be 
compelled to face such a question. "She did not wish to 
offend France, and an offer without England had no chance 
of acceptance." Vide E.D. Adams, Great Britain and the 
American Civil War. 11925]« 11,-76 note.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.816, 8th July 1865, PO 27/1574.
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earlier joint expedition to China. As an essay in Anglo-
French co-operation, it was a conspicuous failure. Yet it
did little more than ruffle the surface of Anglo-French
relations; for this the forbearance of the British Government
was largely responsible.
Cowley, it seems, was the first to discourage the
notion of protesting at the extension France had given to
the original scope of the expedition. "For my part," he
wrote to Layard shortly after the breach at Orizaba, "I am
for letting them [the French] go on if they will. They never
can establish themselves permanently in Mexico, which is all
we have to guard against, while they will spend both men and
1
money which will aid in keeping them quiet." 'Mexicans not 
2
being Hindoos', Palmerston was inclined to agree that the
danger of a French conquest was negligible. Besides, the
establishment of a monarchy would be "a Godsend to all countries
3
having anything to do with Mexico." And if he was slower
than Cowley to welcome the drain on French resources he at
least saw the futility of raising objections to the despatch
of French reinforcements which "the Emperor will no Doubt
4
send whether we approve or not." Russell's personal experience
1. Cowley to Layard, private, 30th May 1862, B.M. Add. MSS.
39103. Private Layard Papers.
2. Palmerston to Russell, private, 13th August 1862,
G. & D. 22/22.
3. Palmerston to Russell, private, 19th June 1862,
G. Sc D. 22/22. ' '
4. Palmerston to Russell, private, 19th June 1862, G. & D. 22/221
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1
of Napoleon I's campaign in Spain made it hard for him to
resist an occasional thrust at Napoleon Ill's venture in 
2
Mexico. Yet he, too, appreciated the folly of entering into
3
controversy on the subject.
Thus Thouvenel*3 fear that Britain might jeopardise
the future good understanding between tne two countries by
an open protest against French proceedings in Mexico was 
4
needless. Britain's only protest was in her eventual with­
drawal from the joint expedition. Even then she avoided 
widening the political separation between herself and France 
by refusing to ratify the Convention in which Wyke and Doblado 
had settled British claims on Mexico independently of the
French. At least, that was the interpretation she gave to
5
her action in correspondence with France. In fact the Cabinet
1. Vide Spencer Walpole, The Life of Lord John Russell 
“11889], I, 36 ff.
2. "The first Napoleon wished to regenerate Spain" he wrote
in a despatch that was to be read to Thouvenel, ... "The 
end is well known and might serve as a warning if 
experience were not always bought and never borrowed." 
Russell to Cowley, No.991, 8th October 1862, PO 27/1428.
3. In a despatch dated 30th April 1862, and seen by the Cabinet,
Russell impressed upon Cowley the need for "avoiding as 
much as possible to give a controversial character to your 
communications with the French Minister and seeking rather 
by a temperate statement of the difficulties both present 
and prospective which the conduct of the French agents is 
calculated to produce to incline the French Government of 
itself to prescribe to those Agents greater patience and 
caution for the future." Russell to Cowley, No.473,
April 30th 1862, PO 27/1422.
4. Cowley to Russell, No.572, 2nd May 1862, PO 27/1438.
5. Russell to Cowley, No.699, 17th June 1862, FO 27/1424.
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had decided to disavow the Convention because they regarded
certain clauses as intrinsically objectionable. But, at
Palmerston's suggestion, their decision was deliberately
turned to profit as a gesture of goodwill to France. "HMG
are rejoiced," ran the official despatch to Cowley, "that they
are not obliged, at a moment when the French expeditionary
force appears to be in difficulties to take a step which might
have borne the Character of aggravating those difficulties
and might have implied feelings on the part of the British
Government which they are far from entertaining towards that
2
of the Emperor."
Thus did Britain seek to minimise the effect of her
rupture with France in Mexico. And her task in preventing the
3
"Mexican wet blanket" from spreading a gloom over the general
relations of the two countries was considerably eased by the
growing belief that a consequence of French activity in Mexico
would be enforced quiescence in Europe. Of this, Palmerston
was more persuaded than Russell; indeed, it was largely owing
4
to his advice and guidance that the breakdown of Anglo-French
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 14th June 1862, G.& D.22/14.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.699, 17th June 1862, PO 27/1424.
3. Clarendon to Hammond, private, 23rd December 1863, FO 391/7.
4. On more than one occasion Palmerston found it necessary to
remind his Foreign Secretary that critical references to 
the Emperor's proceedings in Mexico were inexpedient. "It 
does not seem to be our Interest, nor that of Europe," he 
wrote at the end of 1863, "to induce him to withdraw from 
his Mexican Enterprise, it is a Safety Valve for his Steam, 
useful to prevent an Explosion in Europe." Palmerston to 
Russell, private, 22nd December 1863, G. & D. 22/l4.
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co-operation in Mexico did not seriously affect the general
relations of the two powers. Paradoxically, Britain came to
derive a positive satisfaction from the French violation of
the Convention of london; and although the French Government
did not scruple to foster the legend that Britain had abandoned
1
French troops at a time of peril, they were chary of advancing 
the contention officially.
In the three major incidents of this region, therefore, 
Britain and France either acted together or separated in good 
humour. But forming a background to these few prominent 
questions were a number of minor ones in which they either 
acted apart or in opposition. These smaller issues were of 
two kinds; firstly those which gave rise to diplomatic 
representations between the two powers, or to measures of 
opposition; and secondly, those which were carefully 'soft- 
pedalled* at government level. j
It was the British Government who were mainly responsible 
for raising the issues of the former category. Although anxious I 
to avoid controversy with France overseas, there were certain | 
of her proceedings which they were not prepared to tolerate. j 
Of these, the recruitment of African labour for Réunion, Mayotte 
and Nos si Be was perhaps the most important. The suppression ; 
of the African Slave Trade had long been a special object of
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1863], V, 112,
26th June 1862.
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concern to Palmerston: and the French practice of purchasing
slaves, although nominally to free them, threatened seriously
to interfere with it. British agents had frequent cause to
complain of the encouragement and support given by French
colleagues to the activities of the slave traders. Objections
were raised on political and economic grounds as well as
humanitarian: for it was shown that in their desire for the
establishment of engage depots the French were led into
political intrigues either with or against the native rulers;
and that in their quest for slaves they gave stimulus to
tribal warfare which impeded legitimate trade.
The British Government did not hesitate to bring these
charges to the notice of the French Government. In July 1859,
for example, they deeply deplored the indications that had
reached them "from all quarters" of the determination of French
agents to persevere in procuring labourers from Africa "by
means too closely resembling the Slave Trade". "On all sides,"
it was stated, "the traffic threatens to disturb the legitimate
commerce which had at last obtained a firm footing amongst the 
1
natives." In 1861 it was the political aspect of French 
activities to which objection was raised. The erection by 
French agents of a large and mysterious building in Zanzibar 
ostensibly a hospital - prompted the British Government to 
remind the French of the "very intimate relations of friendship
1# Russell to Cowley, No.35, 25th July 1859, FO 84/1089.
Ill
and alliance" which subsisted between Great Britain and
Zanzibar: "An active and important trade is moreover carried
on between E l h Indian subjects and the subjects of the Sultan
of Zanzibar," Russell wrote to Cowley, "Her Majesty's
Government could not therefore see with indifference any events
which tended to destroy the Independence of the Sultan or to
1
transfer his Territory to another Power," In 1863, a higher
note was sounded. The British Government took advantage of
the establishment of a French protectorate over Porto Novo to
remind the French Government that the suppression of the Slave
Trade was a "noble task" and "fit employment" for the energies
of two great nations. Whilst affecting to have full confidence
in the Emperor's devotion to that cause, the British Government
did not attempt to disguise their opinion that "the French
on the coast of Africa seem to have been mainly animated by
petty commercial jealousy of the English and have been wholly
2
insensible to higher and nobler motives."
Considerations of prestige may well have influenced 
the conduct of the French: but it seems in the main to have
been inspired by the acute shortage of native labour on their 
sugar plantations. France was willing to sign an undertaking
1. Russell to Cowley, No.6, 27th June 1861, FO 146/1007.
2. Russell to Grey, No.l, 30th September 1863, FO 84/1199.
The draft of this passage is in Palmerston's hand.
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1
to respect the Independence of Zanzibar: but she was
reluctant to give satisfaction in the matter of the Free
Emigration system; and even after the conclusion of the
2
Coolie Convention, she continued to acquiesce in the shipment
3
of slaves to her colonies in the Mozambique Channel. Un­
fortunately for Anglo-French relations, France was not able 
to make the same reconciliation between humanitarian instincts 
and commercial interests, as Britain.
The other form of French activity to which the British 
Government took exception was the establishment of French 
coaling stations on strategic British trade routes, notably 
the British route to India. But this was a negligible source 
of Irritation between the two countries. For although the 
British Government took active measures to frustrate the 
projects of the French, they were careful to do so unobtrusively. 
Thus, on learning from the Foreign Office that a French Company 
were thought to be meditating the purchase of Socotra, the j
India Office agreed to instruct the Political Agent at Aden ■
to take steps to dissuade the native chief from selling It to
4- I
the French. Similarly, on hearing rumours that the French ,
1. Cowley to Russell, No.2, 10th March 1862, PO 146/1066. I
I
2. 1st July 1861. I
3. Vide W.L, Mathleson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade !
1839-65 [1929], 184.
4. Melvill to Hammond, 23rd June 1869, FO 78/3186.
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were contemplating a settlement at Disseh, off the Eritrean 
1
coast, Russell instructed the British Consul General at
Alexandria that the Red Sea and Indian Telegraph Company
should he invited to apply to the Forte for permission to
2
establish one of their stations on the Island, Britain was
not entirely successful in her efforts to exclude French
influence from the region of the Red Sea. In 1862, the French
ensign was run up at Obock - almost opposite Aden - on a site
3
purchased from the Sultan of Tadjoura and Rahaita. But 
Britain made no attempt to obstruct the French settlement; 
and Napoleon III, in return, made no move to exploit its 
potentialities.
Of the many petty incidents deliberately belittled in 
the cause of good understanding between the,two powers, three 
may be singled out as in some sense typifying the rest: those
in Madagascar, Cambodia and the Pacific Islands. They are 
typical, of course, only of the incidents revealed in the 
British archives: and for this reason give special emphasis
to the forbearance practised by the British Government. But 
it is not to be inferred that Napoleon III was necessarily any
1. Colquohoun (Alexandria) to Russell, private and confidential,
18th December 1860, FO 78/3186.
2. Russell to Colquohoun, 2nd January 1861, No.l, FO 78/1589.
3. Memorandum on French and Italian Designs on the Red Sea
and its immediate neighbourhood (March 1882), Confidential 
Print No.4590, FO 146/2415.
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the less disposed to observe restraint in similar circumstances.
Indeed, the material in the British archives suggests that
Napoleon also was impressed by the need for minimising the
distant disputes of French and British agents, particularly 
1
in Madagascar.
Rivalry between the British and French in Madagascar
was traditional. Some attempt had been made to check it in 
2
1856. In that year, both powers agreed to refrain from
modifying their political relations with the Island without
informing the other. Nevertheless, suspicion of French designs
formed a recurrent theme in reports from the Governor of
Mauritius in this period. Local apprehension was treated
sympathetically in the Colonial Office: but it received
little serious attention in the Foreign Office where the
prevailing sentiment seemed to accord with Cowley's casual
reflection "After all, what harm can they [the French] do us
3
in Madagascar?" This attitude was at once apparent in 
1859 when news was received from Governor Stephenson of 
Mauritius that the French were thought to have concluded a 
treaty with the Sakalava chiefs of western Madagascar, for 
the cession of the fine port of Bally or Bombetoe. Duly
1. Some confirmation is afforded in Sonia Howe's recent study
The Drama of Madagascar [1938].
2. Cowley to Clarendon, No.28, 5th January 1856, FO 97/220.
3. Cowley to Layard, private, 14th April 1863, B.M. Add. MSS,
39105. Private Layard Papers.
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1
acquainted with the facts hy the Colonial Office, the
Foreign Office instructed Cowley to make "suitable
representations" to Walewski on the apparent departure of
the French from the terms of the previous agreement between
the two powers. An exchange of views between Russell and
Wodehouse, the Under Secretary, shows, however, that Britain
was not prepared to press her representations. Wodehouse,
receiving what purported to be the text of the Treaty,
3
published in Le Moniteur de l'Ile de Réunion,minuted his chief
as follows: "I should think the less we interfere with
Madagascar the better. The French will probably fail as they
have always failed hitherto in establishing their influence
4
there." Russell entirely agreed: and subsequent events
all went to prove that the British Government were not 
disposed to quarrel with France about the extension of her 
political influence in Madagascar, provided that this did 
not connote any exclusive trading facilities for the French.
As Napoleon III was aware of the limits of British restraint, 
and did not seek to overstep them, Madagascar remained the
1. Merivale to HammoncJ 29th August 1859, FO 97/220.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.294, 30th August 1859, FO 97/220.
3. June 8th 1859*
4. November 2nd 1859, FO 97/220.
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scene of local differences between the British and French,
but did not give rise to any serious contention between
their governments.
Nor was the British Government disposed to quarrel
with France about the extension of her political influence in
the Far East. In August 1863, a French protectorate was
established in Cambodia. British merchants in Singapore
1
viewed this step with misgiving. British naval authorities
were no less alarmed. "A serious subject for consideration"
wrote Commodore Montresor, at sea in the Straits of Malacca,
"is ... not that the French in occupying this extent of
protectorate are trading close upon the heel of our empire but
that the very highway of our trade is likely to be greatly
2
affected during war ...." The British consul at Bangkok
appeared more resigned to the French move; he took care to
dispel the notion of the Siamese Government that it was in
the British interest to resist the extension of French
3
influence in Cambodia. But in 186 5, he made a brief attempt
4
to get the protectorate annulled. When he received a draft 
of the treaty which France was urging upon Siam with the 
object of defining the relations of the two powers towards
1. Commodore Montresor to Admiralty, 8th Oct. 1863, No.31,
(copy), PO 69/39.
2. Commodore Montresor to Admiralty, No .31, (copy),
8th October 1863, FO 69/39.
3. Knox to Russell, No.30, 8th October 1864, FO 69/39.
4. Knox to Russell, No.22, 26th April 1865, FO 69/39.
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Cambodia, It occurred to him that the French might be
persuaded to renounce their protectorate over Cambodia in
return for the recognition by Siam of Cambodian independence.
He hastened to make this suggestion to the Kalahome: but
too late. With an expedition foreign to his nature, the
Kalahome had hurried through negotiations with the French so
as to be able to take part in a white elephant hunt. Unlike
the British consul, the naval authorities and the merchants,
the Foreign Office displayed no jealousy of French proceedings
in Cambodia. On receiving a translation of the treaty
1
between France and Cambodia in November 1863, they forwarded
it to the India Office. But it was not until the following
March, when the question of its bearing on the British right
to establish consuls in Cambodia was raised in Parliament,
that Cowley, informed of its existence for the first time,
2
was instructed to make enquiries of Drouyn de Ihuys, Moreover 
it was not until September 1865, that the India Office could 
be prevailed upon to give their opinion of the French proceed­
ings. They then stated that the French might be regarded
"without anxiety or concern" so long as they did not "in any
3
way interfere with the independence of Siam." In affecting 
to regard the whole affair as à "matter of ridicule rather
1. Schomburgk to Russell, No.34, September 29th 1863,
FO 69/39,
2. Russell to Cowley, No,255, telegram, 6.45 p.m., 11th
March 1864, FO 69/39.
3. Merivale to Hammond, 29th September 1865, FO 69/39.
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than moment," the nonchalance of the French Government was
1
no less remarkable.
It was owing to the British Government that the third
local quarrel between British and French agents - which was
always potential rather than actual - never materialised. It
was set in the Pacific Islands which, like Madagascar, were
the scene of traditional rivalry between the two powers. It
threatened to develop out of action by the British Consul in
Fiji, son of the Pritchard who had been so notoriously
associated with a neighbouring archipelago in the forties.
Thinking to forestall the French, Pritchard junior had
persuaded Ebenezer Thakombau ’'King of Fiji" to sign a deed of
2
cession giving the Fiji Islands to Victoria. He appeared in
England to promote his project in person. But the British
Government, after sending an independent officer to examine
the question on the spot, decided to decline the offer.
Their refusal was based upon considerations of expense,
location, and significantly, the prospect of "possible disputes
3
with other civilised countries." In other words, the British 
Government were not prepared to offer provocation to France 
for the sake of obtaining territory they aid not want.
1. Cowley to Russell, No.756, 23rd June 1865, FO 69/39.
2. Vide J.I. Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific
Islands 1800-1875. 242 ff.
3. Rogers to Hammond, September 7th 1861. Accounts and
Papers. XXXVI, (1862), 23.
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It was just because there was so little real conflict
of interest between the two, powers that the British Government
felt justified in stifling this local rivalry. For in this
period there was no colonial rivalry between Britain and
France in the later sense of the term. Britain looked upon
colonies as liabilities - expensive to maintain, not always
remunerative in trade, and serving only an apprenticeship in
their connection with the Mother Country. Her resolve to call
a halt to any further extension of British sovereignty was
in itself sufficient to prevent the development of colonial
conflict with France. For it meant that she offered France
neither stimulus nor opposition in the colonial field. But
if Napoleon was less resolute in disavowing the advances of
his local agents, he too was concerned over the expense of 
1
colonisation. He confided in Cowley that France was not a
1
colonising nation: and his successive Foreign Ministers
persistently decried the distant exploits secretly encouraged
2
by their irrepressible colleague, Chasseloup Laubat. Nor
1. "She [France] has few colonies", Cowley reported the
Emperor to have said in 1861, "and those she has cost 
her more than they are worth." Cowley to Russell,
No.799, confidential, 2nd July 1861, PC 27/1393.
2. Whose Anglophobe tendencies caused Cowley to declare
him "as ill conditioned a dog as I know". Cowley to 
Layard, private, 17th August 1863. B.M. Add. MSS.
39107, Private Layard Papers.
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was there any substantial economic rivalry between the two
powers. Both countries, it seems, recognised the principle
of the Open Door, although neither yet gave it that 
1
description: and commercial jealousy was apparent only in
such local disputes as those which occurred on the East and 
West Coasts of Africa.
In this region, therefore, relations between Britain 
and France were the most untroubled of all. The major issues 
were characterised by co-operation rather than conflict.
And there was little real clash of interest in the minor ones: 
for the most outspoken controversy - that centering round the 
Slave Trade - was chiefly remarkable for the degree to which 
the vigour of British representations outclassed, the demands of 
selfish interest. Yet the veiled dispute over strategic points, 
and the local jealousy of agents, traders and missionaries 
pointed to the existence of a latent rivalry which to some 
extent cut across the way in which the comparative harmony of 
this region was enlisted to dispel discord in others. By 
increasing the susceptibility of various members of the British 
Cabinet to encroachments by France - especially those members
1. In discussing the terms of the French Treaty with 
Cambodia, Cowley reported Dpouyn de Ihuys to have 
declared that "it was well known that the French 
Government never sought in treaties of this nature 
for any special advantages for France." Cowley to 
Russell, No.375, 12th March 1864, PO 69/39.
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who represented the Colonial Office, Admiralty and India 
Office - it was not without some adverse effect upon Anglo- 
French relations in issues of greater importance nearer home#
CHAPTER V.
• THE BACKGROUND OP CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES
"So it must always be with a man who is constantly
trying to shape his Course not according to any fixed plan
or determined Principle of action but according to the
1
trifling Breezes of momentary Expediency
Palmerston*3 explanation of Napoleon Ill's "Trimming 
1
Game" in Italy is significant for its implication; that 
foreign policy should be conducted in accordance with certain 
definite principles. To Palmerston and to Russell this was 
axiomatic; both recognised a merit in consistency. They were 
not entirely agreed in their conception of those principles. 
Palmerston thought of a principle of foreign policy primarily 
as a general law for promoting national interest. Russell, 
however, influenced by the Whig tradition, felt that a principle 
of foreign policy should also acknowledge a certain moral 
standard. Yet the difference was one of theory only. For 
in practice, Russell made no attempt to subordinate national 
advantage to international morality: merely so far as possible
to reconcile the two.
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 21st September 1860, 
G. & D. 22/21.
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Napoleon III was less addicted to principles, moral 
or otherwise. Partly as a result of temperament, partly 
because he seldom had a free hand, he frequently appeared in 
the role of an opportunist. Yet Palmerston was wrong in 
thinking imperial policy was devoid of principles in the 
Palmerstonian sense. For just as there were certain 
constant objectives behind French policy, so there were 
certain general principles that were designed to further 
them. Indeed, Palmerston was to have far less cause to lament 
the absence of French principles, than the fact that they 
so rarely accorded with his own.
British principles hinged on a double aim of policy.
"Our objects," Russell declared in the House of Commons,"...are 
to maintain the peace of Europe and to secure that every Power 
should be allowed its independence as at present enjoyed. We
h1 1
ask nothing more than that. He looked on these "legitimate"
2
aims as the traditional objects of British foreign policy, 
still eminently suited for promoting Britain's advantage.
1. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CIXI, 138,
6th February 1861,
2. '%u are too well informed" Russell wrote in an official
despatch to Cowley, "not to know that the national 
independence of the States of Europe has been for three 
centuries excepting perhaps during the reigns of Charles 
II and James II the object of the policy of Great Britain." 
Russell to Cowley, No.1273, 24th December 1860, FO 27/1330.
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Britain had been in a position to play a leading part in the
two major treaty settlements of the nineteenth century.
She was reasonably satisfied with the status quo. All she
desired was peace in which to develop her trade and her
resources. Prance was less fortunate. Although victorious
in 1356, she was still unreconciled to the consequences of
her defeat in 1815. Her allegiance to the Treaties of Vienna
was only nominal. .She was far from identifying her own
prosperity with the existing territorial settlement; and she
had inherited, with Louis Napoleon, a tradition of intervention
on behalf of oppressed nationalities in Europe. Moreover,
1
despite the Bordeaux pronouncement, she was by no means 
averse to effecting the changes she desired by war. From 
hypotheses so different, it was not surprising that the 
principles behind British and French policy were' generally 
conflicting.
1. "II est clair pour tout le monde" Napoleon wrote in a 
memorandum for the Council of Ministers shortly before 
the Italian War "que lorsque l'Empereur a dit L'Empire, 
c'est la paix, il voulait par ces paroles rassurer 
l'Europe et faire comprendre qu'il n ’irait pas de gaîté 
de coeur recommencer les conquêtes de son oncle. Personne, 
cependant, n'a pu connaître par ces paroles que l'Empereur 
s'engageait à ne jamais faire la guerre .... Le véritable 
sens du discours de Bordeaux est donc ceci; "Je ne 
ferai la guerre que lorsque j'y serai contraint pour 
défendre l'honneur nationale et pour atteindre un but 
grand, éleve et conforme aux véritables intérêts du pays." 
Emile Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral [1898], III, 537-542.
125
An Immediate consequence of the British position, and
a first principle of British policy was respect, amounting
almost to reverence, for the letter and spirit of treaty
obligations. It was a principle that was applied to all
diplomatic engagements, but more especially to the Treaties
of Vienna as these were regarded as the very foundation of
the new 19th century structure of international relations.
"[l]t is the only landmark we have" wrote Cowley. 'Without
1
it we should be completely at sea." This did not mean
that the British Government were opposed to recognising any
modification in existing treaties. They were prepared to
admit the necessity of revision as a means of avoiding war,
or registering the outcome of war - provided the revision was
made in a regular manner. But recognising the security of
Britain in the existing order of things, they came to demand
a special respect for international engagements.
It was hardly to be expected that there would be
a corresponding principle in France. In' exile Louis Napoleon
had called upon France "de mettre dans tous les Traités ton
2
épée de Brennus en faveur de la civilisation"; as Emperor
1# Cowley to Russell, private, 7th November 1859,
G. & D. 22/53.
2. Le Prince Napoléon-Louis Bonaparte, Des Idles Napoléoniennes. 
[1839], p.11.
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he stood In defiance of the engagement taken by Europe in
1815 to resist the return of a Bonaparte to the throne of
Prance. Existing treaties had no special sanctity for him#
Rather they were shadowy encumbrances, obstacles to a progressive
programme. His general attitude towards them was thought to
be reflected in Prince Napoleon's famous 'treaty-tearing 
1
pronouncement' in 1861. "La politique française doit
respecter les traités," he had been careful to state, "mais
quant à ces odieux traités qui ont mis le pied de 1 'Europe
sur la gorge de la France [i.e. Treaties of Vienna, 1815]
il faut, toutes les fois que nous le pouvons les maudire et 
2
les déchirer." But it was a distinction that was difficult 
to maintain. By its very nature, the principle of the 
sanctity of treaties scarcely admits an exception. France's 
attitude towards the Treaties of Vienna coloured her whole 
conception of the value of treaty engagements, and led her 
to actions which provoked ill feeling and distrust in 
England.
"it is not ... the position which Prance will occupy,
but the manner in which she sets Europe and treaties at
3
defiance that is so offensive." This judgment of Cowley
1. Clarendon to Hammond, private, 13th March 1861, FO 391/3.
2. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1862], I, 78,
Sénat le 1er mars 1861.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 15th April 1860, 0. & D. 22/54.
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on the French annexation of the neutralised districts of
Savoy was indeed the crux of Britain's objection to the
whole transaction. It struck the keynote of her remonstrance 
1
in March I860. It explains her insistence on a European
2
Conference in the following July. The decision to press 
for a conference was taken in the Cabinet and directly 
related to the need felt by Britain to regularise the 
essentially irregular and illegal situation created by the 
Treaty of Turin. France succeeded in postponing the 
Conference indefinitely: and the British Government there­
fore declined to recognise the Treaty of Turin as part of
3
the public law of Europe.
Less than a year later, France again roused British 
mistrust by seeking to extend the period of her European 
mandate in Syria beyond the term laid down in the Convention
1. "HMG would .. beg to submit that no case has been made
out to justify this cession on the ground of necessary 
defences for France, and that this cession would most 
unjustly and in violation of Treaty engagements 
materially weaken a defensive arrangement which united 
Europe has provided as a security for the neutrality 
and integrity of Switzerland." Russell to Cowley, No.288, 
22nd March 1860, FO 27/1324. (The whole despatch was 
drafted by Palmerston).
2. ".. it seems to Her Majesty's Government" ran the official
despatch "that the change which is produced by the 
Treaty of Turin, and especially the first case of 
aggrandisement of France in Europe since 1815, requires 
a formal Conference and a frank discussion." Russell to 
Cowley, No.669, 5th July 1860, PO 27/1326.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.709, 19th July 1860, FO 27/1326.
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of September 1860. Reluctant to withdraw her troops until
a fresh administration had been established in the Lebanon,
France came to place a loose interpretation on the stipulations
of the Convention. Reporting an interview with Thouvenel on
4th January 1861, Cowley represented him to have said that
"[h]e did not suppose a few weeks more or less in the
departure of the troops would signify or that a prolongation
of their stay for that period would require the signature of
another Convention.” Cowley gave the Foreign Minister no
reason to suppose that Britain would take a similar view.
"I replied that J could not agree in this opinion ... that
occupation could not be prolonged for a day without the
1
consent of the Porte." The British Government confirmed the
Ambassador's statement in no uncertain fashion. "[l]t is
impossible" Russell wrote to Cowley in a despatch to be read
to Thouvenel "for Her Majesty's Government to consent to the
prolongation of the stay of the French troops in Syria beyond
2
the term fixed by the Convention of the 6th September." In 
a later despatch, the British Government insisted that it would 
be a grave error "in point of right, and in point of policy" 
if the five powers were to confuse the question of foreign 
occupation with that of the future administration of the
1. Cowley to Russell, No.18, 4th January 1861, FO 27/1383.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.60, 9th January 1861, FO 27/1372.
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Mountain. "Suffice it to say that unless the Five Powers 
and the Sultan agree to renew the Convention of last 
September that Convention will expire, and the lawful
1
occupation of Syria by foreign troops will terminate with it."
But France did not appear to appreciate the force of these
arguments. Writing shortly after this outspoken representation
from the British Government, Cowley reported that he feared
he had been unable to make the Emperor understand the
difference between the duties assigned to the expeditionary
force and the European commission; "nor did he seem to be
aware" the Ambassador added "that he is positively bound to
withdraw his troops at the period fixed by the Convention
2
of the 5th September."
It was not only in violating treaties, and placing
a loose interpretation on them that France caused disquiet
in England. It was also in the brazenness with which she
urged their wholesale revision. Cowley's immediate reaction
to the Emperor's Congress proposal of 1863 was a general one.
"[l]t is terrible" he wrote to Russell, "to have to deal
with a man who can so lightly put forward theories replete 
3
with mischief." Russell entirely agreed. He was no less 
taken aback at the suddenness of the proposal; no less appalled
1. Russell to Cowley, No.108, 24th January 1861, FO 27/1372.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.165, confidential, 29th January 1861,
FO 27/1384.
3. Cowley to Russell, private, 5th November 1863, G. & D.22/59.
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at its revolutionary nature. "The notion of scratching 
out the date from the Treaties of 1815 and of going over them 
to vote whether they shall stand good or not seems to be at
1
variance with all sound principles of international law •••"
France again transgressed the British principle of
respect for international obligations by the indifference
with which she viewed the violation by other powers of
treaties to which she and Britain were also signatory. The
British Government particularly resented her diplomatic
inertia on the question of the Treaty of London of 1852; still
more that she carried her indifference to the point of
violating the spirit of her own obligations. For at a time
when the treaty was nominally in force, the French Government,
by means of a despatch to their Ambassador in London,'subse-
2
quently communicated to the smaller German courts, as well
3 4 ,
as by articles inserted in the Constitutionnel and La Patrie, j 
publicly envisaged a solution of the Danish Question on the 
basis of nationalities.
A second principle on which Britain based her foreign 
policy was the much vaunted principle of non-intervention. 
Appreciating its moral value, as well as its hidden potentialities
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 14th November 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
2. Cowley to Russell, No,443, 4th April 1864, PO 27/1527.
3. 1st April 1864.
4. 1st April 1864.
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for extending British influence, Russell adopted it as
1
"the whole foundation" of his policy. "[W]e will never lose
sight of the principle which we have before enunciated and
which we think is a sacred principle" he declared in the House
of Commons, " - one to which there are indeed some, but very
rare exceptions, - namely, that with regard to the internal
government of a country the people of that country are the
best judges, and that no foreigner should interfere by force
2
to coerce or to overwhelm their decision." It was typical of
Russell that he should have admitted exceptions to the
principle on the grounds of "our own conduct in various 
3
instances" and "the very foundation of the Constitution 
3
we now enjoyl" In theory the exceptions he allowed were
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 28th May 1862, (copy),
C. & D. 22/105. That Russell expected to further British 
interests by a policy of non-intervention in Italy is 
apparent from one of his earliest private letters to Cowley, 
"All I wish," he wrote, "is that when England speaks she 
should speak not for dominion nor for influence, but solely 
for the benefit of Italy. Our unpopularity in that country 
might in this way be dispelled and we might become the 
most trusted as the ipost disinterested of all Powers." 
Russell to Cowley, private, 23rd June 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
Nor was the motive behind the British policy of non­
intervention in Mexico disinterested. "[w]e have kept 
strictly ... to non-intervention," Russell wrote to Layard, 
"and thereby have preserved our Influence in Mexico ..." 
B.M. Add. MS. 38988, Layard Papers, [undated, ? February 
1862j.
2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLIX, 1794,
12th July 1860.
3. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CLXl, 128,
6th February 1861.
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sufficiently comprehensive to cover almost any instance of
intervention. He was prepared to sanction intervention to
obtain "a clear and beneficial object"; to secure "the
2 2 
safety of a foreign state" or "its paramount interests";
to avert the danger of war. British forbearance, moreover,
was conditional upon the forbearance of others. In practice,
however, there were few occasions on which Britain departed
from the principle of non-intervention; few occasions when
her interests demanded she should take advantage of the
exceptions she had formulated. This did not mean that she
withdrew from participation in the events of the Continent.
Palmerston was insistent on the British right and duty of
offering advice. He strongly objected to the Queen's "Quibble"
that "Diplomatic Suggestions" in the central Italian question
after the signature of the peace preliminaries at Villafranca
were "Intervention in the sense in which Intervention has been
repudiated." ... "[l]o say that England ... is to have her
tongue gagged and not to be permitted to express an opinion
or give advice as to Settlements which tend to affect both
the Balance of Power and the Firmness of Peace is to reduce
3
England to a Condition of Imbecility ..."
1. Russell to Cowley, No.556, 4th June 1860, FO 27/1325.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.258, 16th August 1859, PO 27/1285.
3. Palmerston to Russell, private, 23rd August 1859,
0. & D. 22/20.
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The French theory of nationalities corresponded
closely with the positive side of the British principle of
non-intervention. "[L]e Gouvernement de la France respecte
profondément l’indépendance des peuples;" Billault declared
in the Corps Législatif, "il est profondément respectueux
aussi pour le principe de la souveraineté nationale; le
principe de la souveraineté nationale fait sa force, fait sa
légitimité et sa gloire. Et quant au principe de l'indépendance
des peuples, il l'a écrit sur son drapeau, et il l'a écrit
1
aussi en Italie avec son épée." It is true that France
refused to admit the British principle of non-intervention as
2
a general rule of policy. Nevertheless she usually affected 
to subscribe to it. Indeed it was apparently such a laudably 
disinterested doctrine that it was difficult openly to disavow 
it. Yet although there was a point at which the principles of
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1863] V, 99,
Billault in the Corps Législatif, le 26 juin 1862.
2. Cowley reported Walewski to have said in August 1859
"that the Imperial Government could not admit the doctrine 
of non-intervention as a general rule of policy although 
they were ready to adopt it in the present instance with 
regard to Italy, but that they considered that many 
circumstances might arise in other countries when it 
might be right and proper for the French Government to 
interfere." Cowley to Russell, No.331, 3rd August 1859,
FO 27/1301.
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the two powers met - respect for "l'indépendance des peuples" -
there were several ways in which the enunciation of those
principles led to controversy and a sharpening of differences.
Firstly in interpretation. Both powers were pledged
to non-intervention in Italy, but both invoked the principle
in an opposite sense in the face of Garibaldi's threat to
the Italian mainland. France professed to believe that the
only way of enabling the Neapolitans to choose their own form
of government was to prevent Garibaldi from crossing the 
1
Straits. The proposal was accordingly made to the British
2
Government by the French Ambassador: and subsequently the
French charge d'affaires communicated a further suggestion that
3
Garibaldi should be prevented from disturbing the Pope.
But the British Government based their refusal of these
overtures on the very grounds on which France had sought to
justify them. Both were declared objectionable "as being in
4
contradiction to the principle of non-intervention." The 
argument between the two countries, as Thouvenel himself 
observed, rested on the application to be given to the word 
'intervention'. France regarded Garibaldi's expedition as
1. Cowley to Russell, No.960, confidential, 24th July 1860,
FO 27/1342.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.741, 26th July 1860, FO 27/1327.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.809, 15th August 1860, FO 27/1327.
4. Russell to Cowley, No.874, 7th September 1860, FO 27/1328.
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a band of foreign adventurers; Britain as a band of native
Italians. But there was yet a further difference. "//hen he
had subscribed to the principle that there should be no foreign
intervention in Italy" Thouvenel was represented as saying,
"he had intended no more than that each country should be
allowed to settle its own affairs within its own limits, but
the question became entirely changed when territorial limits
were disregarded and the unity of Italy was the object sought
for." Cowley pronounced the qualification a new one. France
had not questioned the right of the Duchies and Romagna to
place themselves under Victor Emmanuel. Thouvenel rejoined
that he had neither justified nor acknowledged it; that the
cases were different as the sovereigns of central Italy had
abandoned their thrones. So, Cowley retorted, had Francis II
"to all intents and purposes," whilst the position of the
1
Legations and Marches was exactly analogous.
Similarly in Mexico there was a difference of opinion 
on the interpretation of the principle of non-intervention.
A French suggestion to back measures of pacification in that 
country by force drew from Russell a despatch in his best 
style. "The present proposal as I understand it is to impose 
or to influence by an armed force an arbitration in the 
internal affairs of Mexico," he wrote to Cowley. "To such
1. Cowley to Russell, No.1205, 12th September 1860, FO 27/1345.
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forcible interference in the internal affairs of an
independent nation Her Majesty's Government are on principle
opposed." He went on to consider whether conditions in
Mexico warranted a departure from the general rule but came
to the conclusion that there was "no case in which a remedy by
1
foreign interference appears so hopeless." But France was
not concerned to justify an exception. She professed to
acquiesce in the British view in principle, and to admit
the inexpediency of forcible intervention in the internal
affairs of an independent nation. But she drew a distinction
between forcible interference and the moral encouragement
2
offered by the presence of foreign troops. It was a 
distinction she maintained to the end: French troops were
merely reinforcing the wishes of the majority of Mexicans
3
which had hitherto been suppressed by a usurping minority.
British suspicions that France was secretly contravening 
the principle of non-intervention whilst publicly protesting 
adherence to it was another source of irritation to the 
relations of the two powers. In Tunis, for instance, France 
repeatedly declared that her consul had acted against 
instructions in attempting to coerce the Bey; that his actions 
were disapproved; that he would be reprimanded and recalled.
1. Russell to Cowley, No.1037, 30th September 1861, FO 27/1380.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.1181, 2nd October 1861, FO 27/1397.
3. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1863], V, 104,
Billault in the Corps Législatif, le 26 juin 1862.
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He was in fact replaced: but the production of correspondence 
between the French Government and Consul did little to impress 
the British Government with the veracity of the other French 
assertions. "As to Drouyn's Forbiddings of Interference," 
Palmerston commented, "they were much like the Exhortations 
to the Irish School Boys who were pumping on their Master
1
not in addition to the Ducking to nail his Ears to the Pump."
There were also instances in which Britain objected
to the exceptions which France claimed for the principle of
non-intervention. Most important was the French occupation
of Rome. The British Government summed up their case for
the withdrawal of French troops in a despatch of 31st October 
2
1862. They admitted that the Law of Nations allowed 
exceptions to the general rule that each nation was the best 
judge of its own form of government. The exceptions in 
favour of supporting existing governments, they maintained, 
were usually defended on the grounds that a minority had 
seized power by intrigue, violence or military revolt, and 
that if protected the majority would, in time, be enabled to 
reassert its authority. Such occupations were generally 
limited to a term of two to five years. The French occupation 
of Rome, however, had lasted thirteen years: and the population
1. Minute by Palmerston, 24th December 1864, B.M. Add. M.S.
Layard Papers, 38990.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.1077, 31st October 1862, FO 27/1428.
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appeared even less reconciled to their ruler than they had
done formerly. Billault's defence of French Roman policy in
the Corps Législatif was masterly. England, he said, had
invoked "le grand principe de la souveraineté nationale" in
opposition to the French occupation of Rome. "Ce principe"
he went on "nous l'avons reconnu, car il est le notre. Mais ...
nous avons nettement déclaré que des considérations d'un ordre
supérieur pour la paix du monde .imposaient à ce principe
une exception nécessaire," He did not, of course, forget to
mention that Britain herself allowed a departure from the
principle of non-intervention in the cause of peace. And he
hacked his argument with an illustration. He pointed to the
lands bordering the Black Sea and Bosphorus where Christian
populations were held in subjugation in the interest of Europe
and the peace of the world. "N'est-ce pas cet intérêt qui
commande aux puissances d'étouffer ces sentiments de
nationalités frémissantes et de leur imposer la soumission?
L'Angleterre, n'est-elle pas elle même h la tête de ces
1
puissances de cette politique?"
Finally there was a point at which the French theory 
of nationalities went beyond the British principle of non­
intervention. In opening the final session of the Corps 
Législatif in 1863, the Emperor declared that it had been a
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1863], I, 202,
Corps Législatif, le 10 février 1863.
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constant principle of his foreign policy in the previous four 
years "favoriser, dans la mesure du droit et des traités,
1
les aspirations légitimes des peuples vers un meilleur avenir."
Yet it was exactly on the score of promoting the cause of
nationalities at the expense of treaty arrangements that
Britain took issue with France. It was the root of her
objection to the French championship of subject races in the
Ottoman Empire. It was the root, too, of her criticism of
French policy in the Danish question. Britain did not only
quarrel with France for publishing a proposal to consult the
wishes of the Duchies on the eve of the assembly of a
2
Conference to save the Treaty of London. Aiming herself
"to combine the existence of Denmark as a self-governing State
with the satisfaction of the people of Holstein, Schleswig 
3
and Germany" - to save the spirit of the Treaty of London if 
driven to abandon its substance - she resented the way in
I
which France judged the whole question from the point of view 
of nationalities. When the French Government indicated a 
desire to consult the wishes of the people in the mixed districts 
of Schleswig the British Government discovered that "it would 
be a step backward in civilisation to lay down as a principle
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1863] I, 3,
Discours prononce par 3.M. 1 'Empereur, le 12 janvier 1863.
2. Supra . p.130.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.500, 11th June 1864, FO 27/1519.
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that a Sovereign could not rule with justice and fairness
subjects of a different race and language from the race
1
and language of the governing nation." A prime instance of
Russell's practical approach to principles! Drouyn de
Ihuys at once disclaimed anything so reactionary. "It was
only when subjects thought themselves aggrieved as in the
present instance that it seemed necessary to have recourse
2
to separation as a means of cure." Even then there was a 
wide discrepancy in the views of the two powers. For the 
British Government refused to believe that the Duchies would 
have been able to overthrow Danish authority without the 
aid of foreign intervention.
There was also an offshoot of the French theory of 
nationalities to which the British Government objected: the
principle of consulting the wishes of foreign populations by 
means of universal suffrage. This had an obvious attraction 
for France: it was the basis of her own constitution. But
for a variety of reasons, not always easy to disentangle, 
Britain viewed it with disfavour. In the first place she 
considered it a revolutionary procedure. "vVe could not adopt 
it" Russell wrote to Cowley "without flying in the face of all 
our doctrines since 1688. Parliaments regularly summoned
1. Russell to Cowley, No.500, 11th June 1864, FO 27/1519.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.694, 13th June 1864, FO 27/1530.
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are the basis of our government - and if we accept universal
1
suffrage we are gone." But she had other objections as well. 
She regarded it as an expedient which lent itself to 
unscrupulous manipulation; one that encouraged unjustifiable 
intervention in the internal affairs of other countries* The 
views of the two powers were thus essentially different; and 
the difference was a recurrent source of friction between 
them.
In 1859, for instance, Russell pronounced the French
idea of sending Commissioners into central Italy to ascertain
the wishes of the Duchies by universal suffrage as "rather 
2
ominous." He was even prepared to protest if the suggestion
were made formally at the approaching Conference, "To assert
that the opinion of a people can only be obtained by universal
suffrage" he wrote "would invalidate the authority of our
government and annul the deposition of Charles X and Louis 
3
Philippe." Moreover, if money and intrigue were successful
in obtaining a majority in favour of recalling the expelled
rulers, there would then be a question of sanctioning the use
3
of force against a 'factious minority*. Open controversy 
developed later, with Russell's proposal to consult the wishes
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 12th December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103,
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 10th December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
3. Russell to Cowley, private, 10th December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
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of central Italy by means of newly elected assemblies. In
a despatch to Persigny, Thouvenel stated the Imperial
Government was convinced that it would not discharge its
moral responsibility unless the principle of universal
suffrage, which constituted its own legitimacy, were also to
1
form the basis of any new elections in Italy. Russell at
once rejoined that it was difficult to comprehend "upon what
principle known to the law of nations" that conviction was
founded. "Is it meant that a Government cannot acknowledge a
new Government in Europe as legitimate unless it is founded
on the same principle as its own? .... Is it to be maintained
that France wishes to assimilate the institutions of other
2
countries to her own?" Thouvenel protested that Russell
had misinterpreted the French argument on universal suffrage.
"His Excellency had distinctly recognised the right of other
Governments to hold opinions at variance with his, nor had
he sought to Impose his on others .... He begged me to
convey to Your lordship the assurance that the Imperial
Government had no wish or intention to dictate either to
Sardinia or to the States of Central Italy what their
3
proceedings should be." Yet by a fine stroke of irony, it
1. Affaires Etrangères. Documents Diplomatiques. 1860, (1861)
22. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a M. le Comte
de Persigny, le 24 février 1860.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.180, 27th February 1860, FO 27/1323.
3. Cowley to Russell, No.203, 28th February 1860, FO 27/1334.
143
was France who attempted to delay elections by universal
suffrage: Britain who was glad for them to proceed. This
did not mean that either power had changed its opinion on
the ultimate merits of universal suffrage. Merely that Britain
had no wish to interfere with the free choice of the Italians
in the absence of foreign commissioners: and that without
some form of outside control France saw no prospect of
obtaining the result she desired.
The question of consulting the wishes of foreign
states by universal suffrage was again raised in connection
with the French annexation of Nice and Savoy. Britain’s
indignation at the transfer of territory was considerably
heightened by the manner in which the wishes of the inhabitants
were consulted. It was not so much that she resented the
recourse to universal suffrage in distinction to any other
method of ascertaining the popular will but that she considered
the election had been unfairly conducted. Russell warned
the French Government through Cowley that they would "do well not
to lay stress on the unanimity of the vote of annexation"
unless prepared for a full discussion - which the British
Government had no desire to raise - "on the means which had
1
been employed, and the mode of putting the vote." And in a
subsequent despatch, he left no room for doubt that in the
British view both means and mode deprived the vote of all 
2
authority.
1. Russell to Cowley, Separate, 26th April 1860, FO 27/1325.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.493, 15th May 1860, FO 27/1325.
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A third example of the difference between the two
powers on the subject of universal suffrage was the French
proposal to consult the wishes of the Danish duchies on
their choice of sovereign. This time Britain’s objection
was primarily based on grounds of non-intervention. Yet the
French Government evidently suspected a further cause of
disapproval. The Emperor was at pains to reassure Clarendon
that he had no desire to insist on universal suffrage provided
1
that some other form of plebiscite could be adopted. Drouyn
de Lhuys thought to be even more conciliatory by denying
that universal suffrage formed any part of the imperial
programme. *’He was quite willing to consider any other
suggestion having the same object [i.e. ascertaining the wishes
of the people]," Cowley reported him to have said. "He wished
2
this to be distinctly understood." In fact the British 
Government were of opinion that all three of their objections 
to the general principle were applicable in varying degrees to 
this particular case. To resort to elections at all would 
be to interfere between a Sovereign and his people; to conduct 
them in the presence of foreign intrigue would produce 
unreliable results; to base them on universal suffrage would 
be to carry the democratic principle to dangerous excess.
1. Clarendon to Russell, private, 15th April 1864,
G. & D. 22/26.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.459, 6th April 1864, FO 27/1527.
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On the principle of conducting diplomacy by Congress
or Conference in preference to the normal channels of
diplomatic correspondence, Britain and France were alsD 
1
divided. For the most part, Britain disliked these
international gatherings, viewing them with a mixture of
distrust and scepticism; but there were occasions on which
she was prepared to take part in them, occasions, even, when
she was prepared to initiate them. She was not unwilling
to attend a Conference limited in scope to one subject on
2
which an understanding might reasonably be expected. She 
was ready to propose a conference as a means of averting war 
or regulating the changes made necessary by war. But with 
the memory of Laibach and Verona fresh in the minds of her 
veteran statesmen she was opposed in principle to attending 
a general assembly - whether Congress or Conference - without
1. It was usual at this time to regard a Congress as an
assembly of Foreign Ministers or other specially 
appointed, high ranking plenipotentiaries; a Conference 
as a meeting of local diplomatic representatives, 
presided over by the Foreign Minister of the country in 
which it was held. Cowley called attention to the 
distinction in July 1859 when France suggested that the 
affairs of Italy should be submitted to a Conference or 
Congress. "As you have determined on agreeing to a 
Congress or a Conference" he wrote to Russell, "I trust 
that the result may turn out better than you anticipate .. 
I strongly recommend conferences and not a Congress.
The latter will raise expectations that will never,be 
fulfilled and if the result is nil entails greater gravity 
in breaking up, whereas conferences among Representatives 
already accredited at some great Court can be put an end 
to or fall to the ground of themselves without attracting 
so much public attention ..." Cowley to Russell, private, 
19th July 1859, G. & D. 22/53.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.1338, 22nd December 1863, FO 27/1483.
146
a defined agenda, and previous agreement on the means by 
which decisions were to be effected. Also as a result of 
her experiences - in Paris in 1856 as well as Vienna in 1815 - 
she tended to recoil from the trappings of a formal Congress, 
preferring instead the lesser pretensions of an ordinary 
Conference.
Britain's aversion to Congresses and Conferences, 
therefore, was directly attributable to her policy of non­
intervention; and it was not a little enhanced by Napoleon 
Ill's proclivities for them. He made no secret of the fact 
that he looked to an international congress to revise the 
map of Europe. Moreover, he was as much attracted to the 
glamour of a Congress as Britain was repelled by it. To 
him, a Congress was essentially an assembly which met in Paris 
where Europe might be impressed by the pre-eminence of France, 
and France by the splendour of Empire. But unlike Britain 
he appeared to be genuinely convinced of the advantages of 
discussion over those of correspondence as a means- of 
transacting business. For this reason he was predisposed 
to submit difficulties to à Conference of lesser representatives 
as well as to a full dress Congress.
The difference between British and French notions 
of the function of a Congress provoked a major crisis in Anglo- 
French relations at the end of 1863. In his Speech from 
the Throne on the 5th November, Napoleon accompanied his 
startling pronouncement that "Les Traités de 1815 ont cessé
147
d'exister" with the equally startling proposal to reconstruct
"1'edifice, mine par le temps" hy means of a Congress of all
Europe "où les amours-propres et les résistances disparaît-
1
raient devant un arbitrage suprême." Britain was greatly
alarmed at the proposal. She hastened to enquire what
questions the Congress was to deal with; whether decisions,
if agreed to by the majority, were to be enforced by arms.
And there was an interesting revision in the draft of her
interim reply, possibly on the suggestion of the Cabinet.
In its original form this contained an assurance that the
British Government would be ready to discuss with Prance
"either in Congress or by Diplomatic Correspondence" any
specified questions upon which a solution might be attained
and European peace more firmly established. In the final
version, however, the alternative of a Congress was
2
significantly omitted.
The French Government, in reply, indicated a number
of pressing problems which might be submitted to the
3
deliberations of the Congress: but they gave no satisfactory
undertaking on the question of force. Nor was the Emperor 
any more reassuring on the point in conversation with Cowley.
1. Annales du Sénat et du Corps Législatif [1864], I, 5-6,
Discours prononce par S.M. l'Empereur, le 5 novembre 1863.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.1192, Seen by the Cabinet, 12th
November 1863, FO 27/1482.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.1222, confidential, 18th November
1863, PC 27/1483.
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The Ambassador reported he had evaded the question, merely-
expressing an opinion that decisions would be "acquiesced
in." "He is, or wishes to appear to be sanguine that
[difficulties] .. would disappear under the ordeal of 
1
discussion."
French explanations were far from satisfying the
British Government. Britain declined to attend the Congress,
2
and gave two main reasons for doing so. Firstly,that in 
following a period of peace it would have no authority; 
secondly that as a means of resolving the outstanding questions 
of the day it was unlikely to be effective. "It appears 
certain that the deliberations of a Congress would consist of 
demands and pretensions put forward by some and resisted by 
others; and there being no supreme authority in such an 
Assembly the Congress would probably separate leaving many 
of its members on worse terms with each other than they had 
been when they met."
There was also controversy between Britain and France 
on the subject of prospective Conferences. Britain was 
particularly reluctant, for instance, to meet the French desire 
for a Conference on the affairs of Italy in the autumn of
1. Cowley to Russell, No.1086, 18th November 1863,
FO 27/1498.
2. Russell to Cowley, Seen by the Cabinet, No.1226,
25th November 1863, FO 27/1483.
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1
1859, Her main fear was lest the Conference might be 
asked to agree to the use of force as a means of restoring 
the rulers of central Italy, a measure which would have led 
to the re-establishment of Austrian influence in the îeninsula, 
"The pressing question," Russell wrote to Cowley officially,
"is to know whether the use of force is contemplated as at 
Laibach and Verona to prescribe the form of government and 
dictate the name of the Sovereign in Tuscany and Modena •••• .
H.M. cannot send a Minister to a Congress where any sanction
is to be given or required to a proposal to impose by force
a government or constitution in Tuscany or Modena or any
2
part of central Italy." But there was another reason for 
Britain's reluctance to fall in with the French proposal, 
one to which Russell referred in a private letter to Cowley.
"I rack my brains in vain to find a plausible reason for
I. France first suggested that this assembly should be a
Congress or a Conference. (Walewski to Fersigny, 18th 
July 1359, communicated to Russell, 19th July 1859.
Accounts and Papers. [i860], LKVIII, p. 15). Later she 
formally proposed a Congress. (Walewski to Pérsigny,
21st November 1859, communicated to Russell, 30th November 
1859. Accounts and Papers,[I860I LXVIII, p.229). But 
although Britain consented to attend it, she declined to 
send her Foreign Minister and appointed Cowley as first 
plenipotentiary. The decision was the cause of considerable 
resentment in France. Walewski told Cowley that the 
Emperor was "much ému" at the idea of Foreign Ministers 
not attending and of the Congress thereby degenerating 
into a Conference. (Cowley to Russell, private, 16th 
December 1859, G. 5c D. 22/53).
2. Russell to Cowley, No.329, 17th September 1859, FO 27/1285.
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assembling a Congress" he wrote "... Italy is more tranquil
than she has been for many years But there may be some
hidden desire to revise the map of Europe and if there be
we must join manfully with Austria and Germany in resisting 
1
it ..." Thus in finally consenting to attend the proposed
assembly, the British Government made it quite clear that
they placed implicit reliance on "the French Emperor’s
declared opposition to forcible intervention" in central Italy:
and that they considered deliberation on the means of
establishing the internal and external independence of Italy
on solid bases - as stated in the preamble of the Treaty of
2
Zurich - to form its "sole object."
Britain's reluctance to attend a Conference was also 
q cause of disagreement with France in the Polish question.
When Baron Gros advanced the French idea of submitting the 
affairs of Poland to a Conference or Congress of Europe,
Russell enumerated his objections to "dispersing ourselves
3
into twelve" instead of "concentrating ourselves as three.®
It was not what Russia asked; it would be a slow and clumsy 
machine; there was nothing it could usefully discuss. Privately 
he also revived the old fear that France might take advantage
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 13th December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.535, 3rd December 1859, FO.27/1287.
3. Russell to Cowley, private, 6th May 1863, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
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of such an assembly to propose a reconstruction of the map
of Europe. The disagreement did not at first find its way
into official correspondence. Gros submitted the French
proposal to Russell in the form of a ’conversation écrite’;
Russell gave him ’remarks’ in answer. A month later, however,
Russell Indicated the conditions on which Britain would be
prepared to attend a Conference on Poland in an official 
1
despatch: and once again it was a reminder to France that
Britain would continue to insist on the essentially limited 
function of such an assembly.
But it was not Britain who always opposed the assembly 
of a Conference, France who always supported it. Sometimes, 
from the very nature of their convictions, the roles of the 
two powers were reversed. This, indeed, was what happened 
in the Danish question at the beginning of 1864. In a final 
bid to avert war between Denmark and the German Powers, Britain 
proposed the assembly of a Conference in london. But France 
did her utmost to thwart the proposal. Not that she doubted 
the efficacy of a Conference. Rather that she feared it 
would be the means of solving a problem she wished to keep open.
A last general principle on which Britain and France 
took different views was the contraction of binding engagements. 
It was a principle to which Britain, primarily on account of
1. c.f. Supra..pp.71-2.
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her desire to avoid entangling commitments on the Continent,
was traditionally opposed. But Prance, with a vulnerable
land frontier to defend, was constantly preoccupied with the
search for a binding alliance. "Depuis mon avènement au trône"
Napoleon III wrote to Franz Joseph, on the occasion of his
overtures to Austria in March 1863, "J’ai toujours cherché,
lorsqu’un intérêt commun me mettait d ’accord avec une des
grandes puissances è établir avec elle une entente plus
générale, afin de cimenter ainsi une alliance durable ...
[u]ne alliance .. où il va ferait cesser toutes les incertitudes
1
du passé et tous les dangers de l ’avenir."
This difference of principle on the question of binding 
engagements was one that coloured the whole character of the 
relationship between Britain and France. For it meant that 
Napoleon turned to Continental powers for the security he 
was unable to find in an understanding with Britain. It also 
had serious consequences for the relations of the two powers 
in individual issues, particularly in the settlement of the 
central Italian question. Napoleon might have been persuaded 
to adopt the British solution of the problem in the autumn 
of 1859 if he could have obtained a pledge from Britain that 
she would give France military support in the event of
1. Albert Pingaud, "La Politique Extérieure du Second Empire ", 
Revue Historique. CLVI, (1927), p.57.
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hostilities being renewed by Austria. But when he asked
1
whether Britain would be prepared to make this pledge he
was informed that "every such question must be reserved for
2
the time when the case arises." And this "time honoured
2
observance of English Cabinets" was repeated still more 
emphatically when Thouvenel revived the question of an 
offensive and defensive alliance in the following February.
In an official despatch, of which a copy was given to Thouvenel, 
Russell stated that it was "not usual for the British Govern­
ment in the midst of such quiet for the present and such
3
uncertainty for the future to enter into binding engagements." 
And so the two powers continued to pursue their separate 
policies until the central Italians withdrew from the arena 
of international diplomacy by voting to join the Kingdom 
of Sardinia.
1. Cowley to Russell, privgte, 29th November 1859,
G. & D. 22/53.
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 1st December 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
Russell personally considered the emergency was 
sufficiently great to justify a departure from this 
traditional policy. He agreed with the Emperor, and 
with Cowley that a military engagement between Britain 
and France would be the best means of conjuring an 
attack by Austria; t^iut there is no getting an English 
cabinet to exercise foresight." (Russell to Cowley, 
private, 6th December 1859,.(copy), G. & D. 22/103.
C.f. Supra pp.25-6.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.164, 22nd February I860, FO 27/1323,
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The main principles behind British and French policy, 
therefore, were essentially conflicting. They formed a 
background of potential discord against which negotiations 
between the two powers were conducted. They were the cause 
of initiating disputes, and by provoking controversy, of 
exacerbating existing differences of policy. Theoretically 
they were unrelated to any particular geographical region; 
but because they symbolised the individual interests of the 
two powers and were invoked in support of them they contributed 
in practice to reinforcing the regional trend of the ’alliance’
CHAPTER VI.
SECRET DIPLOMACY AS A FACTOR IN WEAKENING 
THE 'ALLIANCE'.
",..[l]f the alliance is to be anything real and
satisfactory, it is obvious that there must exist ••• between
the Governments $.., a clear understanding by each of the
1
policy, the objects and intentions of the other .
Such is the indispensable condition of a close and 
cordial association between two powers. For if one power 
becomes aware of a secret understanding by the other with a 
third party, or of secret action in conscious opposition to 
its interests, intimacy is gone, and confidence replaced by 
mistrust.
This was the fate of the 'alliance* between Britain 
and France. Owing to the form of her government, the 
temperament of her ruleg the nature of her interests, France 
frequently resorted to secret diplomacy in this period. Each 
year, the British Government was confronted by evidence of 
some secret action by France which was assumed or discovered
1. Lord Derby in the House of Lords, 5th February 1861.
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLXI, 30.
156
to be contrary to British interests. The effect of these 
actions was to cause distrust of France and to lessen 
confidence in her. This was revealed in a number of different 
ways. It was shown, first of all, in the immediate reactions 
of British statesmen and diplomats to the secret proceedings 
of France - in confidential correspondence, in communications 
with the French Government, and in public speeches.
At the opening of the period, the existence of a secret 
agreement between France and Russia was a matter of common 
knowledge. In one of his earliest private letters to Cowley 
on the 23rd June 1859, Russell indicated his opinion of the 
effect that agreement must have on the British attitude 
towards France. "The secrecy about the Russian engagement 
with France is not very consistent with our cordial alliance" 
he wrote, "Walewski might as well be reminded that if he 
wishes the two nations to be friends, he ought to put more 
zeal into the business." Thus in his view, a secret under­
standing between France and a third great power was bound to 
raise doubts in Britain of the strength of French loyalty to 
the Western ’alliance*.
Britain's reaction to a further revelation of French 
secret diplomacy in the following year was not confined to 
confidential correspondence between ministers and diplomats 
nor yet to communications between the British and French
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 23rd June 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
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Governments, It was openly proclaimed in the House of 
Commons. In February 1860, France disclosed to Britain what 
she had previously denied in addition to concealing, the 
existence of an agreement with Sardinia for the conditional 
cession of Nice and Savoy. Once again it was the secrecy 
of the transaction, quite apart from its substance, which 
awakened distrust in the British Government. This was 
emphasised by Russell in a memorable speech on the 26th 
March when he expressed the conviction that "if that bargain, 
[i.e. between the Emperor of the French and the King of 
Sardinia], not so unlike many others which have occurred in 
the history of Europe had been openly declared, I will not say 
what amount of indignation would have been entertained in 
regard to it; but I must say, looking to the circumstances 
under which the question has been brou^t forward, .... the 
course that has been pursued has produced great distrust in 
this country and I believe it will produce great distrust 
all over Europe."
The Pranco-Sardinian understanding over Nice and Savoy 
was not the only instance of French secret diplomacy on 
Italian questions to arouse Britain’s distrust in 1860. A few 
weeks before his famous pronouncement in the House of Commons, 
Russell had been startled to learn from Apponyi that Metternich
1. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series, CLVII, 1257.
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had had a written understanding with Walewski engaging
Austria and Prance to act together in the Congress that was
to have met at the beginning of the year. His amazement
was reflected in the three exclamation marks which accompanied
1
the private communication of this intelligence to Cowley,
"It is quite inconsistent with Walewski’s public professions
to us," he wrote, "and would have justified our declining
2
to join the Congress." Cowley found no difficulty in
obtaining confirmation of Apponyi*s assertion from Thouvenel,
who was none too well disposed to his predecessor. He learnt
that Russian importunities on behalf of the Duchess of larma
had induced the Emperor to offer to support the claims of
the Duke of Tuscany in the approaching Congress in return for
the acquiescence of Austria in the translation of the Duchess
to Modena. Austria had signified her agreement, and despatches
3
had then been exchanged between the two Governments, ' Yet
Cowley also learned "on pretty good authority" that it had 
/
been stipulated that the engagement could never be made use
of as a document binding the French Government. "^ //ho, " he
4
commented, "can understand such crooked ways?"
1, Russell to Cowley, private, 25th February 1860, (copy),
G. & D. 22/104.
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 28th February 1860, (copy),
G. & D. 22/104.
3, Cowley to Russell, private, 1st March 1860. G. & D. 22/54.
4. Cowley to Russell, private, 27th February I860,
G. & D. 22/64.
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In 1861, Britain's trust in France was still further 
diminished by what she regarded as another indication of secret 
French diplomacy. 'When France showed reluctance to withdraw 
her troops from Syria within the period of six months stipulated 
by the Convention of 5th September 1860, the British Government 
suspected that she had signed the Convention with secret 
and ulterior motives. Palmerston, in particular, was 
persuaded that this had been so. "It must be evident to any 
Looker-on" he wrote to Russell, "that the Emperor from the 
Beginning contemplated a Roman occupation of Syria, and the 
augmentation of his army in Syria •• This was from the 
beginning the understanding of the French expeditionary force 
and I well remember seeing in some of our Despatches that
1
the officers had been taking Houses for Two years and more."
This interpretation of Imperial policy was probably incorrect.
At all events, French troops withdrew from Syria after the 
period of their stay had been prolonged for three months by 
consent of the Porte and the European powers. Yet the 
construction which the British Government had placed on the 
French attempts to elude the stipulations of the Convention 
left a permanent influence on the British attitude towards 
France. "When the French proposal of a foreign occupation 
of Syria was mooted last year" Russell wrote privately at 
the beginning of 1861, "several of my colleagues objected
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 31st January 1861,
G. & D. 22/21.
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that the French would not keep their word. I said I could
not believe that they would break a solemn engagement. But
I am now ashamed of my credulity and will take care never
1
to believe any promise they may make however solemn." The 
eventual withdrawal of the French troops in accordance with 
the terms of a revised Convention may have done something to 
modify this resolve: but once shaken, confidence is not
easily restored.
Early in 1862, moreover, British confidence in France 
received a further shock. For the action of French agents in 
Mexico revealed plainly enough that France had put her 
signature to the Convention of October 1861 with very 
different intentions from those to which she had openly 
subscribed. Thus when Drouyn de Lhuys complained to Clarendon 
of the "unfounded mistrust" of France in England in August 
1863, Clarendon took the opportunity of reminding him "that 
a convention had been signed with us respecting Mexico with 
totally different intentions to those which were professed 
and which we were known to believe in. So that although our 
wish was always to remain on the best terms with France and 
as far as possible to act with her upon all the great questions 
that arose, yet that we found the utmost difficulty in doing 
so as we never knew what fresh project would crop up to the 
surface or what blame the French Government would endeavour
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 12th January 1861, (copy),
G. & D. 22/104.
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to attach to us for not following them wherever they chose
to lead." Reporting the conversation to Russell, Clarendon
wrote that his rejoinder had been made "v/ithout warmth and as
1
a simple statement of facts" and that it had "shut him up."
Later in 1862, Britain was again confronted by evidence 
of secret action by France. A series of petty disputes 
between the Serbs and the Turkish garrison in Belgrade 
culminated in the bombardment of the town by the citadel on 
June 17th. In the following month,representatives of the 
signatories of the Treaty of Paris assembled in conference 
at Constantinople to enquire into the cause of the collision 
and to suggest means of preventing a repetition of it. No 
sooner had the first meeting taken place than it was revealed 
that a Franco-Russian protocol had been signed in Paris. The 
disclosure was made in St. Petersburg, and apparently by 
accident. During an interview with the Belgian Minister, 
Gortchakov asked Jomini to read out the latest telegram that 
had been received from Constantinople. This he did as far 
as the sentence 'M. Moustier has shown me the Protocol signed 
at Paris', whereupon Gortchakov snatched the paper out of 
his hand, locked it up in the drawer of the table at which 
he was sitting, and looked "so confused" that the Belgian 
Minister felt obliged to refrain from questioning him about it.
1. Clarendon to Russell, private, 31st August, 1863,
G. Sc D. 22/29.
2. Lumley to Russell, No.28, confidential, 29th July 1862,
FO 65/605.
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He directed his enquiries instead to the British charge
d ’affaires: and it was in this way that news of the protocol
filtered through to the British Government, On receiving a
telegraphic report of the incident from Ht, Petersburg,
Russell wired immediately to Paris for explanations, Cowley
sought out Rouher, then temporarily in charge of the Foreign
Office, mentioned the information which had been received by
the British Government, and asked whether or not it was
correct. The object of the conferences in Constantinople,
the Ambassador observed, "would be completely vitiated if two
of the Powers engaged in .. [them] .. had come to a previous
1
understanding as to the course they should follow," Rouher
declared he had no knowledge of such an agreement. He stated
his belief that none existed. But the British Government,
seriously alarmed, were not to be satisfied with the personal
opinion of a temporary official. They sent a formal despatch
to Cowley, which he was privately instructed to read to
2
Thouvenel "in French if possible", demonstrating very clearly 
the distrust of French policy that had been roused by news 
of the protocol. Appealing for strict adherence to the 
Treaty of Paris, the despatch made a special plea for greater
1, Cowley to Russell, No.955, 5th August 1862, FO 27/1443,
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 7th August 1862, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
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frankness in French dealings with Britain. "It is desirable 
for the prosperity of Great Britain and France, and for the 
peace of the world" it ran, "that those two countries should 
act in the same direction and guide their separate policy 
in such a manner as not to give rise to any ill will or mis­
understanding between them. This is to be effected not 
indeed by always following the same course, which from the 
different character of the two nations is impracticable, but 
by mutual confidence,, openness, and a desire to help each
other in maintaining peace, promoting commerce, and favouring
1
the progress of civilisation."
Thouvenel's immediate reaction to this communication
2
was to deny the existence of a Franco-Russian protocol. He 
told Cowley that he would reply to the British despatch by 
stating that no separate engagement had been concluded between 
France and Russia on the question of Hervia and that the 
Emperor and his Government looked to the Treaty of 1856 as 
the basis of their Eastern policy. But Cowley felt he had 
played the hypocrite long enough in swallowing the French 
denials. Dropping all reserve with the Foreign Minister, he 
stated that he could almost say he knew of the existence of 
a protocol. This provoked the unusually frank admission
1. Russell to Cowley, No.821, 7th August 1862, FO 27/1426.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.963, 8th August 1862, FO 27/1443.
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that "[a] negative in Diplomatic language carried little
weight with it." "if I denied the existence of a protocol,"
Thouvenel was reported to have said, "you would not believe
me. It is better, therefore, to leave this matter untouched.
What I affirm to you upon my honour is that there exists no
tie or obligation between the French and Russian Governments
1
at variance with the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856."
Thus did Cowley succeed in drawing "Thouvenel's protocol 
2
tooth." Russell expressed his satisfaction that "Your
Excellency’s plain and straightforward mode of dealing with
M. Thouvenel has elicited from him a more candid avowal
than he had hitherto made. But it is not satisfactory"
he wrote "to know that the existence of this Protocol was at
first positively denied by M. Thouvenel. It is not satisfactory*
he reiterated "to find that two of the Powers in the
Conference at Constantinople of the greatest weight and
influence are bound by ties and engagements unknown to the 
3
other Powers." He did not doubt that the protocol would
1. Cowley to Russell, No,984, 14th August 1862, FO 27/1444.
2. Cowley to Russell, private, 14th August 1862, G. & D. 22/58.
Professor Riker, on the basis of material in the French 
archives, has revealed that the protocol was "an agreement 
on the part of the two governments to co-operate at the 
Conference of Constantinople in reducing the menace of 
the Turkish occupation of Servia and in seeking to have 
Turkish residents of that country placed under Servian 
jurisdiction." Vide T.W. Riker, The Making of Roumania. 
[1931], 382 note.




turn out to be "a very little baby." But as the British
charge d ’affaires wrote from St. Petersburg, the conclusion
of a secret agreement was calculated to create "mistrust
2
if not uneasiness."
In 1863, the British Government had grounds for
3
suspecting France of a further "act of disingenuousness":
and this at a time when the two powers were ostensibly
acting in the closest association. Again the source of
information was the British Embassy at St, Petersburg.
Shortly after the presentation of the Austrian, British and
French notes on the subject of Poland, Napier telegraphed that
Drouyn de lhuys had sent a confidential letter to the French
Ambassador in which he spoke "apologisingly of the combined
remonstrance ... referring it to pressure on the part of 
4
England." Cowley was unable to conceal the surprise 
with which he leamt of this "extraordinary" proceeding of 
Drouyn de Lhuys. Experience had taught him that "the dealings 
of the French foreign department with its agents abroad are 
not always in strict conformity with the language held by 
the Head of the Department in Paris." Sven so, the assertions
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 29th August 1862, (copy),
G. & D. 22/105.
2. Lumley to Russell, No.112, confidential, 16th September
1862, FO 65/607.
3. Napier to Russell, No.277, most confidential, 26th April
1863, FO 65/630.
4. Napier to Russell, No.267, telegram 9.45 p.m., 24th
April 1863, FO 65/630.
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attributed to the Foreign Minister were so directly contrary 
to the facts as well as to the language he had been holding 
at Paris, that Cowley was inclined to doubt the accuracy of 
Napier's information. If it were substantiated, however,
Cowley indicated the inevitable consequence: that confidence
1
in the French Minister's statements must be "much diminished."
It does not seem that the British Government were
ever able to ascertain the facts of the case. But when
Napier extended his telegram in an official despatch he
stated that although he had been unable to procure a copy
of the letter from Drouyn de Lhuys, he had had it in his hands
and had actually read it. "[T]he general effect left on
the mind of any dispassionate person after a perusal of the
letter" he wrote "would in my judgment be that the object
of the writer was to excuse his course of action and to
2
throw the blame of it on another." Thus although Cowley 
was unable to confirm Napier's information, the evidence on 
which it was based was too well authenticated for it to be 
entirely disregarded.
In 1864 and 1865, the last two years of the administration, 
Britain again had cause to suspect that France was acting 
secretly in contradiction to her professions. At the beginning
1. Cowley to Russell, No.498, confidential, 28th April 1863,
FO 27/1490.
2. Napier to Russell, No.277, most confidential, 26th April
1863, FO 65/630.
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of 1864, with war imminent between Denmark and the German
powers, Cowley's reports left the British Government in
little doubt that France was secretly undermining the British
1
peace efforts she affected to support. Similarly, towards
the end of 1864, and subsequently in 1865, the British
Government were no less convinced that France was secretly
countenancing the interference of her agent in Tunis whilst
2
openly professing to censure and deplore it. Palmerston
was particularly indignant about the French proceedings in
Tunis. He regarded the '%ole Matter" as "a Juggle between
the Emperor, Drouyn and Beauval." "It is difficult to
believe" he wrote to Russell, "that if Drouyn had really sent
Beauval the Directions and Reproofs which he told us he had
sent, Beauval would have continued to act as he did, unless
those ostensible Instructions were accompanied by others of
a contrary kind or unless he (Beauval) had private Instructions
3
from the Emperor himself ..." In his view the incident
tended "to lower one's opinion of French Honesty and to
3
destroy Confidence in French assurances." This he represented 
to the French Government through their Ambassador. "I told 
La Tour the other day" he informed Russell in February 1865,
1. c.f. Supra p.89.
2. c.f. Supra pp.136-7.
3. Palmerston to Russell, private, 15th December 1864,
G. & D. 22/15.
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"that the whole of that affair [i.e. Tunis] was calculated
1
to destroy Confidence in the French Government."
Not a year passed, therefore, without prominent British 
statesmen and diplomats testifying to their waning confidence 
in France on account of some secret action which they suspected 
or discovered to he contrary to British interests. But it 
was not only in their commentaries on French secret diplomacy 
that they revealed their deepening distrust. It was also in 
their actions, in their conduct of both foreign and domestic 
policy.
In the sphere of foreign politics, the British
Government revealed their uncertainty about French intentions
by an acknowledged policy of "restraining France by the
2
shackles of diplomatic Trammels." This policy was directly
inspired by the French annexation of Nice and Savoy and
first applied in the Syrian question. Thus when the French
Government proposed the despatch of foreign troops to the
Lebanon, Britain made her consent conditional upon the
conclusion of a Convention between the Porte and the Great 
3
Powers. She asked in addition for the signature of a 
protocol on the lines of the earlier one of 17th September
1. Palmerston to Russell, private, 14th February 1865,
G. & D. 22/15.
2. Palmerston to Russell, private, 8th February 1861,
G. & D. 22/21.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.710, 19th July 1860, FO 27/1326.
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1840, declaring that the Powers sought no separate advantage
by their intervention in Syria. The policy of control by
'diplomatic Trammels' was still more apparent when France
sought to prolong the period of her occupation. The
conditions upon which the British Government were prepared
to agree to an extension of three months in the stay of
the French troops were stated in terms which were as offensive
as they were explicit. "I have to instruct you .. to be
prepared to accede to the proposal of the French Government”
ran the official despatch to Cowley "provided it is expressed
in the clear and precise terms which are contained in the
draft of Convention transmitted as an enclosure in this
despatch and 'provided that by no condition direct or
indirect expressed or implied is it to be agreed to or
understood to be agreed to that the fulfilment of the positive
engagement that the evacuation is to be completed by the 5th
June is to depend upon anything other than a faithful and
2
honorable execution of the words of the Convention.'”
Nor was it for want of precautions in defining the 
scope of the combined operations against Mexico that the 
British Government were outwitted by France. Indeed, the
1. Russell to Cowley, No.725, confidential, 23rd July 1860,
FO 27/1327.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.274, 7th March 1861, FO 27/1373.
The passage in parentheses was inserted by Palmerston 
in his own hand.
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project had no sooner been broached, than the British
Government stated their opinion that if such operations were
to take place, the participating powers should declare that
they did not seek "any augmentation of territory or any
special advantage" and that they would "not endeavour to
1
interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico..." Subsequently
they insisted upon the functions of the expedition being
consigned to a Convention in which "[i]t must be provided ...
that the forces of the contending parties will not be employed
2
for any ulterior object ..."
Distrust of France, and uncertainty about her intentions
were again apparent in the way in which the British Government
endeavoured to fetter the freedom of French action in
questions arising from the Greek Revolution in 1862. Shortly
after the flight of King Otho, and the establishment of a
provisional government at Patras, the British Government took
the precaution of reminding both France and Russia of the self-
denying clause they had signed in the Treaty of 6th July 1827.
"In any negotiations on the subject of Greece" the despatch
ran "the letter and the spirit of this Article must be kept
3
constantly in view." The British policy of imposing
1. Russell to Cowley, No.1 0 2 3 , 27th September 1861, FO 27/1380.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.1049, 5th October 1861, PO 27/1380.
3. Russell to Cowley, No.1090, confidential, 1st November 1862,
FO 27/1429.
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restraint upon France was carried a stage further by Cowley.
In conversation with. Drouyn de Lhuys, he suggested that the
three powers should make a joint declaration to the provisional
government of Greece to the effect that in electing a new
Sovereign, the engagements contracted between the protecting
1
powers should be scrupulously observed. Russell took up
the idea in an official despatch three days later. ".. Her
Majesty's Government consider it of importance" he wrote "that
the views which the three Protecting Powers take of the
obligations of the Protocols to which they are Parties touching
the election to the Throne of Greece of any Prince selected
from among the Princes forming part of the Families reigning
in the States which signed the Treaty of 1827 should be made
known at Athens without delay through their respective
2
Ministers in Greece." Provided France and Russia were
willing to do likewise the British Government were prepared
"to instruct Her Majesty's Minister at Athens to declare that
Great Britain will not consent ... to the throne of Greece
2
being assumed by such a Prince." Cowley was instructed to 
press for an early decision from the French Government. But 
the Emperor did not care to be bound in so positive a manner.
1# Cowley to Russell, No.1271,- 14th November 1862, FO 27/1447.
2. Russell to Cowley, No.1134, 17th November 1862, FO 27/1429.
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He expressed adherence to the engagements that had been
contracted by the protocol of 3rd February 1860, but declined
to make known at Athens that he would refuse his consent to
the throne of Greece being assumed by a Prince from the royal
family of one of the three protecting powers, if such a Prince
1
proved to be the spontaneous choice of the Greek nation.
Finally the British Government devised potential
"diplomatic Trammels" to meet the contingency of French
military intervention in the Polish and Schleswig-Holstein
questions. These embryo fetters figure only in Russell's
private correspondence. But both were a direct consequence
of experience of French secret diplomacy in the Italian
question. At a crucial stage in the Polish negotiations,
Russell wrote privately to Cowley that "[i]f the French were
to go to war alone for Poland and begin as they probably
would on the Rhine, we should not, I hope, repeat the blunder
which Derby made in 1869 - We should, I hope, bind the French
down strictly not to add to their European possessions on
account of the "idea" of helping Poland as they helped Italy 
2
and themselves.” He was no less determined to %ind the 
French down strictly" at an equally crucial stage in the
1. Cowley to Russell, No.1308, 21st November 1862,
FO 27/1477.
2. Russell to Cowley, private, 27th June 1863, (copy),
G. & D, 22/105.
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Schleswig-Holstein question. "In case the Emperor should
ever quit his pacific attitude" he wrote privately in June
1864, "there are two things to be borne in mind whether we go
with him or remain neutral. 1, There ought to be renewed
assurances in case the Rheno-Prussian provinces are attacked
that Belgium shall be left independent and neutral. 2. In
case Italy is assisted we cannot consent that any part of
the Italian continent or islands such as Sicily or Sardinia
1
shall be separated from Italy."
It was not only the French propensity for secret 
diplomacy, of course, which prompted Britain to pursue this 
policy of attempting to set diplomatic limits on French action. 
It was partly a conviction that French interests, both in the 
Mediterranean and northern Europe were opposed to her own; 
partly the knowledge that France had made one addition to 
her territory in the direction of the Alps and might well 
make another in the direction of the Rhine. Yet the very 
secrecy of French diplomacy did much to convince Britain that 
French interests conflicted with her own and also that French 
intentions were aggressive. It reinforced her suspicions 
of France and accentuated the need for adopting measures of 
precaution.
Similarly with the other manifestation of Britain's 
distrust - the unprecedented scale of her armament and defence 
programme in time of peace. It was not solely attributable
1, Russell to Cowley, private, 30th June 1864, (copy),
G. & D. 22/106.
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to the secrecy of French diplomacy, yet it was considerably 
influenced by it. At the opening of the period, Britain's 
military and naval estimates stood at a total of over £26,000,00Q 
Leaving out of account the estimated expenditure on the Chinese 
War, they showed an increase in the following year, then a 
slight but gradual decrease. Transition in the character 
of naval construction was largely responsible for this 
unparalleled peacetime expenditure. The introduction 
of the screw in place of the paddle, and the substitution of 
iron for wood were innovations that were being incorporated 
in the French navy more rapidly than in the British. In 1859,
Britain no longer enjoyed the relative naval superiority to !
1
France which it was her established principle to maintain.
!
1, Russell referred to this principle when Persigny came to 
inform him at the end of July 1859 that the Emperor had 
resolved to place his forces by land and sea on a peace I
footing. "Her Majesty's Government received this announce- j
ment" he told the French Ambassador, "in the spirit in which 
it was made, namely as affording a proof of the Emperor's 
desire to be at peace in Europe. If anything more precise '
and detailed were attempted it must fail. Great Britain .. 
was a great maritime Power and must continue to be so. In 
1817, when this country had no reason to fear any enemy.
Lord Castlereagh had declared that we ought to have a 
naval force equal to that of any two of the Maritime Powers 
of Europe. This basis was assented to by the nation, and 
for many years we had acted upon it. Latterly, however, 
new machinery, the employment of Steam Power and its 
application to Screw line of Battle Ships had made our old 
reserve of Ships of war unavailing. We had therefore 
begun and should continue to construct Ships and to raise 
seamen so as to place our navy in the same proportion of 
relative force to those of other Powers as in 1817 it was 
decided that it ought to bear."
Russell to Cowley, No.197, 30th July 1859, FO 27/1284.
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Indeed, British naval power stood in danger of falling below
that of France. Thus it was that the French Colonels'
demonstration against England at the time of the Orsini plot
gave rise to panic of invasion in England. Thus, too, that
Derby bequeathed a legacy of swollen service estimates to the
liberals and the nucleus of a local volunteer force. But it
was not only the mounting strength of the French navy which
determined the Liberals to press on with these defensive
arrangements. It was also a general uncertainty about French
intentions for which the secrecy of French diplomacy was
largely responsible. The knowledge of a secret understanding
between France and Russia at the beginning of the period gave
impetus to the task of raising Britain's naval strength to a
1
two power standard. Subsequent instances of secret action 
by France all conspired to place a premium on ade.quate defence.
1. "We cannot disarm here" Russell wrote privately to Cowley 
on 28th July 1859, "for our Navy is not yet in proper 
relative proportions to France and Russia."
Russell to Cowley, private, 28th July 1859, (copy),
G. & D. 22/103.
The influence of the Franco-Russian understanding on the 
British naval programme is again apparent from a letter 
of Palmerston's. "Considering the strength of the Navy 
of,France" he wrote on 30th September, "and the certain 
Reconstruction of a Fleet of some 27 or 30 line of Battle 
Ships at Cronstadt, we ought steadily to go on adding 
to our Ships of War of all Classes for 3 or 4 Years to 
come."
Palmerston to Russell, private, 30th September, 1859,
G. & D. 22/20.
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Without reading in the French archives, it is impossible
to judge the extent to which the French attitude towards
Britain was similarly affected by evidence of British reserve
towards France. From the British archives and published
sources it would seem that France rarely complained of the
secrecy of British action. There were occasions on which
the French Foreign Minister revealed suspicions to Cowley
of the existence of a secret understanding between Britain
and other powers directed against France. But this was more
of a tu quoque. When the British Ambassador was enquiring
about the existence of a secret Franco-Russian protocol,
Thouvenel rejoined that "he had as much right to suspect some
secret understanding between Her Majesty's and the Austrian 
1
Governments." Similarly in 1863, when Drouyn de Lhuys was
aware that Britain suspected him of having taken steps to
excuse French participation in the combined remonstrance
against Russia, he mentioned to Cowley reports which had reached
him - ".. very detailed ... and from various quarters.." - of
an understanding between the British, Austrian and Russian
2
Governments against France.
Nor is it possible to deduce very much about the
confidence which France was disposed to place in the British
Government from France's actions. She made no attempt to
1. Cowley to Russell, No.996, 15th August 1862, FO 27/1444.
2. Cowley to Russell, No.512, confidential, 1st May 1863,
FO 27/1490.
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introduce restrictive clauses into instruments of cooperation
with Britain. And so far as the high level of her expenditure
on armaments was concerned, it is probably fair to assume
that this was dictated as much by the military character of
the Imperial regime as by fear of Britain; and that fear
of Britain was the fear of attack provoked by French aggression,
In fact, it would seem that Britain was extremely
reluctant to resort to secret diplomacy. She did so only
in exceptional circumstances. The only notable instance in
which she acted secretly against France in this period was
when she entered into secret agreements with Austria and
1
Prussia after the annexation of Nice and Savoy. But these 
agreements were essentially defensive compacts, and cut 
across no legitimate interests of France. But the fact that 
Britain so rarely employed secret diplomacy against France 
does not mean that France was not convinced of the contrary.
And such conviction may well have diminished her trust in 
Britain.
A study of the British archives, therefore, leads to 
the conclusion that the Anglo-French 'alliance* was much 
weakened by the secret diplomacy of France. Throughout this 
period, Britain was repeatedly confronted by evidence of 
secret action by France; evidence of how little she knew of
1. Supra pp.41-2.
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the real intentions and policy of France; evidence of how
readily France would depart from the spirit of the western
'alliance'0 This provoked distrust which was revealed
publicly as well as in private. Public expressions of
British distrust - whether in speech or action - then roused
irritation in France and ill-feeling between the two countries.
Thus the secret diplomacy of France operated a vicious circle
which played its part in destroying the cordiality of their
association and preventing the 'alliance' from being, in
1
Derby's words, "anything real and satisfactory."
1. Supra p.155.
CONCLUSION
.... "The fact is that in our alliance with France we
are riding a runaway horse, and must always be on our guard;
but a runaway horse is best kept in by a light hand and an
easy snaffle. It is fortunate for us that we are thus mounted
instead of being on foot to be kicked at by this same steed;
and as our ally finds the alliance useful to himself, it will
probably go on for a good time to come ...." {Palmerston,
1
1867).
In 1865, the fiftieth anniversary of the battle of 
Waterloo, England was not only at peace with France but still 
in nominal alliance with her. Yet the 'alliance' had long 
ceased to be an effective instrument of diplomacy; at no time 
between 1859 and 1865 did Britain feel able to place that 
reliance upon France which was a necessary condition of any 
forceful cooperation. She suspected France of desiring to 
undermine her position in the Mediterranean; also of seeking 
to extend the French frontier at the expense of arrangements 
designed to secure the safety of her own shores. These fears 
were traditional. They were enhanced at 'this time by the
1. E. Ashley, The Life of Henry John Temple. Viscount
Palmerston. 1846-186'^ [1876 ], II, 127. Palmers ton 
to Clarendon, 29th September 1857.
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unique combination of circumstances which placed a Bonaparte
on the throne of Prance with arbitrary control over formidable
military, and mounting naval resources. They were still
further accentuated by the character of the principles behind
Imperial policy and by the Emperor's leaning towards secret
diplomacy. All these factors conspired to produce a fixed
distrust of France in Britain, even without the additional
circumstance of rivalry overseas. Indeed, it was this
distrust which was the dominant characteristic of Britain's
approach to her relationship with France between 1859 and
1865. At the opening of the period it was veiled by the
circumstances in which the Liberals came into power. It was
gradually uncovered in the autumn of 1859 and reached a climax
with the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in the following
year. Thereafter it persisted as a constant background to
the improved relationship of the two powers, colouring the
whole tone of their association. It caused Britain to insist
1
upon what Russell called a "jog trot pace" in her cooperation 
with France and this proved irksome and irritating to the 
French steed. So that a rider on a runaway horse was no 
less apt a description of Britain's relations with France
1. Russell to Cowley, private, 3rd December 1863, (copy), 
G. & D. 22/105.
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In Palmerston’s second administration than it had been 
in his first. And such a precarious combination was clearly 
no match for the singleness of purpose behind Prussian 
diplomacy.
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